ASK THE RABBI

While all agree that semichat geula l’tefilla (connecting the beracha of “Ga’al Yisrael” to Shemoneh Esrei) is important at Shacharit, not all agree regarding Ma’ariv (see Berachot 9b). Since the conclusion is that it does apply at Ma’ariv, one may not talk before Shemoneh Esrei of Ma’ariv (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 236:2).

Nevertheless, the Rashba (Shut I, 293) justified a minhag to call out “Rosh Chodesh” before Shemoneh Esrei at night. He reasons that talking for the needs of tefilla is not considered a hefsek and that the fact that Ma’ariv is an optional prayer reduces the severity of such a break. Indeed we rule that pertinent announcements are permitted at Ma’ariv (Shulchan Aruch ibid.), but not at Shacharit (Taz, OC 114:2).

The Maharashal (see Bach, OC 236) disagrees with the Rashba. He argues that the only speech permitted between geula and tefilla is reciting things instituted by the Rabbis (such as Hashkiveinu and Baruch Hashem L’Olam). He posits that Ma’ariv is no longer optional because Klal Yisrael accepted it as binding, and that in any case, in the midst of tefilla, even if it were optional, one may not make a break. The Mishna Berura is among those who bring no dissenters on the Shulchan Aruch’s permission to announce YVY at Ma’ariv, and this is the standard approach presented by contemporary Ashkenazi tefilla compendiums (see Ishei Yisrael 28:24; Tefilla K’hilchata 19:20).

Some poskim, though, cite minhagim which do not permit calling out “YVY.” The K’tzot Hashulchan (27:5) cites the Ba’al Hatanya’s siddur as forbidding it; the Kaf Hachayim (OC 236:17) says that the minhag in Yerushalayim was against it, and the Yalkut Yosef (OC 422:2) rules this way. One explanation (see Kaf Hachayim ibid.) of these counter minhagim is that they are concerned that the Maharashal, not the Rashba, is right. It is perhaps more likely that it is a shame to allow speaking when there are effective, preferable alternatives.

As you mentioned, many suffice with simple banging, as in many shuls everyone understands what they are hinting at. Producing sounds, like other forms of non-speech hints, is not a hefsek in davening except for in Shemoneh Esrei and the first parasha of Kri’at Shema (Shulchan Aruch, OC 653:6; Mishna Berura 104:1). It is likely that the minhag of banging developed not as a rejection of the possibility of announcing, but out of a realization that, in some shuls, it is unnecessary.

Another alternative (see Magen Avraham 114:2, in a related context; Kaf Hachayim ibid.) is for one who gets up to YVY in Shemoneh Esrei to remind others by saying those words out loud. While one generally should not daven Shemoneh Esrei out loud, it is permitted for one davening at home when there is a reason for it (Shulchan Aruch, OC 101:2). In shul we are concerned that this will disturb others (ibid.). However, it is hard to have such an objection when one person is saying two words to help the tzibbur. An advantage of this system is that the reminder comes closer to the time people recite YVY, and is in that way more effective. Do note that some consider saying words of Shemoneh Esrei out loud to be disrespectful (see opinions in Dirshu 422:2), at least if not done by someone appropriate like a gabbai or the chazan (Halichot Shlomo, Mo’adim p. 1). There is often a technical problem – if the one saying out loud does not start early or daven faster than others, many will get to YVY before him.

In summary, there are three legitimate ways to remind people to recite YVY, each with advantages and disadvantages, some of which depend on the shul (e.g., if people understand the bang). Since people have seen each system, many shuls develop a hodgepodge of practices, which is neither great nor terrible. If the rav has not set a policy, any alternative is fine.

The basis of the idea of the rights of a matzran (adjacent neighbor) to acquire real estate before others is a Rabbinic rule that exceeds the letter of the law but is a matter of “hayashar v’hatov” (straight and good) (Bava Metzia 108a). It is based on a general assumption that a neighbor gains more by obtaining the property than someone else, and we therefore expect the other to buy elsewhere (see Rashi ad loc.). It is not surprising that various opinions limit the scope of this novel extra-judicial halacha, especially when the logic in a given case differs from that of the gemara’s classic case.

Rabbeinu Tam (see Tosafot, Bava Metzia 108b) posits that bar metzra applies only to agricultural fields, where the ability to connect and work the fields together is valuable, not to houses. (The Rosh, Bava Metzia 9:34 makes other distinctions.) We do not accept this opinion (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 175:53). However, it is apparently not because we reject the concept that the logic has to apply, but that we reject the premise that an adjacent homeowner does not have significant reasons to benefit more (see Bi’ur Hagra ad loc.).

The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 59) rules that the laws of bar metzra do not apply when one has rented out his land which his neighbor wants to rent, but only when he sells. Thus, your point that you and your buyer are/will be leasing from the Jewish Agency is cogent. However, a few contemporary piskei din (including one I co-authored) posit that since on practical grounds you bought your home and plan to sell it, the laws of bar metzra apply despite the formality that it is officially a long-term lease.

Regarding who is a bar metzra, poskim are also relatively practical. While bar metzra rules apply to adjacent single-family homes, that is because they can be “attached” for some joint usage (see Taz to CM 175:53; Pitchei Choshen, Matzranut 11:(61)). The Pitchei Choshen (ibid.) raises the importance of people within a building, even if their apartments are not adjacent, sharing stairways. In most cases, an apartment within one building cannot be “attached” to an apartment in another building. It is hard to determine without studying the layout and municipal rules of your situation whether your adjacent neighbor from a different building might have bar metzra rights; we assume that the owner of the other half of your building does.

Your personal responsibility to see to this matter is tricky. A seller does not have a halachic obligation per se to ask permission of neighbors, as the halacha focuses on the neighbor’s ability to claim the right to obtain the real estate from the buyer after his valid sale (see S’ma 175:7). Although the neighbor can protest before or after the sale, it does not seem that the seller must seek anyone out, and this is also common practice when one does not know of such interest.

The gemara (Pesachim 105a) says that one who is eating as Shabbat enters must interrupt his eating to recite Kiddush. It suggests that similarly one who is eating as Shabbat ends would have to interrupt the meal for Havdala. However, the gemara concludes that Havdala does not interrupt eating; it only interrupts drinking. Rashi explains that continuing the meal one started on Shabbat actually honors Shabbat. Since drinking is not considered a kavua (set, important) form of eating, there is nothing significant to continue. Furthermore, starting to eat when one should be making (or soon making) Havdala is a severe matter.

This gemara is the basis for the halacha that one who starts seuda shlishit before shki’a may continue freely (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 299:1). (The Shulchan Aruch ibid. mentions a minority opinion that once the time for Havdala has actually come, one must stop in any case; this is not accepted.)

May one continue when he has started eating but it is not a classic Shabbat meal, which must begin with bread and end with Birkat Hamazon (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 188:6-7)? The K’tzot Hashulchan (94, BHS 3) says that anything less than a proper meal is not the type of eating that allows one to continue. The Aruch Hashulchan (OC 299:5) adds that the fact that one did not wash and have bread shows that he did not consider it important enough. The Shevet Halevi (VIII, 36) seems to disagree, positing that any food that one eats in order to fulfill the mitzva of seuda shlishit has importance, and that status determines the matter of continuing. Rav Abba Shaul (Ohr L’Tzion II, 22:8) is lenient if one ate cake since eating a lot of cake constitutes a full meal regarding Birkat Hamazon. The Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (59:(47)) cites Rav S.Z. Auerbach as being unsure about this matter, but rules stringently even for one who was eating cake.

It is not clear to what extent all the above opinions disagree and how far each opinion goes, as we will explain. There are different opinions found in the Shulchan Aruch (OC 291:5) as to what one must eat for seuda shlishit. While the main opinion requires a bread meal, there are others: a mezonot food; meal-like foods; even fruit. It is possible that some of those who do not count cake were working with the assumption that this does not suffice for seuda shlishit, and cake lacks importance on its own merits. If you accept the opinion that it works for seuda shlishit, it is not unreasonable that it does for continuing as well. It is also possible that in contemporary society, in which many people rarely eat bread, other serious eating would also count. We would expect a consensus (it is not widely discussed) that a gluten intolerant person in the middle of an otherwise normal seuda shlishit would be able to continue. The idea that no bread is a sign of not having a set meal does not apply in these cases.

In the other direction, perhaps the Shevet Halevi allows continuing eating only the main food with which you want to fulfill the mitzva. This likely includes all the intended non-Mezonot food and drink to go along with the Mezonot food of a breadless meal. However, if one intends to fulfill the mitzva with cake more or less alone and then, for example, when a nice desert is served, one decides to have that too, it is likely not included. Thus, it is difficult to answer your question, as it lumps many possible scenarios together, and each has its own opinions and nuances.

We have good news and bad news. The bad news is that we were not able to find any classical or semi-classical sources that there is a mitzva for every 4 amot one walks in Israel. The good news is that there are bigger and better ways to get that effect, which those of us who live here do naturally. On to the sources!

The gemara (end of Ketubot) attributes many wonderful benefits to Eretz Yisrael. One who lives there “dwells without sin” (Ketubot 111a). Being buried there is like “being buried under the altar” (ibid.). Rabbi Yochanan adds: “Whoever walks 4 amot in Eretz Yisrael is assured to be one who receives the World to Come.” Thus, walking in Eretz Yisrael has a powerful spiritual merit!

The Rambam (Melachim 5:11) paraphrases this gemara. However, his language indicates that this source may not be relevant to your question. The Rambam starts with the great merit of living in Eretz Yisrael and then continues: “… even if one walked in it 4 amot, he will merit the World to Come.” Thus, someone who lived in chutz la’aretz, took one trip to Israel, landed at Ben Gurion, walked a few steps, and took the next plane out gets this merit. He presents it as (obviously) a (significantly) lower fulfillment of connection to the Land than living there. The question is: if one is living in Israel and meriting extreme spiritual benefits (and has already walked hundreds of thousands of amot), does he get an additional mitzva for walking another four?

HaRav Yehuda Shaviv (Techumin (XXIII, p.)) and HaRav Shlomo Aviner (cited in Shut Eretz Yisrael, 44) assume that a tiyul in Eretz Yisrael is a matter of mitzva and between them cite a few sources: the above gemara/Rambam; a letter by HaRav Tzvi Yehuda Kook; and Mishneh Halachot (III:189). The latter source is dealing with a different question. Is it a mitzva for a ben chutz la’aretz to visit Israel? Some prominent sources posit it is not. The Maharit (II:28) says that if one made a neder to visit Eretz Yisrael, it can be nullified according to the rules for a non-mitzva vow, for there is a mitzva to live in Eretz Yisrael, not to visit it. Also, one is allowed to embark on a voyage by sea on Friday only for a mitzva, and there is a difference of opinions if visiting Eretz Yisrael counts (see Magen Avraham 248:15; Mishna Berura 248:28). The mainstream opinion to reconcile the “non-mitzva” sources with the gemara granting importance to even a “4 amot visit” is that it is not a mitzva per se, but it is nonetheless very worthwhile.

So there is a great spiritual jump when one who had no physical connection came and walked in the Land. But there are two ways to learn the gemara regarding one who already has a great connection by living in Israel (or, to a lesser degree, being in the midst of an extended stay). It is possible that walking more furthers it (1000+1>1000). The other approach is that 0 to 1 is a great jump, but that for one who lives every (or most) breathing moment of his life in Israel (and hopefully contributes to its flourishing), caring about a few more steps is missing the point. (Compare to one who wins a huge lottery and cares about the cents at the end of the multi-digit number.) While one can argue that approach #1 is correct, it is hard to claim that the gemara proves it.

Even according to approach #2, traveling in the Land is significant. Appreciating Eretz Yisrael is important (see Ketubot 111a-b) and may even be connected to the mitzva to live in it (Eretz Hemdah I,1). Seeing sacred, beautiful, … parts of the country promotes appreciation, and the more, the better. This is what Rav Tzvi Yehuda and others refer to. But it should make no difference if this enhanced connection/appreciation came on foot, by car, by going somewhere new, repeating an old visit, or thanking Hashem for Israel when you go to bed. The sources do not seem to indicate that walking per se is a mitzva.

Much of the material on this topic concerns a statement by the Magen Avraham (19:1). He wonders why no beracha is made when one attaches tzitzit to a relevant garment (i.e., because the mitzva is not complete until one wears the garment), and yet there is a beracha when one attaches a mezuza to a doorpost (i.e., even though the mitzva is living in such a house). His answer is technical – one normally attaches mezuzot when he starts living there, so that he does fulfill the mitzva at that time, whereas one normally attaches the tzitzit before he wears them. So the Magen Avraham assumes that the mitzva is to live in a house that has mezuzot, not to attach the mezuzot to the doorposts. In fact, he says that if one put up the mezuzot before the obligation began, he would recite a beracha of “… commanded us to live in a house that has a mezuza” upon entering the house to live.

One of his indications is the idea that mezuza is “an obligation of the dweller” (Pesachim 4a), in other words that the mitzva is linked not to home ownership but only to living in it, i.e., in a house with mezuzot. R. Akiva Eiger (Shut I:9) apparently agrees, at least mainly, with the Magen Avraham (see Pitchei Teshuva, Yoreh Deah 291:4). He suggests that one who moves to a place where a previous occupant put a mezuza would make a beracha upon entering, as would one who left his own place for a significant amount of time and then returned to it.

Many (strongly) disagree with the Magen Avraham, but this can be for more than one reason. Some object to the beracha’s wording, arguing that one cannot create a non-standard form of the beracha that is not mentioned by Chazal (Birkei Yosef, Orach Chayim 19:2). The Beit Shearim (YD 370) points out that the Magen Avraham is aware that one cannot make the regular beracha (… likvo’ah mezuza), which refers to the action of attaching. He agrees with the Magen Avraham that there is a mitzva fulfillment as long as one lives in the house with a mezuza but claims that the beracha was established for the action that begins the process. (There is much discussion, beyond our scope, among the poskim (see Yabia Omer, VIII, YD27) about the stage at which one can and should attach the mezuza, e.g., as he moves in? when the house is prepared to be lived in? after he moves in?) However, there is close to a consensus (Rav Kook in Da’at Kohen 182 is a notable exception) that, irrespective of the matter of the beracha, the ongoing state of living in a house with proper mezuzot is a or the primary fulfillment of the mitzva.

Therefore, one need not have regrets if he came into a house with pre-existing mezuzot. He has no need to act or make a beracha, just like he need not be disappointed if his house has relatively few doorposts that require mezuzot. Note that generally one who leaves a house in which he attached mezuzot should leave the mezuzot there (Bava Metzia 101b), and we do not find that this is unfortunate because it deprives the new occupant of an action/beracha. That being said, the Aruch Hashulchan (YD 291:2) does allow one who comes into a house with mezuzot to remove and have them checked, which according to some/in certain circumstances makes it proper to make a beracha upon returning them (see ibid. and Living the Halachic Process I, G-5). Yalkut Yosef (Mezuza 92) suggests this; his father (Yabia Omer ibid.) did so regarding a case where one forgot to make a beracha when attaching them.

Thinking about the mezuzot, like thinking about any mitzva, is a nice thing. Some people have the practice of kissing the mezuza to show affection for the mitzva/holy scroll. However, neither of them have anything to do with the fulfillment of the mitzva.

At first glance, your question is answered directly by very basic sources. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 651:1, based on Sukka 33b) rules: “If they were not tied together before Yom Tov or [the knot] came apart, it is not possible to tie them with a full knot but rather with an aniva (bow knot).” The Rama (ad loc.) cites an alternative – to wrap the lulav leaf around the three species and then tuck its head underneath. However, we should discuss some other factors about the process, including how koysheklach, used by Ashkenazim, affect the situation.

One question is whether what you did is different and inferior to the normal situation. There is a machloket Tannaim whether there is a full halachic obligation of egged – to tie the minim together (Sukka 33a). According to the opinion that it is required, it must be a halachic knot, the type that is forbidden to make on Shabbat/Yom Tom (ibid. 33b). While we pasken like the opinion that egged is not fully required, it is still a mitzva to have them tied up – in order to “beautify” (=noy) the mitzva (ibid. 33a). The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) rules that this is normally to be done with a double knot. It is unclear if the Rama (ibid.), who gave the idea of wrapping and tucking, meant this only for when it is done on Yom Tov or it can even be done regularly (see Mishna Berura 651:11).

These opinions correspond to two approaches to what the gemara meant by rejecting the need for egged but urging some level of it due to noy. One approach is that the noy is in having the minim tied up together, the same way practically as egged, just that it is not as crucial. According to this, you ostensibly missed out by not being able to make a knot. The second approach is that there is a different criterion, which is aesthetic, and a halachic knot is not an independent value.

These approaches find expression in the machloket about koysheklach, which developed a few hundred years ago in Ashkenaz lands. There were some, including the Chatam Sofer (Sukka 36b), who say that noy in this context follows halachic grounds of egged, and therefore if the koysheklach are not wound firmly by a halachic knot, they are insufficient. Supporters of koysheklach respond in one of two ways: 1) Since egged is not needed, noy follows aesthetic criteria, according to which koysheklach exceed a simple double knot; 2) Koysheklach contain permanent intricate knots, and it makes no difference whether one tied a knot around the minim or whether the minim were slipped into an existing knot (or set thereof). (See more on the latter distinction in the Harerei Kedem notes to Mikraei Kodesh (Frank), Sukka II, p. 106-108). These questions also relate to the machloket about whether or not it makes a difference if the minim are bound together by one who is obligated in arba’a minim (see Mishna Berura 649:14).

According to the “practical” approach, what you did was fine, if you attached the koysheklach firmly to the lulav, preferably by wrapping or making a bow knot with a lulav leaf. According to the knot approach, what you did was only okay b’dieved.

Another issue is what to do if you did not remember to detach lulav leaves from the lulav before Yom Tov. Although muktzeh for the mitzva does not apply until the lulav has been used (see Mikraei Kodesh (Harari), Arba’a Minim 9:7), there is a machloket whether removing a leaf from a lulav to be used for this purpose is considered like making a kli (see ibid. 24). They certainly should not be cut to size or made into rings before attaching to the lulav on Yom Tov (ibid. 23, ftnt. 65; see Piskei Teshuvot 651:3). Realize that the more important connection is the one that holds the three minim together, whereas the two or three on the lulav are a later idea (Rama ibid.).  

We wrote (see Living the Halachic Process III, C-4) that there are two or three elements of tosefet Shabbat (adding on to Shabbat). 1) One should cease doing melacha before Shabbat begins; 2) If one accepts Shabbat earlier than required, (at least many elements of) Shabbat starts for him. 3) There (may be) a mitzva to actively accept Shabbat before it begins itself. We demonstrated that while some sources instruct one to actively accept Shabbat somewhat early (i.e., #3), the main opinions and the minhag (at least until relatively recently) are that one need not accept Shabbat orally or by action. It suffices to refrain from doing melacha before sunset. Since then, Orchot Shabbat vol. III came out. Its co-authors discuss the matter (pp. 92-94) and conclude that according to the clear majority of authorities, there is no need for an oral acceptance, although they recommend doing so in deference to minority opinions.

Is Yom Kippur any different in this regard? In some ways, tosefet is more important on Yom Kippur than on Shabbat. The gemara learns tosefet from the fact that the Torah (Vayikra 23:32) refers to the fast of Yom Kippur as being from the 9^th of the month in the evening, that it begins while it is still the 9^th (Yoma 81b). The Rambam omits tosefet in regard to Shabbat and mentions it only in regard to fasting, not melacha, on Yom Kippur (see Maggid Mishneh, Shvitat Asor 1:6). Nevertheless, the majority of Rishonim assume there is a mitzva from the Torah to refrain from melacha before Shabbat as well.

There are a few ways to accept Yom Kippur. (Ashkenazi) women generally accept an upcoming holy day by lighting candles (Rama, Orach Chayim 263:10). One may, for a good reason, stipulate orally or mentally when lighting the candles, that she does not want to accept Yom Kippur at this point (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 44:14). If she recites Shehecheyanu at that time, it is too strong an acknowledgment of Yom Kippur for her to stipulate (ibid.). A woman who is going to shul can say Shehecheyanu with the tzibbur instead of when lighting candles. (This has other advantages, which are beyond our scope). 

One complication with tosefet Yom Kippur is Kol Nidrei. As a rule one should not do hatarat nedarim on Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 228:3). The Rama indeed instructs us to do Kol Nidrei before Yom Kippur begins (OC 219:1), and we recite Shehecheyanu in shul only after that. But those of us who recite the beautiful prayer called Tefilla Zaka – before Kol Nidrei – have a problem because it includes a statement of accepting Yom Kippur. Actually, the Chayei Adam (II, 144:20) presents Tefilla Zaka as being done after Kol Nidrei, and some suggest leaving out the part of accepting Yom Kippur until later (see Ishei Yisrael 46:(35) in the name of Rav Chaim Kaniefsky). Besides conflicting with the normal practice, a technical problem is that Kol Nidrei is often not finished until right before or even after sunset.

Rav S.Z. Auerbach (cited in Halichot Shlomo, Mo’adim II, p. 391) suggested that one can and presumably does (due to Kol Nidrei) his early acceptance of Yom Kippur with an implied exclusion of the prohibition against hatarat nedarim  limiting the acceptance. The sefer Kol Nidrei (83:4) cites Rishonim who say that since there is reason to do hatarat nedarim as Yom Kippur starts, this is a matter of special need, in which case it is permitted to do hatarat nedarim on Shabbat (see Shulchan Aruch ibid.).

We see that one who wants to be machmir in all elements of ushering in Yom Kippur is in a bind. If he wants to follow the opinions to make a clear oral acceptance of Yom Kippur before the end of the day, he raises questions about the propriety of Kol Nidrei. If he wants to be stringent about Kol Nidrei on Yom Kippur, he will be hard-pressed to accept Yom Kippur at a halachically meaningful time. We advise people to follow other good Jews – say Tefilla Zaka and Kol Nidrei at their normal places and rely on the justifications.

[We dealt with this question long ago (Vayeitzei 5773). We reasoned that the envelope is a kli shemelachto l'issur (the main purpose is for a forbidden-on-Shabbat use) and that it is also hachana (preparation for after Shabbat), as this is done to facilitate mailing or presenting a check. We suggested solving both problems by putting a d’var Torah in the envelope, thus having it serve for a permitted use. We invited our readership to provide grounds for leniency without the system we proposed, promising to update our readers if this occurs. We now pay our debt, after one reader, who wants anonymity, made a good point.]

The Biur Halacha (to 279:6) cites an Eliya Rabba (279:13) who claims that an apparent kli shemelachto l’isur does not become muktzeh until it has been used. This is based on the rule of hazmana lav milta (merely preparing something for a certain halachically significant purpose does not yet invest the object with its planned status). Tosafot (Shabbat 44b) and the Pri Megadim (Eshel Avraham 279:14) apply this leniency only when there are permitted uses for which it may be used. However, if from the outset it will clearly be used for primarily (perhaps, exclusively) forbidden activities, it is muktzeh.

The exact formulation of the above may be critical for our case. Once the envelope has the shul's address printed on it, it is identified as being intended to mail (presumably, checks) in it. According to several contemporary poskim (see Shemirat Shabbat K'hilchata 20:13, Orchot Shabbat 19:30; Tiltulei Shabbat (Bodner) p. 43), it is forbidden even if there are also permitted uses if it is clear that this is not the main intention. Each of them gives a hammer as an example of being muktzeh even before usage, despite the famous halacha about using a hammer to open nuts. According to the simple reading of Tosafot (and perhaps the Eliya Rabba), only items that have practically no permitted purposes are forbidden before use. One could argue whether our envelope is like a hammer or is more likely to be used for permitted uses. One can argue that since from the shul’s perspective, a major function of the envelope is to hint/remind the aliya recipient that he “owes the shul,” it would be permitted before its first forbidden use. Certainly, we see a more valid halachic claim for leniency in regard to muktzeh than we did five years ago.

What about the problem of hachana? First, the practical parameters of hachana are among the most complicated matters to set. To re-analyze this specific case, we will divide the question into two: Is it hachana for the shul to give the envelope? Is it hachana for the recipient to take it (home)?

There is a long-standing albeit controversial practice to sell aliyot on Shabbat, and we will assume that it is permitted (see Mishna Berura 323:20). As part of the process, it is permitted to create “pledge cards” (without writing) (ibid.). Although these notations will be used only to “enforce” payment of the pledge after Shabbat, it is permitted to not lose the opportunity for this mitzva. Giving out the envelope, as a hint and reminder to donate, is ostensibly not worse than marking those pledge cards.

There is a different reason to allow the recipient to take them. For one, it is not clear if he will use the envelope for donating, as he might not donate or might donate without using the envelope; so, he might use the envelope for something else, perhaps even on Shabbat. Actually, the main reason many take the envelope is to not turn down the shul’s suggestion that he take it, to not insult the shul or look cheap. That has immediate value and thus taking the envelope is not hachana for him either.

In summary, while we still think it is a good and nice idea to put something Shabbat-appropriate in the return envelope given to people after their aliyot, we can justify the practice of giving the envelopes as is.

The mishna (Shabbat 9b) lists activities in which one must not partake before Mincha; one is eating. (see details in Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 232:2.) However, if he did, he does not stop in the middle for Mincha. There are different versions in the mishna regarding stopping for Kri’at Shema, and the gemara (Shabbat 11a) discusses elements relating to it.

The Shulchan Aruch (OC 235:2) rules that one may not eat a meal within a half hour of the beginning time of the night’s Kri’at Shema, and that if he did, he must stop to recite Kri’at Shema, without its berachot or davening Ma’ariv. The Ran (Rif’s pages, Shabbat 4a) derives this from Sukka 38a, regarding stopping a meal to take a lulav, which distinguishes between Torah-level and Rabbinic mitzvot.

The Ran (ibid.), and Mordechai (Shabbat 224) say that one must stop a meal for Torah mitzvot e.g., Kri’at Shema, only if he started eating improperly (for Rabbinic laws, e.g., tefilla, one may continue even if he started improperly – see Tosafot, Shabbat 9b). This is how the Mishna Berura (325:23) paskens. (These poskim may disagree regarding one who improperly started eating within a half hour of z’man Kri’at Shema, but before its proper actual time.) Your practice of reciting Kri’at Shema during the meal is therefore not required, if you start the meal early enough. (Actually, not everyone who davens at an “early minyan” starts the meal early enough, especially when he davens at a minyan that keeps the same time all summer.)

But is your practice a positive, negative, or “pareve” chumra? There is a concept that one who does something from which he is exempt is called a hedyot. The source is a Yerushalmi on our general topic (Shabbat 1:2), which is probably the logic behind what your guest told you. The Yerushalmi told of rabbanim who were eating together; one stopped to daven Mincha and was criticized by a colleague as above. It is very hard to determine when to apply this rule, as many respected sources have written “one who is machmir shall receive beracha.” Understanding the reason behind the rule, about which there are various opinions, helps. These include: the stringency looks like he is adding on to the Torah; yohara (haughtiness/ holier-than-thou); casting aspersions on those who are not machmir (see more in the entry on this topic in Encyclopedia Talmudit, vol. XXVIII).

It seems to be a small jump from the Yerushalmi to your question. However, some (Sh’vut Yaakov II:30) understand that the Bavli disagrees (see Shabbat 9b). Furthermore, Kri’at Shema, being a Torah-level mitzva is stricter (see above). Indeed, the Rambam (Kri’at Shema 2:6; see also Shulchan Aruch Harav, OC 70:5) says that even when one started eating at a permitted time and is not required to stop for Kri’at Shema, doing so is praiseworthy. The Rambam actually hints at a reason for this ruling, which may help us apply the matter to our case, as he describes one who is concerned that he might not recite Kri’at Shema within its time limit. Therefore, if one recites Kri’at Shema during the meal because he has reason (e.g., based on past experience) for concern that he will not remember after the meal to recite it again, it does not make sense to consider him a hedyot. Many participants in early Shabbat meals forget to recite Kri’at Shema after the meal, so machmir based on such grounds is not inappropriate, even if one is allowed to be optimistic.

[We saw a machloket whether the middle is a line on or (more likely) an area of the head. We will now search for the area’s width/borders.]

The gemara (Eiruvin 95b) provides a clue. The halacha that one who is saving tefillin, found on Shabbat in a place where one may not carry, wears two pairs at a time, is because there is room on the head to wear two tefillin in a halachic manner. How big is this area on the head?

Important sources, both early (see midrash, cited by Tosafot, ad loc.) and more recent (see Bi’ur Halacha to 32:41), indicate that the standard size of tefillin is 2 etzbaot (4 cm. according to Rav Chaim Naeh). It is unclear (see Divrei Yoel ibid.) as to whether this includes the ma’avarta (through which the retzuot go); we will assume not. Thus, the area, from hairline going back is at least 8 cm. Most poskim assume that if you can put two normal size tefillin, you can also put one big tefillin up to their combined size (see Bi’ur Halacha ibid., Divrei Yoel ibid.). Therefore, we can dismiss what a fringe source claims – that the tefillin must fit in within the space in between (not including) the eyes, which is approximately 3 cm. width. According to this, some 95% of today’s tefillin (as well as Chazal’s) are unusable.

In a widely quoted teshuva, the Divrei Chayim (OC II:6) reacted with disdain to the then new idea of using a mirror to get the tefillin centered exactly. He argues that tefillin can be off-center, as there is room for two tefillin also laterally. (Some ask that if he is right, why couldn’t the gemara (ibid.) allow bringing 4 (2*2) tefillin in at a time.) The Tzitz Eliezer (XII:6) agrees with the Divrei Chayim but says that it is best to have the tefillin quite centered, and that the latter objected only to use of a mirror. In the past, men were prohibited to use a mirror, as it was a feminine activity (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 156:2), without real need.

If the middle refers to an area and it cannot be limited to the area in between the eyes, what is it? The Magen Giborim (Shiltei Giborim 27:6) suggests that the entire top of the head is okay, as it is parallel to the placement on the arm, but this does not fit well with the language of the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch. If the Beit Yosef is correct, that the bayit is learned from the knot, Rashi by the knot seems to say that anywhere opposite the oref is fine; extending that to the front of the head, this would be most but not all of the width of the top of the head. You get a similar width by taking “between the eyes” literally, but including the width of the eyes. Measuring from the center of one eye to the other gives 6.4 cm. for the average person (# courtesy of my optometrist), which works out reasonably if the 4 etzbaot (see above) includes the ma’avarta, which does not exist on the sides.

Perhaps “between your eyes” is not literal but teaches the general area, in the middle of the head. From there one is to follow normal guidelines – the Torah was not given to angels and does not want us to be OCD. For the average tefillin, that requires them to be approximately centered (no mirror required, just as people don’t use for the knot). If we take the permitted area from front-back and turn it into a square, we also aim for the center but have reasonable leeway with normal-sized tefillin. The same is true if any part of the tefillin’s width needs to be over the exact middle. All these possibilities are consistent with the mainstream approach, including the Tzitz Eliezer (above). Middle – apparently; precise – NO.

In summary only fringe opinions make exactness/mirror necessary for centering tefillin shel rosh. But given that opinions exist and centering is probably laudable, using a mirror is not something to criticize (it is not less important than centering a tie). One who is very careful about centering and lax on how low the tefillin go is misguided.