ASK THE RABBI

Most of the discussion about walking is found in regard to Shemoneh Esrei, and we will start with that.

Your shul-mate may be remembering (incorrectly) the following mishna (Berachot 30b). During Shemoneh Esrei, “even if a snake is wrapped around his leg (parallel to war), he should not stop.” However, the gemara (ad loc. 33a) says that this is only when it does not appear that the snake presents real danger. Furthermore, the stop (hefsek) referred to is speaking, e.g., calling someone to save him. One actually is allowed to walk to another place to protect himself from even a moderately precarious situation, as walking is not a real hefsek (Mishna Berura 104:10).

Of course, one should not walk for no good reason during Shemoneh Esrei, as it is a low-level hefsek. We find the following priority list for one who must take care of something during Shemoneh Esrei (Mishna Berura 104:1), from best to worst: 1) hinting to someone to help without talking or moving; 2) walking somewhere without speaking; 3) speaking, which is permitted under only extraordinary circumstances.

In comparison to Shemoneh Esrei, the position of one’s body is less important during Kedusha. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 95:1) says one is required to have his feet together during Shemoneh Esrei, to “imitate” angels in service of Hashem. In contrast, regarding Kedusha he writes (ibid. 4) that it is good (i.e., less critical than for Shemoneh Esrei) for one’s feet to be together. Again, one does not walk for no reason, but legitimate concern for a special needs child’s physical (or emotional) safety is fully justified. The additional liturgy for Shabbat within Kedusha is not even considered a full-fledged part of Kedusha (see Mishna Berura 125:1) and arguably it is even less problematic to walk then. Furthermore, one who is not davening has a lower-level obligation to join Kedusha, to not look like he does not endorse what is being said. This would seem to not apply to one whose pressing preoccupation is clear to all. So halachically, you are clearly fine.

We continue with a conjecture about your shul-mate’s reaction. Although he said he was motivated by concern for your Kedusha obligations, it is likely that he was bothered by something else. Having a child running wildly through a shul with or without an adult chasing after him is not ideal for the atmosphere of a shul or davening. Those with certain personality types are particularly disturbed by such a situation. Some people properly care greatly about decorum and quiet in shul. The situation may make others just feel nervous. You may not think in such terms, because you are, laudably, concerned with the welfare and happiness of the child.

It can be a good idea to discuss such a situation (presumably, the father) with the rabbi or other leadership. The job of any true leader is to strike a proper balance between the needs of the general community and the unique needs of individuals. We cannot be of help from here, as only someone intimately familiar with the setting and the people involved can do it justice. Obviously, no reasonable rabbis would ignore the needs of a special needs child. However, it is plausible to arrive at an arrangement using discretion as to when the child will spend time in shul. But again, the feelings of the man you refer to (even though he is wrong in what he said and seemingly how he said it) and perhaps other people is a possible issue, not the halachot of Kedusha.

You may be assuming that one may not be menachem avel on Shabbat. The gemara (Shabbat 12a-b) (reluctantly) permits being menachem avel on Shabbat, as does the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 287:1). Since this is not the optimal time to do so (Shabbat 12b; Magen Avraham 287:1), we should not be surprised by the minhag to not be menachem on Shabbat, at least for Ashkenazim (see Gesher Hachayim 20:5:2).

The timing of an avel’s entrance is based primarily on his ability to enter shul (not before Shabbat – see Tur, Yoreh Deah 393). Note a historical fact. Until relatively recently, Ma’ariv of Shabbat in shul was done during daytime, so that the community accepted Shabbat early with the saying of Barchu (see Rama, Orach Chayim 253:2, as one of many sources). The custom developed to recite Mizmor Shir L’yom HaShabbat, which became the acceptance of Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch, OC 261:4). Between Lecha Dodi and Mizmor Shir became the perfect time for the avel to come in. People could be menachem freely because it was still Friday, and he could enter as it would immediately be Shabbat, when his presence in shul became appropriate. As we pointed out in Bemareh Habazak, if Shabbat began before the community accepted Shabbat, it is also permitted for him to go into shul. Your question is a good one. Does it become forbidden to say Hamakom yenachem …?

One could argue that it is still permitted, as we saw that it is permitted to be menachem on Shabbat, despite the minhag not to do so. Since the custom is to welcome the avel at that point in davening, we would follow the halacha that it is permitted. However, the Pri Megadim (Mishbetzot Zahav 287:1) says that once the community has said Mizmor Shir, they may no longer announce “to go out to welcome the mourner” (it was apparently more elaborate than today) because it is a public display of mourning (this is not obvious assertion), which is forbidden (see Shulchan Aruch, YD 400:1). He allows individuals to go over and express consolations, but not the shul and not with the standard weekday formula. The Mishna Berura (287:3) states that some authorities permit regular language.

Thus, the purist will logically agree with you that after sheki’a, the shul should not say Hamakon yenachem. We could compromise and say that during bein hashemashot (doubt whether it is day or night), one can be lenient and allow the marginally problematic group consolation. (In Bemareh Habazak we allowed Shabbat leniency from sheki’a because we are lenient on matters of aveilut (Moed Katan 18a).) However, the minhag seems to allow welcoming the mourner even after tzeit hakochavim (nightfall). In theory, we can say the minhag is a mistake, by not updating the practice after the timing changed.

However, it is possible (and preferable) to uphold the minhag for two reasons. On a matter that is not overly serious halachically, we uphold minhagim even when they appear to be “wrong.” Sometimes we also do not know the wisdom behind the minhag. Let us suggest a possible fundamental justification, while not being sure that it is a correct explanation. The Pri Megadim is talking about a case where the community consciously accepted Shabbat with Mizmor Shir. As such, public aveilut behavior is inappropriate. However, when the community has not yet accepted Shabbat with their behavior, it is not forbidden to welcome the avel. While each individual is not allowed to violate Shabbat because the time of Shabbat has come, consoling the mourner is not a violation (see above). If just the public nature of the practice is the problem, sensitivity to that may begin only with Mizmor Shir even the time of Shabbat came earlier.

In any case, we will uphold the minhag of our shuls, many or most of which still welcome mourners before Mizmor Shir despite your good question.

We will start with an overview of the halachic issues involved.

Regarding the possibility that Jews will buy a non-kosher product, you need not be concerned about it for a combination of reasons, including the following (see more in Living the Halachic Process, vol. II, C-20). There is no Torah-level prohibition of lifnei iver (facilitating sin) because people can get these products elsewhere. Only a small minority of the customers are Jews and your intention is not for them. Therefore, since those who buy non-kosher items are not interested in keeping kosher, it is not your problem. The question is about your selling not-kosher, which could be a problem even if it is to non-Jews.

The gemara Pesachim 23a learns from the pasuk, “Vesheketz yiheyu lachem,” that certain foods that are forbidden to eat are but are not forbidden in benefit, have certain limitations on benefit. The gemara states that if he did not seek to obtain the non-kosher food, he can sell them, but he may not purposely obtain the foods in order to gain from them. The prohibition applies only to food that is forbidden from the Torah (as opposed to Rabbinically) (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 117:1). This applies primarily to meat and fish products, as opposed to many other non-kosher foods (dairy products, pastries, etc.).

According to most Rishonim, this is a Torah prohibition (see Shut Chatam Sofer, Yoreh Deah 104-106, 108; Yabia Omer, vol. 8, YD 13). The Rashba (Shut III:223) says that the reason is to minimize the possibility of coming to eat forbidden foods, while others say it is a gezeirat hakatuv (heavenly decree without a known reason).

The consensus of poskim is that the prohibition applies when a Jew owns the food, even in cases where he is not expected to come in direct contact with it (Chatam Sofer, ibid 108, cited in Pitchei Teshuva, YD 117:6). Even if you are not considered to have contact with the food (we do not know to what extent you visit the warehouses), the prohibition applies because of your ownership (see ibid.). Thus, you should check (we can help) that the products are not forbidden by the Torah.

[After receiving labels of many products, we realized we need to discuss non-kosher ingredients – from animals or non-kosher fish – that are in capsules.]

There is no Torah-level prohibition in eating a not kosher food by swallowing it when it is encapsulated in a non-food (see Mishneh Lamelech, Ma’achalot Assurot 14:12; Aruch Hashulchan, YD 85:40). Thus, one can argue that non-kosher food in a capsule is not a problem. On the other hand, one can argue that the food inside is still forbidden food, and it could be taken out of the capsule and eaten. Furthermore, perhaps the only important question is if the food is forbidden, and whether or not it will be eaten in a halachic manner is not important (see above).

The halacha is that one is not allowed to go out of his way to get things that are forbidden to eat by the Torah and are slated to be eaten (Shulchan Aruch, YD 117:1). Such things are forbidden in commerce even if you are not likely to eat them. However, in this case, at the time you will obtain the capsules, they are not slated for eating in a forbidden manner, and it is therefore permitted to buy them in order to sell.

There is much discussion as to whether gelatin capsules themselves are permitted (beyond our scope). However, it is sufficient that there legitimate opinions permit it (at least from the Torah), as in such a case, it is permitted to sell it (Darchei Teshuva 117:63).

[We have determined that this question is for halachic curiosity and not to be used to make a claim. This allows us to discuss the matter generally, and to do so less rigorously than if this were a din Torah.]

Shimon was mainly accurate in citing the Rama (based on Terumat Hadeshen I:317), except that even if it is implicitly clear from context that the provider intends to give the food for free, the recipient is exempt. This enables Reuven to claim that common business practice that the professional who is wooing a potential client pays (we take no stand on the veracity) overcomes the standard halachic assumption.

However, two distinctions make things difficult for Reuven. First, in the Rama’s case, the provider has to extract money, which puts some burden of proof on him. In contrast, the restaurant accepted Shimon’s claim that he must pay only his own meal and Reuven for his own. Indeed, if Shimon would have run out, Reuven would have to pay for his own meal without complaints against the restaurant. So, Reuven wants Shimon to reimburse him and therefore has to provide relatively more proof.

More importantly, in the Terumat Hadeshen’s case, there is more room to claim that the provider decided to charge after the food was given. In this case, it sounds that Reuven agrees that Shimon never intended to pay, if Reuven were not interested in the project (just that he is annoyed by it). Putting the indications together, Shimon never obligated himself, even if Reuven thought he did.

Perhaps, though, Shimon caused Reuven damage by causing him to order his meal. On one level, where is the damage? Reuven received a meal that is worth the money he paid! Yet, the concept of d’mei basar b’zol is relevant. This means that when one eats something expensive when he was justified to believe he would not need to pay, he pays only at a discount rate (see Bava Kama 112a). Thus, the difference between that rate and what Reuven paid might count as damage.

Sometimes, one who causes another to spend money based on an assurance which he does not see through, has to pay. One case is when one tells his co-litigant to travel to court and the former does not come; he has to pay for the uncalled-for expenses (Rama, Choshen Mishpat 14:5). However, the restaurant date was not pointless for Reuven. Besides the meal, it had the potential to facilitate great benefit for both Shimon and Reuven (many believe that a good venue for a business meeting is valuable). The fact that it did not work does not retroactively make the effort uncalled for. While this could induce Shimon to pay, it also means that Reuven was not damaged. Although we cannot get into a complete analysis of sources and factors we were not supplied, my experience/intuition lead me to expect that Shimon could not be compelled to pay.

That does not mean that Shimon acted properly. If Shimon was aware that Reuven expected him to pay, and especially if this encouraged Reuven to listen to Shimon’s sales pitch, then Shimon violated g’neivat da’at (deception). The gemara (Chulin 94a) includes in this prohibition relatively innocuous cases in which the deception could cause a party to give something of value due to a favor he thinks he received. There is reason to suspect that Shimon did that. It would be laudable but not required if, as teshuva for g’neivat da’at, Shimon reimbursed Reuven, at least partially.

We can extend your excellent set of questions, based on your assumptions. Perhaps one should recite bHlo with the tzibbur even though he does not usually do so. If it is not justified to say bHlo, why isn’t responding amen a forbidden amen l’vatala (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 215:4), as you asked regarding tefillin, irrespective of hefsek?

Let us first look at the basis of bHlo. This set of 18 p’sukim, which are completed with a beracha, were instituted post-Talmudically because people were often afraid to stay for Ma’ariv at night. The 18 p’sukim were a reminder/replacement of sorts for Shemoneh Esrei they were missing; Kaddish was instituted to follow these p’sukim (Tur, OC 236). The question is whether this institution continued when people went back to staying for Ma’ariv, and there are indeed different opinions (see Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 236:2). Most Ashkenazim in chutz la’aretz recite it, as the Rama implies, whereas the universal practice in Eretz Yisrael is not to do so, likely due to the opinions of the Gra, the Shulchan Aruch Harav, and the Arizal (see Kaf Hachayim, OC 236:14).

In general, one whose place’s minhag is not to recite a certain beracha and is davening in a place where they recite it (e.g., Hallel in shul on Seder night) does not recite the beracha unless he is the chazan (see Igrot Moshe, OC II:94). BHlo is different in a couple of ways (see Mishneh Halachot V:29). On the one hand, the importance of reciting it is relatively low, and not all agree that it is necessary even abroad. On the other hand, all agree that it was once deemed proper, and many poskim who do not say it, do not consider it pointless, just insufficiently justified. As a reflection of these (and perhaps other) factors, the consensus is that one who is just visiting chutz la’aretz does not say it (assuming people will not notice his divergence (see Tefilla K’hilchata 19:(49)), whereas a chutz la’aretz person does not say it while in Israel, at least if davening with a minyan (Mishneh Halachot ibid.).

Regarding amen, the question is a little harder. While it is forbidden to answer amen to a beracha l’vatala, many poskim limit what is considered l’vatala in this regard. The Be’ur Halacha says that one is allowed to answer amen to a beracha, which according to the listener’s p’sak, is not called for. When someone praises Hashem appropriately, based on a legitimate opinion, it is fit to receive an amen (Pri Megadim, EA 215:1). Answering, though, is optional because the obligation to answer amen does not extend to a case in which it is only a doubt if the beracha and its amen are called for. The Har Tzvi (OCI:38) goes further, requiring to answer amen. Yabia Omer (IX, 38), regarding a Sephardi answering amen to a beracha on Hallel on Rosh Chodesh or to an Ashkenazi  woman’s beracha on a mitzva in which she is exempt, disagrees and rules not to answer. Your question about tefillin on Chol Hamo’ed (in chutz la’aretz, where there are two legitimate opinions as to whether to put them on) would seem to depend on this question, and the majority opinion is that he may answer amen.

Regarding bHlo, it would seem that, indeed, because of the problem of hefsek, it is better not to voluntarily answer amen. On the one hand, a hefsek between birchot Kri’at Shema and Shemoneh Esrei is less severe at night (see applications in Shulchan Aruch, OC 236:2; Mishna Berura 236:7 and elsewhere). However, since answering amen to bHlo is almost definitely not a requirement, it is better not say it (see similar idea in B’tzel Hachochma IV:25).

There are three opinions among the Tannaim (see Ketubot 34a) about the extent of the prohibition of ma’aseh Shabbat (receiving the main benefit of a melacha done on Shabbat – see Rama, Orach Chayim 318:1; Mishna Berura 318:4). The most accepted opinion (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 318:1) is Rabbi Yehuda’s: if the violation was b’meizid (on purpose), the violator may never use the result; other people may use it after Shabbat. For a violation b’shogeg (by mistake), the violator and others may use the result, but only after Shabbat. You are talking about b’meizid. (Poskim primarily agree that although we generally consider one who was brought up not Shabbat observant as a tinok shenishba, that is regarding possible sanctions against him. His actions in ignoring the laws of Shabbat, though, are considered b’meizid.)

Therefore, your friend is forbidden to eat the fish. The Mishna Berura (318:4) rules that he is allowed to sell them (the Ktav Sofer, OC 50 says that when selling was the violator’s original intention, the benefit of selling is forbidden). Therefore, he is certainly allowed to give them away as a present, and ostensibly you would be allowed to eat them.

We, though, must discuss a complication. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 99:5) rules that if one purposely mixes non-kosher food with enough kosher food for bitul, the “mixer” is forbidden to eat the mixture, but others are permitted. It is also forbidden for a person on whose behalf the mixer acted. The Magen Avraham (318:2) states that logically the same thing should apply to ma’aseh Shabbat, i.e., the result should be forbidden forever not only to the violator but also for one on whose behalf he desecrated Shabbat. However, the Magen Avraham concludes that the Beit Yosef’s logic regarding bitul does not apply here. There, we are stringent because it is likely that one would improperly do bitul for a friend’s benefit since doing bitul is a weak aveira; Since Shabbat is a serious aveira, Chazal were not as worried that people would violate it on someone else behalf. On the other hand, the Ktav Sofer (ibid.) says that a mechallel Shabbat on a regular basis is willing to do so even for others. Whether or not we accept this Ktav Sofer is not a simple matter (see discussion in Bemareh Habazak I:31).

There are additional reasons for leniency. The Maharhsal and Taz (YD 99:10) say that the prohibition on the beneficiary of bitul is only if he was aware and/or happy about the perpetration. If the recipient was not in favor of it, he may benefit. The Pri Chadash (YD 99:13) argues. The machloket appears to be whether the penalty is to discourage from sin the perpetrator or the recipient. The lenient opinions seem to apply to your case, as well, as you do not want him to desecrate Shabbat. Furthermore, here your friend presumably fished primarily for himself (and perhaps more for the sport than for the fish), not for you. Indeed, we find regarding a non-Jew who did work for himself and for others, Halacha views it as the main intention being for himself (Shulchan Aruch, OC 276:2).

First, let us consider what a kohen could do with teruma he received. It is forbidden to eat teruma when either the eater (Rambam, Terumot 7:1) or the teruma (ibid. 2:14) is tameh. We assume that all kohanim in our times are tameh even after going to a mikveh because we lack ash from a para aduma required to remove tuma from a human corpse. (Poskim assume that kohanim have been exposed to corpses at some time despite the prohibition to do so.) Therefore, a kohen would not be able to eat the teruma.

Not all teruma is tameh because solid foods become tameh only after they have been muchshar l’kabel tumah, i.e., prepared to become tameh by being touched by one of seven liquids (usually, water) to the owner’s satisfaction (Vayikra 11:38, Rambam, Tumat Ochalin 1:1-2). This occurs only sometimes.

A kohen may feed teruma that is pure to his animal (Rambam, Terumot 6:1). A great amount of teruma removed centrally is given to the zoo and safari after animals have been transferred to a kohen’s ownership. Fundamentally, teruma that is fit for human consumption may not be given to animals, but authorities are lenient because kohanim will anyway not eat it (see Derech Emuna, ad loc. 10). If teruma is tameh, it should be burnt, and a kohen may benefit from its burning (Rambam, ibid. 2:14). Thus, olive oil teruma is of use to a kohen for lighting.

Apparently, your question is not about the kohanim’s welfare, but about your mitzva to give the teruma to a kohen even if he does not particularly want it. But is there really a mitzva? Not necessarily. The Rambam and Ramban (Sefer Hamitzvot, shoresh 12) dispute whether hafrashat (removal of) teruma and giving it to a kohen are two parts of one mitzva or two independent mitzvot. While each implies it is a mitzva to give it to a kohen, the Netivot Hamishpat (243:8) states that one is not required to do so physically. Rather, one sets aside part of the produce as teruma, and Hashem has determined that it belongs to the kohanim, with the owner deciding which one can come and get it. The Pri Chadash (Yoreh Deah 61:1) suggests that this is the reason there is no beracha if and when one does actually give it. There is also an opinion that there is a mitzva (see opinions in Derech Emuna, Terumot 2:(361)).

Despite the existence of opinions that it is a mitzva, many poskim say that one should not give teruma in our days to a kohen. There is a major question whether we should rely on the kohanim’s presumption of being valid kohanim (see discussion in Shach, YD 322:9). The Chazon Ish (Shemitta 5:12) argues that since we no longer have a beit din that interrogates to confirm the authenticity of kohanim’s claims, we do not have grounds to trust that they are allowed to receive teruma. He reasons that it is therefore wrong to give them the teruma. The Rama (Orach Chayim 457:2) brings two opinions on whether one gives them challa, which is parallel to teruma, in chutz la’aretz, where it can be eaten by a kohen who is a tameh meit if he is too young to have tumah coming from his body. The Mishna Berura (457:22) explains the opinion that one does not as being due to insufficient pedigree. The Maharit (I:85) is among those who does trust a kohen’s pedigree sufficiently to give them teruma, for example, tameh oil that he can use for burning, as the Rama in Yoreh Deah (331:19) rules.

 Another reason to not give teruma to a kohen is that one should remove it from human access someone mistakenly eats it (see Pesachim 33b). Although the Rama (ibid.) is lenient that kohanim will not make a mistake, he refers to a case where there the kohen can benefit from the gift, not to a nominal giving for the giver to perform a (possible) mitzva, only for the kohen to dispose of it.

In summary, the standard practice of not giving teruma to a kohen (except for organized donations to animals) is likely halachically indicated and not a matter of laziness.

We wrote in the past about whether it is permitted to fly a kite on Shabbat. We concluded that there are not sufficient grounds to forbid it, despite the possibility a person could make mistakes in the process (as is possible regarding many permitted Shabbat activities). Your question relates to an important scenario, especially because kites often get stuck in trees.

It is certainly forbidden to climb the tree in order to free the kite. It is forbidden to climb trees on Shabbat, out of concern that one who does so will pull off a branch or fruit from the tree (Beitza 36b). Although there is discussion if this prohibition applies to totally barren trees (see Eiruvin 100b), the halacha is that it applies to all trees and firm vegetation (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 336:1) as long as it is above three tefachim off the ground (ibid. 2). It is also forbidden to lean a ladder against the tree and climb the ladder, due to a prohibition to use a tree or that which is considered the “side of the tree” (Shabbat 154b; Shulchan Aruch ibid. 13).

Is it permitted to, without climbing, free the kite by pulling on the kite strongly? In many cases in which the kite is strongly intertwined with the leaves and branches, pulling strongly enough to remove the kite will certainly knock off parts of the tree even if that is not his intention (p’sik reishei). Assuming that one has no use for what comes off, this would be only a Rabbinic violation of Shabbat even if were done on purpose (see Shabbat 73b). According to most poskim, a p’sik reishei is forbidden even on a Rabbinic prohibition (Mishna Berura 314:11; Yabia Omer I, OC 19 cites poskim on both sides of the debate).

What about cases in which it is not definite that any part of the tree will be severed? It is forbidden to shake trees or parts of trees (Rama, OC 336:13; Mishna Berura 336:63, based on Beit Yosef in the name of Orchot Chayim). This is forbidden because it is using the tree (see above) (see Shabbat 155a; Aruch Hashulchan, OC 336:37). Since this is not just a violation of muktzeh, it is forbidden not only when one does so directly with his hand, but even with another instrument, e.g., the kite string (see Shabbat 155a). This is apparently so even if he did not do so intentionally but as a p’sik reishei. Seemingly whenever one has to pull on a caught kite, branches and leaves will be moved.

Even if one could just lift the kite out without moving anything, it would still be forbidden. The gemara (ibid.) forbids placing things on a tree, as it is prohibited to use a tree on Shabbat. The Rama (OC 336:1) is among those who say that it is likewise forbidden to remove things from a tree. Some understand that the Rosh (Shabbat 5:2) does not view removing things from a tree as using it (see Shevet Halevi IV:74). This is part of the Shevet Halevi’s grounds for allowing one to easily pick a tallit that accidentally fell on a low bush. However, assuming the part of the tree in question is at least 10 tefachim (about three feet) high, there would still be a prohibition out of concern one might climb the tree in order to remove the object (see Rosh ibid.; Mishna Berura 336:12; Shevet Halevi ibid.). Indeed, the Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (16:7) forbids removing a ball on Shabbat from a tree upon which it fell, whether doing so by hand or with the help of a pole. While it is not necessary to point this out from a halachic perspective, note that the chances one will come to climb the tree to rescue the kite are probably higher than in the classic case of placing something in a tree above ten tefachim.

In conclusion, once the kite is stuck in the tree, it should not be taken down on Shabbat, in any manner. This is something the kite flyer should consider before flying it. A rabbi might be wise to consider the chances that kids will know/remember this halacha and be disciplined enough to follow it, when setting policy for his community

As we have written (see Living the Halachic Process III, D-21), we believe in the legitimacy of the various minhagim for which days of sefira to observe and that one may choose different ones on different years according to needs. Certainly, then, one should respect someone else’s choice. True, it is proper for a community to have set practices that all conform to, including in this matter (Rama, Orach Chayim 493:3). However, in the great majority of contemporary Jewish communities, there is a great mix of people from various places of origin and backgrounds. While in certain areas of halacha, community consensuses have developed, the poskim recognize sefirat ha’omer as one in which diversity still exists (see Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim I:159).

One can ask, though: considering the different opinions, is it okay to make a wedding at a time that puts people in a situation of choosing to do things that are ostensibly forbidden for them? The Minchat Yitzchak (IV:84) deals with a wedding of Sephardi boy and an Ashkenazi girl in Buenos Aires which needed to be around Lag Ba’omer. Ashkenazim (in that place, at least) can have weddings on Lag Ba’omer but not after; Sephardim can have weddings after Lag Ba’omer but (probably) not on it. Although the Minchat Yitzchak arrived at a way of doing it which could work for everyone, he posited that participants could not take part in a wedding seuda that would go against their minhag of sefira (the ceremony without lively music would be permitted). The simple reading of the Chatam Sofer (I:142) is similar.

However, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC I:159) posits that everyone can take part freely in the wedding during such times. His rationale is that once a marriage has taken place, it creates simcha obligations that break normal rules. For example, a couple who get married at the end of Nisan are allowed to continue with sheva berachot festivities, which should have been forbidden for the other participants. Rav Moshe even claims, based on the end of the Chatam Sofer’s teshuva, that the latter agrees that people can take part in the wedding.

Rav S.Z. Auerbach (as cited in Halichot Shlomo, Moadim 11:19) similarly posits as a simple matter that if a couple is celebrating a wedding, invitees can take part. (He and Rav Moshe seem to disagree whether one could take part in the celebration if they got married at a time that was not appropriate for their own minhag.) It is possible that the Minchat Yitzchak would agree that given the practice that people do get married at times that do not fit all, one could take part b’di’eved.

In any case, we prefer the approach of Rabbis Feinstein and Auerbach for several reasons: the approach makes sense; those poskim are among those who most impact on our rulings; it is proper to be lenient on sefira questions (Chok Yaakov 493:2; Chatam Sofer ibid.). Imagine that we would be limited by the chumrot of all the sefira opinions and consider the not so distant three weeks with no weddings. It turns out that 4 months of weddings are squeezed into just over a month, which in many communities causes problems of hall availability and conflict that can be very stressful (and/or expensive) to couples and their families.

There is one further reason to allow full participation (see Halichot Shlomo ibid.). Seudot mitzva create all sorts of dispensations regarding national mourning. We know about eating meat at siyumim during the Nine Days. For a closer example, according to many (see Dirshu 493:8), there can be dancing at a hachnasat sefer Torah during sefira. Therefore, music/dancing at a wedding might not be forbidden, as it is an important part of an important seudat mitzva (see Rama, OC 338:2). In fact, according to some, the main reason not to get married is that it is a bad omen to get married at such a time (see Shvut Yaakov II:35). Thus, there is an additional reason for dancing at the seudat mitzva being fine.

The question of BK during Shemoneh Esrei is a complex one that can depend on several factors. The mishna (Berachot 34a) states that a chazan should do BK if he is the only kohen there and he is confident that he can return to complete chazarat hashatz without confusion. The implication, as the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 128:20) rules, is that if there were another kohen available, the chazan would not recite BK. The Radbaz (IV:293) reasons that the same thing should be so for one in the middle of his personal Shemoneh Esrei – if and only if he is the only kohen should he go up. The Magen Avraham (128:40) accepts the Radbaz, and this is the first opinion cited in the Mishna Berura 128:106).

However, many disagree with this Radbaz and Magen Avraham. The Rav Pealim (III, OC 4) points out that in the mishna’s case, the chazan is up to the point of Shemoneh Esrei in which BK is recited. If he is anywhere else in Shemoneh Esrei, we can say that BK is a hefsek (improper break). Indeed, a second opinion in the Mishna Berura makes this distinction, ruling that only if the kohen is up to the correct place for BK does he recite it, and this is the opinion that seems prevalent today (see Tefilla K’hilchata 14:35; Yalkut Yosef, Birkat Kohanim 21).

Your question implies that since the kohen says Shemoneh Esrei “along with the chazan” (a system that has certain advantages for some somewhat slow daveners – beyond our scope) he would be up to the right place. Then, almost all agree that he should do BK when he is the only kohen. If so, we do not know why he is reluctant to do this. However, there are two factors that impact whether he is required to do so.

First, one whose tefilla will be confused by doing BK (see aforementioned mishna, Berachot 34a), does not recite BK (Sha’ar Hatziyun 128:83). (Admittedly, it is hard to know what qualifies as being confused). Yalkut Yosef (ibid.) does cite an opinion that confusion applies only to a chazan, as everyone will be waiting for him to resume tefilla, and not to an individual. However, the Pri Megadim (Eshel Avraham 128:40) is among the more accepted opinions that confusion plays a role here as well.

Another factor is that the obligation to do BK has to be activated in a timely fashion. One violates his obligation for BK only if he has been called to do so, based on the pasuk in this context “amor lahem” – say to them (see Beit Yosef, OC 128). There is another halacha that a kohen can do BK only if he stepped toward the duchan during the beracha of R’tzei (Sota 38b). So if this kohen failed to move forward at least a little bit at that time (he may do so during Shemoneh Esrei, but the kohen in question presumably does not), he is disqualified. Realize that usually a kohen is not called until right before BK (if he is the only kohen, he will not be called at all – Shulchan Aruch ibid. 10.). So for those who did not step forward, it will be too late to obligate them. It is strange, then, that some poskim, including the Radbaz (ibid.) discuss a Torah obligation of BK superseding the Rabbinic mitzva of Shemoneh Esrei even before he is called (Halachot Ketanot I:64 points out this difficulty). It is difficult to say that the kohen violates his obligation if he does not prepare himself for BK on time. In theory, someone could force the issue by telling your kohen earlier in chazarat hashatz to prepare himself (based on Magen Avraham 128:40). However, we do not think that this is appropriate behavior.

So, one might encourage the kohen to find the best way to make BK possible (see Living the Halachic Process vol. IV, A-16). However, we do not think he should be shamed into doing so when he might have a reason not to.