ASK THE RABBI

I leave to you to deal with communal implications of an event done to attract specifically non-Shabbat observant buyers and the possibility it will cause non-observant Jews to violate Shabbat. Those issues require familiarity with the local situation.

It is difficult to know if the agent, who provides services for the Jewish seller, will need to do melachot in showing the house. When it is not necessary, then even if he does melacha, it does not relate to the Jew for whom he is doing the job (Orchot Shabbat 23:54-58). However, even assuming the agent will not take any steps of formal transactions for you at the open house, just trying to promote a future deal is forbidden on Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 306:1). One may not ask a non-Jew to do even a Rabbinic prohibition such as that, without special grounds (Shulchan Aruch, OC 307:5).

A major factor that often permits amira l’nochri (asking a non-Jew to do work for him) exists here, namely, katzatz. When the non-Jew gets paid by the job, as opposed to as a worker paid by time, it is permitted for him to do melacha for the Jew (Shabbat 19a; Shulchan Aruch, OC 244:1). The logic is that in such a case, he is acting not because the Jew asked him to but to receive the money that the result earns him (see Mishna Berura 244:2). Realtors are almost always paid only if and when they succeed in facilitating a sale and their rate is unrelated to the amount of time it took, but to the result.

However, there are two problems with using this leniency in this case. One is that even regarding katzatz, the non-Jew must not be told explicitly or otherwise realize that it is necessary that at least some of the work must be done specifically on Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, OC 252:2). Here, the plan the Jewish owner accepts is for the open house to be held specifically on Shabbat. It does not help if the realtor thought of the idea, as it is still a plan to work on the Jew’s behalf specifically on Shabbat. If this were the only problem, one could look for leniencies to alleviate the problem (details are beyond our present scope.)

The second problem, which applies if we are discussing a home in the midst of a community that includes Jews, is marit ayin. The gemara (Avoda Zara 21b) says that one may not let a non-Jew work on his property even if he does so for his own profit because it is known as a Jew’s establishment and some people will assume the type of business arrangement with the non-Jew was one that is forbidden. While this can apply even when the non-Jew is working on a Jew’s movable object (e.g., fixing his car), if it is clearly a Jew’s, the prohibition is broader and sterner when it is related to land/house (Shulchan Aruch, OC 244:1-2). While the problem should not apply when it is known that this type of work is paid by the job (as is the case for realtors), this does not help when the work is done in the Jew’s known, accessible house (ibid.). The concern is that although people will figure he is paid per result, they may suspect that the Jew asked him to do the job specifically on Shabbat (Mishna Berura 252:17).

Therefore, writing about a case where the owner does not live in the house and hands over the job of showing the home to the realtor alone, Orchot Shabbat (23:158) forbids allowing the non-Jew to show the house on Shabbat if it is known to be a Jew’s house and is accessible to a Jewish community. Our case, where the owner takes part in making the open house on Shabbat, is more clearly forbidden. In many communities, this will not only be “technically” forbidden but may be seen as a scandalous affront to Shabbat.

May the concern for the honor of Shabbat help provide the seller with merit to succeed in finding his buyer, during the week.

[Last time we saw that in the midst of Birkat Yotzer Ohr, there were two reasonable ways to time putting on the shel rosh and making the berachot.]

Had you switched the beracha to L’hani’ach Tefillin within toch k’dei dibur (app. two seconds), you probably could have combined the beracha opening with the intended, preferable wording and ignored Yotzer Ohr (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 209:2). Having not done so, were you truly in the midst of the beracha of Yotzer Ohr and were correct in continuing with it or was the unintended beracha of Yotzer Ohr worthless?

It might seem to depend on the question (see Berachot 13a; Megilla 17a) of mitzvot tzrichot kavana (are mitzvot valid b’di’eved if the right action was done without intention to fulfill the mitzva?). While the ruling is not fully clear, especially concerning a Rabbinic mitzva, including almost all berachot, the main current is that one does not fulfill the mitzva (Shulchan Aruch, OC 60:4 and Mishna Berura 60:10). Also, it is possible that a beracha made with a different beracha in mind is worse (see Tosafot, Berachot 12a). Furthermore, arguably a “slip of the tongue” (you apparently went from Yishtabach to Yotzer Ohr on “auto pilot”) might be considered mitasek, which is worse than lack of intent (see Rosh Hashana 32b). On the other hand, this case might be better than classic mitasek, as you intended to praise Hashem with a beracha, albeit a different one.

Whether your Yotzer Ohr was valid might depend on how one learns a Magen Avraham (209:5). Writing about one who recites Malbish Arumim with Poke’ach Ivrim in mind and then immediately inserts Pokeiach Ivrim, the Magen Avraham is unsure which beracha he fulfills. If he had intended for Malbish Arumim and then tried to “erase” it in favor of Pokeiach Ivrim, he fulfilled Malbish Arumim. The Panim Meirot (I:58) changes the text in the Magen Avraham because one can correct a mistaken recitation immediately (Shulchan Aruch, OC 209:2 about one who recited Borei Pri Hagafen on water), and the Magen Avraham says that one who mistakenly recited, at Havdala, Borei Me’orei Ha’eish before Borei Minei Besamim can correct to Borei Minei Besamim. The Dagul Meirevava keeps our text and distinguishes as follows. In the case of water and of besamim, the object he held during the beracha proved he made a mistake, which enables him to switch to the correct beracha. In contrast, regarding Pokeiach Ivrim/Malbish Arumim, there is no physical indication the beracha was mistaken and therefore, it is unclear if he can change it. The Yad Ephrayim (ad loc.) makes a different distinction. Because Borei Pri Hagefen on water is nonsensical, moving on from Borei Pri Hagefen is natural, whereas regarding Malbish Arumim and Pokeiach Ivrim, which are both appropriate berachot, it might not be possible to switch, as the originally recitation takes effect. Our case contains a split between the distinctions. On the one hand, Yotzer Ohr and L’hani’ach Tefillin were both appropriate at that point, but being about to fasten the tefillin made it clear you did not intend then for Yotzer Ohr.

The above, though, is moot. Since Yotzer Ohr is a long beracha, even if lack of intention invalidates its beginning, the continuation of the beracha validated it. If you would have stopped for L’hani’ach Tefillin, you would have given up on the beracha you began, making it l’vatala, so it was good you continued. It might have been better to repeat “yotzer ohr…” (without “Baruch ata…), with kavana, but the beracha, as you did it, was valid b’di’eved.

Considering the need to react to a mistake, you got a lot of things right, which we will now review. We will start with your assumption that your recitation of Yotzer Ohr was valid, and later we will revisit that assumption and its ramifications.

While it is hard to quantify such matters, one should not have tefillin on when there is even a small/modest chance that he might release gas (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 37:3; Mishna Berura 30:4). The most important time to have tefillin on is for Kri’at Shema and Shemoneh Esrei (Shulchan Aruch, OC 25:4). After starting Baruch She’amar, when breaks are permitted only for important reasons, the best place to make important interruptions is between Yishtabach and Kaddish (with a minyan, other than for a chazan) or Yotzer Ohr (by oneself) (see Rama, OC 54:3). Even at this point (and certainly in your case), though, one should recite only the berachot and Baruch shem … and not the additional p’sukim (Ishei Yisrael 16:26*). While other possibilities exist, as we shall see (see also Mishna Berura 53:5), your plan makes great sense.

Finding yourself in the midst of putting on tefillin in the midst of one of birchot Kri’at Shema (Yotzer Ohr ends with “Yotzer Hame’orot”) indeed raises questions. One does not make a beracha on tefillin in the middle of a section/beracha, and unless it is during Kri’at Shema, one should wait until the next beracha break to put on the tefillin with the berachot (Shulchan Aruch, OC 66:2; Be’ur Halacha ad loc.; Mishna Berura ad loc. 15; Ishei Yisrael 19:13). There is a minority opinion (see Mishna Berura 54:13) that recommends putting on the tefillin at the first opportunity, even in the middle of a beracha, and making the beracha on them after touching them at the next break. You anyway had little to gain, with the tefillin already on (see opinions in Dirshu 66:5), by reciting L’haniach Tefillin before Yotzer Hame’orot, so waiting had logic.

In your case, though, there was another factor. One must not speak between the tefillin shel yad and tefillin shel rosh, which you did with the entire beracha of Yotzer Ohr. The severe issue (Sota 44b) is based on the fact that the break creates an artificial need for an extra beracha (Mishna Berura 25:28), but that did not apply to you. You did not make the beracha in the first place and should have recited the same L’haniach Tefillin (for the ongoing mitzva of the shel yad) and Al Mitzvat Tefillin (followed by Baruch shem k’vod … - Ishei Yisrael 19:13) for the shel rosh. There is no problem per se with having only one of the tefillin on for extended periods, and when necessary this is prescribed (Shulchan Aruch, OC 26:1). Nevertheless, it is relatively important to do the two in proximity to each other (Mishna Berura ibid.).

Therefore, we would have recommended to put on the shel rosh without berachot and make up both berachot after Yotzer Hame’orot. Although we generally want a mitzva’s berachot to precede the mitzva (Pesachim 7b), there are agreed precedents that the beracha on the tefillin will come later. One example is one who is traveling precariously before the time for tefillin (Shulchan Aruch, OC 30:3), and another is one whose tefillin arrive right between Ga’al Yisrael and Shemoneh Esrei (Shulchan Aruch, OC 66:8). On the other hand, neither setup is perfect and neither is forbidden, and therefore what you did was also reasonable.

As promised, we will return to discuss the mistaken beracha next time.

Generally, an avel is obligated in all the mitzvot, with a prominent exception being not wearing tefillin on the first day of aveilut because he is not fit to connect with the grandeur of tefillin (Berachot 11a). So, ostensibly there would have to be a good reason to deprive an avel who is a kohen from doing Birkat Kohanim, and there is no explicit source in Chazal that this is the case.

The Mordechai (Megilla 817), in discussing that a kohen who will not do Birkat Kohanim must not be in shul when the kohanim are called, which obligates him to go up, mentions an avel during the 12 months for his parents as one who does not duchen, according to the minhag. The Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 128) wonders what the logic of the minhag could be, but he cites a Shibolei Haleket that there is a need for a kohen to be in a state of simcha in order to do Birkat Kohanim. This is also the logic behind the Ashkenazi minhag to do Birkat Kohanim only on Yom Tov (Rama, OC 128:44; see more on the topic in Living the Halachic Process III, A-17). There is even a related Ashkenazi minhag that single men do not duchen because they do not “dwell in happiness” (see ibid.) The Shulchan Aruch (ad loc.) does not accept either of these minhagim (Ashkenazim accept the former), but regarding shiva, he does instruct the avel to leave the place of davening before the kohanim are called (i.e., before they start R’tzei - Be’ur Halacha ad loc.).

The Shiyarei Knesset Hagedola compares the avel during shiva to the situation of all on Tisha B’av, where according to some (including minhag Yerushalayim) there is no Birkat Kohanim in Shacharit, because the first part of Tisha B’av is the antithesis of happiness (not all agree; see opinions in Eliya Rabba 559:13; R. Akiva Eiger to Magen Avraham 131:10). Some distinguish because on Tisha B’av the mitzva is only delayed until the afternoon and because the entire congregation is in aveilut (see Yabia Omer IV, Yoreh Deah 32). The Radbaz (I:1) does not see any reason for the avel to give up his mitzva.

Based on the idea that the avel sets the tone for the entire minyan¸ the minhag in many places is that no one does Birkat Kohanim and, according to some, the chazan does not recite Elokeinu vei’lokei….in a shiva house (Ishei Yisrael 24:50). However, many refer to a minhag Yerushalayim to do Birkat Kohanim there (ibid.; Gesher Hachayim, vol. I, p. 205). According to this minhag, even the avel can and likely should do so himself. After all, since it is only a minhag for a kohen to refrain and it is a Torah-level obligation for a kohen to duchen, it is problematic for a kohen/avel to not take part. We have seen that the kohen should walk out before R’tzei, but this tension makes it understandable if he takes part himself. (It is not clear why he must walk out considering that our minhag is to not call kohanim until right before the Birkat Kohanim, which is too late for them to go up (see Shulchan Aruch ibid. 8), but this is apparently the minhag). Therefore, whether the shiva house in question was in Yerushalayim¸ so that the avel may have been right, or elsewhere, since fundamentally he did nothing wrong, there is no need to get involved. (If you feared that he will be embarrassed if “corrected” on another day, you could have mentioned to him after davening that there are different opinions and asked whether he received a ruling.)

If the avel follows the standard minhag (i.e., does not do Birkat Kohanim), what does he do about walking out if he is the chazan? There is a major question (which we wrote about in this column, Vayeira 5780) whether a kohen who is a chazan should ever do Birkat Kohanim; he certainly should not if he might get confused (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 128:20 with commentators). Therefore, the avel/chazan need not leave whether or not other kohanim are reciting Birkat Kohanim.

We will be assuming you were correct in starting the meal. To make that clear cut, you should have started the meal at least a half-hour before the optimal time for these recitations, which is tzeit hakochavim (Mishna Berura 267:6 regarding Kri’at Shema; ibid. 489:23 regarding sefirat ha’omer). Grounds for leniency to start eating after this point are beyond our present scope (see discussion in Piskei Teshuvot 489:16).

The mishna (Shabbat 9b) says that we interrupt certain activities, including eating, in order to recite Kri’at Shema, but do not interrupt for tefilla, as only Kri’at Shema is a Torah-level obligation (Rashi ad loc.). The above refers to a case where he started when he should not have, but if he started early enough before the time for Kri’at Shema, he is not required to interrupt the meal (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 235:2, see Mishna Berura ad loc. 21).

According to the Rama (OC 489:4), sefirat ha’omer is like Kri’at Shema – if he started eating when he should not have, he should interrupt the eating for sefirat ha’omer, but if he started when he was allowed to, sefirat ha’omer can wait until after he finishes eating. Sefirat ha’omer is treated as strictly in this regard as Kri’at Shema because of the opinion that sefirat ha’omer is a Torah-level mitzva even when there are no korbanot (Rambam, Temidin 7:24, as opposed to Tosafot, Menachot 66a), and/or because it is a minor disruption of the meal (Mishna Berura 489:25).

When it is not required to interrupt, is it positive to do so anyway? The Yerushalmi (Shabbat 1:2) says regarding one who is not required to interrupt eating for Mincha, that if he voluntarily interrupts, we call him a hedyot (simpleton), like others who do things from which they are exempt. Many explanations are given as to why it might be objectionable to “go the extra mile” – it may be haughtiness, it can reflect poorly on those who follow the halacha as given, it can distort the true halacha (see opinions in Encyclopedia Talmudit, entry “Kol hapatur min hadavar v’oseihu”). This rule appears at odds with the common halachic rule that one who is more machmir than he needs to be is lauded as worthy of blessing, and many attempts are made to distinguish between various cases. Regarding the case of Mincha, which the Yerushalmi addressed, while some say that one who is unnecessarily stringent is called a hedyot (Magen Avraham 232:9), others question whether this is accepted (Be’ur Halacha to 232:2; see Divrei Yissachar 18). Regarding voluntarily stopping the meal for the generally more stringent Kri’at Shema and sefirat ha’omer, none of the major commentators raises the prospect of calling him a hedyot.

There may be reasons to prefer a voluntary interruption of the meal specifically for sefirat ha’omer. We have seen already the idea that sefirat ha’omer is fulfilled with relative ease, as it does not require much of a break. Additionally, there is special importance to the concern that if he forgets to recite sefirat ha’omer that day, it might disqualify the entire mitzva (see Noda B’yehuda I, OC 27). On the other hand, the Sha’agat Aryeh (22) says that on Shabbat, when one is in the midst of a mandatory full meal, the obligation of Birkat Hamazon (50 + times a year) is more frequent (tadir) than sefirat ha’omer (49 times a year), which gives the former precedence regarding order. (It is unclear if this applies if one does not plan to bentch until much later). In this regard, Kri’at Shema is more common, and therefore has preference over both (ibid.).

[We have discussed questions about respect for objects involved in mitzvot (tzitzit, netilat yadayim cups, a “yad”), and so relying on electronic access, we will go light on sources. The fact that the question never dawned upon me intrigued and pushed me to seek logical guidelines.]

The gemara (Megilla 26b) says that while tashmishei kedusha (objects related to holy texts) require geniza, tashmishei mitzva (used to facilitate mitzvot, e.g., sukka, lulav, shofar, and tzitzit) may be thrown away. Authorities posit that one may not disgrace the latter (see Orach Chayim 21 regarding tzitzit), and sources make gradations in restrictions based on level of linkage to the mitzva (e.g., tzitzit and schach > tzitzit garment and sukka walls, respectively) and levels of disgrace (use with filth > throwing in the garbage > leaving unattended outside). 

Oil left in a Chanuka ner sometimes must be burnt without benefit (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 677:4). This limitation is because of muktzeh (set aside) for a mitzva and does not apply to Shabbat candles, which calls for it being used for human needs (Tosafot, Shabbat 44a). There is a machloket among contemporary poskim whether Shabbat oil leftovers may be disgraced, including throwing them directly into the garbage, (see opinions cited in Ginzei Hakodesh 19:12). (All the above refers to a significant amount of leftover, not negligible residue, as we distinguish regarding kedushat shvi’it leftovers.) We refer to a thesis we raised (this column, Shelach 81) that throwing things in a normal home garbage is not as degrading as throwing into a garbage dump of old.

A tea light shell is not a producer of a mitzva flame, but just something that held it. This makes it a tashmish d’tashmish mitzva, the lowest of the Pri Megadim’s (153, MZ 15) six categories of special objects, for which he provides no halachot. Therefore, it is not surprising that regarding a simple glass cup holding oil/candle for Shabbat lights, the standard opinion is that one may discard it as he likes (Ginzei Hakodesh 19:13).

However, Ginzei Hakodesh (16:(16)) cites an interesting principle from Rav Elyashiv. When an object is clearly related to a mitzva per se (not just a good practice, e.g., a kipa), it should be discarded respectfully. Using regular halachic rules, a chanukiya or Shabbat candlestick could be more lenient than the glass cup sitting on it, as it is one step further removed from the mitzva. But one can (even though it probably is unnecessary) accept this stringency and still not have qualms about the tea lights. On technical grounds, tea lights are used throughout the world for many other purposes than Shabbat candles, so its connection might not be as clear. However, there is a more fundamental distinction. The clear connection to a mitzva makes sense not because someone can guess what it was used for (the user is himself aware), but it is a matter of association.  We and/or society closely associate certain objects with a mitzva. You will find candlesticks/chanukiyot in Jewish museums and kids’ mitzva games, not oil cups. An object that would cause a nostalgic person to feel loss when throwing out should be disposed of carefully when its nostalgia is connected to a mitzva. While higher levels on the kedusha “totem pole” follow objective halachic criteria, a tashmish d’tashmish mitzva gets special treatment only when it subjectively deserves it. A normal person disposes of flimsy, disposable tea light shells without sentiment, and therefore there are no limitations. The factors that caused me to not think of your question are likely reason for it being permitted

While we are not generally against personal chumrot, unnecessary ones involving regular use of plastic are not positive “chasidut,” as the Orthodox Jewish community must embrace civic and global environmental responsibility. 

A mishna (Megilla 24a) seems to address your question. Whereas a katan may get an aliya, he may not serve as chazan or be poress al Shema. Rashi (ibid. 23b) explains that poress al Shema is reciting Kaddish, Barchu, and the first beracha of Birchot Kri’at Shema (the latter no longer practiced – Rama, Orach Chayim 69:1) on behalf of latecomers. Shuls that recite Barchu at the end of Shacharit and Ma’ariv (Barchu Batra) do a form of this (see Mishna Berura, intro. to siman 69), and thus we see that a katan may not lead it. Rashi (ibid. 24a) explains that because a katan is not obligated in these matters, he cannot do them on behalf of others.   

However, there are cracks in the opposition to ketanim doing Barchu. Rav Yosef Karo (Beit Yosef and Shulchan Aruch, OC 53:10) refers equivocally to a minhag to allow a katan to serve as chazan for Ma’ariv. The Rama (ad loc.) is even less enthusiastic about it, and the Mishna Berura (53:32) cites being motzi the tzibbur in Barchu as the main problem. However, the minhag and the poskim who justify it must have a way to deal with the mishna. The Rashba (Shut I:239) suggests that there is not a problem of a katan not being obligated in tefilla/Barchu because an older katan is obligated Rabbinically and tefilla is only a Rabbinic obligation even for adults. He proposes then that the reason a katan may not be a chazan is due to kavod hatzibbur, which may allow for flexibility (see Beit Yosef ibid). The Beit Yosef also suggests that since Ma’ariv was originally an optional tefilla, a katan may suffice to lead it (the mishna could relate to Shacharit).

What can we learn from a katan’s ability to recite Kaddish? For one, we see that a katan can recite for the tzibbur something that requires a minyan. On the other hand, according to most, a katan can only recite the Kaddeishim that are peripheral to tefilla (Gesher Hachayim 30:8:4). It is actually because a katan is incapable of being chazan that Kaddish Yatom was set aside for mourners, including ketanim (Mishna Berura 132:10). In some ways, Barchu appears to be less of a problem of being motzi than Kaddish is, as it seems just like a prompt for the tzibbur to bless Hashem with “Baruch Hashem hamevorach…”  (the chazan’s repetition of those words apparently is not to be motzi the tzibbur – see Mishna Berura 57:3-4).

Additionally, we do find that a katan does say Barchu when he gets an aliya. To explain the dichotomy in the mishna we have to say something along the lines that Barchu before an aliya is a requirement of the oleh and it is not reciting something on behalf of the tzibbur (Ishei Yisrael 15:(94)).  

We have seen some logic and scant sources to allow a katan to recite Barchu at least at Ma’ariv, which we arguably might extend to Barchu Batra of Shacharit, which is based on only a chance that someone missed Barchu. However, poskim assume that a katan should not be reciting it (Gesher Hachayim ibid.; Ishei Yisrael 15:32; Tefilla K’hilchata 17:).

If a katan did Barchu Batra, may/should one answer? Answering Barchu is important enough to interrupt at almost every juncture in davening (Shulchan Aruch, OC 66:3), apparently even for Barchu Batra after having already answered Barchu (see Mishna Berura 109:5). It is wrong to not respond when the tzibbur is answering Barchu Batra (Ishei Yisrael 16:(87), citing Rav C. Kanievsky zt”l). Admittedly, one must not answer Barchu without proper prompting (e.g., nine people did not hear it – Be’ur Halacha to 57:1). However, a katan is capable of prompting during his aliya and may just be missing the full power to be motzi others with it, and we have seen opinions that he can say it as a chazan at Ma’ariv. Therefore, if the mistake was made to have the katan say Barchu Batra, we posit that it is better to answer him than to not answer (even in a case where the katan will not notice and be embarrassed).

The gemara (Berachot 58b) says that upon seeing a friend after separation, after thirty days he recites Shehecheyanu and after twelve months, “… mechayei hameitim”. According to most opinions, if one recites the latter, he does not recite the former (Magen Avraham 225:2; Mishna Berura 225:4). The berachot are predicated on the assumption of significant joy over the reunion, making it logical that it is only for friends one is fond of (Tosafot 58b), and even very fond of (Shulchan Aruch, OC 225:1).

Shehecheyanu is a common, general beracha for a wide variety of happy experiences. Mechayei Hameitim is surprising for this context, as its daily usage relates to belief in Hashem literally resurrecting the dead, not reuniting with a live person. The Mishna Berura (ibid.) is among those who explain that since after twelve months, Rosh Hashana has passed, in which a person’s fate was decided, one can be happy that his friend survived. There is precedent for a celebratory beracha for another’s survival (Berachot 54b regarding Hagomel).

Mechayei Hameitim’s unique nature may help explain why people do not commonly recite it (as reported by the Ben Ish Chai (I, Eikev 13) and many others) in this context with the full formula, including Hashem’s Name, known as shem u’malchut. (People often say “baruch mechayei hameitim” as a half-joke upon seeing someone after a long absence). The Panim Meirot (I:65) says that since it is borrowed from Shemoneh Esrei, where it lacks the full formula, it is recited without Hashem’s Name. The Ben Ish Chai explains that it is because not everyone about whom it would be said appreciates the comparison.

Finally, in regard to your question, the Aruch Hashulchan (OC 225:2) says that since the beracha relates to resolving the doubt whether a friend is alive, if one communicated with him during the twelve months, he does not recite it. The Mishna Berura (ibid. 2) cites a machloket Acharonim about this and says not to make a beracha due to safek even regarding Shehecheyanu. However, Yechaveh Da’at (IV:17) takes issue with him because the logic (see Aruch Hashulchan ibid.) and sources (Halachot Ketanot I:120 gives a different explanation) on the matter apply only to Mechayei Hameitim.

Therefore, we cannot recommend reciting Mechayei Hameitim in your case. Shehecheyanu is a much more plausible option, for the happiness of seeing someone for the first time in [well over] thirty days, as Yechaveh Da’at ibid. and Yaskil Avdi (OC 25:3) recommend. Many poskim are against even Shehecheyanu and even if the two were not in touch, as not every friendship qualifies for the beracha. This approach is augmented by the opinion that such a Shehecheyanu is not mandatory (see Yechaveh Da’at ibid.). Although you seem close, Chesed La’alafim (OC 225:15) and Nimukei Orach Chayim (225:1) say that since if the beracha were commonplace in this context, people would be embarrassed not to recite Shehecheyanu for a friend even if they are not close, the minhag developed to stop saying it for friends. Perhaps for a close relative this is not a concern (ibid.). Regarding a child-in-law, the question is interesting. On the one hand, the relationship is often very close. On the other hand, it is not as emotionally intense, and since it varies greatly from family to family, it makes sense to be concerned about embarrassment and opt for a lo plug without a beracha. Also, while Zoom is not like seeing in person, it might reduce the excitement of subsequently seeing in person and precludes the beracha (see ibid.). The stronger claim is that it does not preclude excitement in person, so that the beracha is appropriate.

In summary, while Shehecheyanu is probably called far, those who opt for halachic caution can thank Hashem (important) informally (see Birkat Habayit 24:1).

There are too many permutations to touch all of them, but we will try to address the main ones, with a focus on likely mistakes. Most of the relevant sources discuss the similar combinations in davening, but for the most part, the applications in both cases are the same (Mishna Berura 287:2).

If one totally left out either Shabbat (e.g., by missing all the words in parentheses in the siddur/bentcher) or Yom Tov (e.g., by opening up to Kiddush of Shabbat), one is not yotzei (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 47:41). The question is if he mentioned each at some but not all points. It is necessary to relate to the correct day(s) in the main body of the beracha, and if he left it out, it is not enough if he recited the right thing in the beracha’s ending (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 487:3).

If one says “… vatiten lanu … et yom haShabbat hazeh,” that is enough even if he forgot the other mentions (and obviously if he left out “b’ahava"). It is less clear if he mentioned Shabbat only in the last words before the end beracha, as that might be considered part of the end and not the main body of the beracha (see Mishna Berura 487:13). Regarding the Yom Tov element, “… vatiten lanu … et yom…" is even more important, as one must mention the specific holiday (Mishna Berura 487:11; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 47:42), and it is mentioned only once during Kiddush.

The end of the beracha is very important, and if one recites on a regular Yom Tov the ending of Shabbat or vice versa, he is not yotzei (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 487:1). The matter is less clear on Yom Tov that falls on Shabbat. If he leaves out one element, the beracha could still be significant because he correctly addressed one element. While the missing element is crucial, perhaps it is enough that it was mentioned in the midst of the beracha. The Knesset Hagedola (to Tur, OC 487) says that if one mentioned Shabbat in the middle but not at the end on Shabbat/Yom Tov, he does not need to repeat Shemoneh Esrei. The Pri Chadash (OC 487:1) presumes that the Knesset Hagedola’s basis is the halacha (Shulchan Aruch, OC 268:4) that if one davened a weekday Shemoneh Esrei on Shabbat and mentioned Shabbat in its midst, without a separate Shabbat beracha, he is yotzei. However, the Pri Chadash rejects the proof based on the fact that on a certain level, a full Shemoneh Esrei on Shabbat could have been appropriate, whereas a seven-beracha amida on Shabbat and Yom Tov needs to be done with an accurate middle beracha. We assume like the Pri Chadash, including in regard to Kiddush (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata ibid. 41). If he did not speak extraneous things, he would not have to repeat Borei Pri Hagafen (HaSeder He’aruch 52:7). If he repeated the beracha and the second time mentioned only Shabbat and not Yom Tov, he is likely yotzei since both elements were ultimately recited (see Igrot Moshe, OC IV, 70:14).

If one mentioned Shabbat at the end and not Yom Tov, the situation is better, based on the following source. The gemara (Beitza 17a) cites three opinions of Tannaim regarding what the proper break-up of berachot is for the amida of Shabbat/Yom Tov. Beit Hillel says that the beracha ends with mention of only Shabbat, whereas Yom Tov is mentioned only in the middle. We pasken like Rebbe, who says that the end beracha mentions both Shabbat and Yom Tov. However, many presume that Rebbe only came to add on Yom Tov as a lechatchila, whereas if one mentions Yom Tov in the middle and ends with only Shabbat, Rebbe agrees that he is yotzei (Be’ur Halacha to OC 487:1). The Be’ur Halacha points out that the Yerushalmi’s version of Rebbe is like Beit Hillel (the end beracha need not mention Yom Tov ), and the discrepancy is more palatable if Rebbe agrees b’di’eved. Thus, regarding practical halacha, mention of the specific Yom Tov in the midst of the beracha is sufficient b’di’eved (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata ibid.).

The gemara and early Rishonim do not speak explicitly about such a problem. However, the late Ashkenazi Rishon, the Terumat Hadeshen (I:127), assumes there is an issue and identified a Talmudic source for it. The gemara (Pesachim 39b) says that one may not boil two grains of wheat, one on the other, out of concern that the water will not fully reach both grains and prevent chimutz (leavening). He posits that with an oven’s dry heat, a fold in the matza will also impede the halting of the chimutz. The Darchei Moshe (Orach Chayim 461:3) quotes a Maharil who accepts the concern when the two areas fully stick together, as this seriously impedes the hot air. If while rolling the dough, it folds over, additional rolling can undo the problem.

There is ample room to disagree with the Terumat Hadeshen. After all, it is permitted to make a matza up to a tefach (3-4 inches) thick (Pesachim 37a; see Aruch Hashulchan, OC 461:11). The Beit Yosef (OC 461) treats the Terumat Hadeshen as a novel stringency, and he does not cite the halacha in the Shulchan Aruch. The Rama (OC 461:5) does bring it as halacha.

Most Acharonim view matza kefula as a stringency (Chok Yaakov 461:18), unless the matza under the fold does not have the color of baked matza (Magen Avraham 461:11-12). This leads to certain leniencies. The Chok Yaakov says that if one finds matza kefula only after Pesach (when chametz is forbidden only Rabbinically), it is permitted. It is also questionable whether one must burn it before Pesach or on Chol Hamoed (on Yom Tov, it is forbidden to burn or move it; one just covers it ­– Shulchan Aruch, OC 446:1), although he should remove it (Magen Avraham ibid.).

There is a surprising leniency about how much matza is considered chametz due to the folded part, because there is leniency regarding full chametz in a similar case. If bread is baked together with matza in an oven, the matza remains kosher (Shulchan Aruch, OC 461:5) because non-fatty foods do not transfer enough taste through the air to forbid it (Mishna Berura 461:22). Even if they touch each other, it is enough to remove the area around the place of contact (k’dei netila – approximately, an inch). Poskim distinguish between if the baking took place on Pesach, when a tiny part of chametz forbids large mixtures, and before Pesach, when prohibited foods are “nullified” if there is sixty times more permitted food (Shulchan Aruch, OC 447:1-2). Although in certain cases, bitul before Pesach does not last into the more stringent days of Pesach (chozer v’nei’ur – ibid. 4), it does not apply here. The Rama rules that if the matza kefula was baked on Pesach, the entire matza is forbidden, whereas if it was baked before Pesach, it is enough to remove the part around the folded part (Mishna Berura 461:32). The Sha’ar Hatziyun (461:57) says that we might accept the opinions that the whole matza would be forbidden if the folded part is more than one sixtieth of the matza.

There is a similar issue regarding bubbles in a matza (Rama ibid.), but we generally assume it does not apply in our days since matzot are made in reliably very hot ovens with very thin dough. Regarding the folding over, some hold that the grounds for stringency are more distant than in the Rishonim’s times (see Dirshu 461:82 in the name of Rav C. Kanievsky, in regard to not being required to remove such pieces in our days).