ASK THE RABBI

If Reuven left his property in a place/manner it has no right to be, and Shimon’s animal went by and purposely kicked it, Shimon must pay damages, but Shimon is exempt from the animal’s inadvertent damage while walking by (Bava Kama 32a; Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 389:20). You might compare your bicycle to Shimon’s animal. However, the exemption of inadvertent damage to improperly positioned objects applies to damage done by one’s animal, not done by a person (Tosafot, Bava Kama 27b; the person powering/steering the bicycle is considered a direct damager).

The mishna (Bava Kama 27a) says that if Reuven left his vessel in the public domain and Shimon tripped over it and broke it, he is exempt. The gemara (ibid. 27b) wonders why we cannot expect Shimon to be careful, and cites four answers. The most accepted one (Shulchan Aruch, CM 412:1) is that people are not expected to inspect their walking path. You might claim that, similarly, you cannot be expected to lead your bike through a tight place without possibly scratching an obstructing car. However, poskim (Nimukei Yosef to gemara ibid., Yam Shel Shlomo, Bava Kama 5:9) say that the leniency is limited to cases where the damager was unaware that the object was present, but when he knows there is something to avoid damaging, we expect him to succeed. The fact that the object is not supposed to be there and the damager’s lack of intent to damage do not seem to exempt.  

A stronger ground for exemption, although not for too many cases, is based on Rav’s explanation to the gemara’s exemption – in the mishna’s case, Reuven’s vessels made the public path impassable. This is based on the concept that in certain cases, a person can take the law into his own hands to protect his interests (Shulchan Aruch, CM 4:1). So, if the situation warrants it, a person may purposely break the vessels in order to get by, and he certainly is exempt if when trying to squeeze by, he accidentally did damage (Bava Kama 28a; Shulchan Aruch, CM 412:2).

Regarding your question, each case can be different and can be unclear. How crucial is it to squeeze by (i.e., is there no reasonable detour?)? How likely is it that you will damage the car, and does it make a difference? What is the halacha if you could have gotten by without damage, but you did a poor job? The Aruch Hashulchan (CM 412:4) seems to take a measured, practical approach to this matter, understanding the passerby’s predicament, but gives few details. I saw an approach that gives great leeway to the passerby (Mishpetei Hatorah, Bava Kama 53), but it was low on sources and proofs.

There is a third reason not to have to pay in certain cases. The damage a slow-moving bicycle might make to a car is likely to be minor. Damage payment is either to fix the object or to pay for its depreciation. (There will not be a need to replace the car.) In Living the Halachic Process (I, J-6) we pointed out that only when the normal thing is to fix such damage can the owner demand it to be fixed. This might depend not only on the extent of the scratch but also how nice the car looks other than the new scratch. When repairs are not called for, one needs to determine depreciation, and depreciation is also affected by the above factors. For an old, beat-up looking car, the amount due could thus be 0 NIS.

It is good that you not only regret what you did but want to make amends properly. Given that there are many unknown pertinent factors (to us and even to you), we will provide general rules and ideas. You can decide yourself or ask us or others for further advice.

The gemara (Bava Kama 118a-b) brings opinions and distinctions on the level of awareness the victim needs for the return to remove the thief’s culpability. We now present the Shulchan Aruch’s (Choshen Mishpat 355:1) summary regarding inanimate objects, which we will call money. If the victim knew money was stolen, he must become aware it was returned, although the realization need not come at the time of return. If the victim was unaware the money was stolen, it is enough return it to his possession without any knowledge [but in a way that he will get to use it].

There are different opinions whether the victim’s knowledge of the theft means that he saw the thief taking it (Rashba, Bava Kama ibid., who says he then has to remove the victim’s grievance) or just that he became aware (Ra’avad, ibid.). The Shulchan Aruch’s language implies that general knowledge suffices. However, it is unclear how to view a case when one notices he cannot find money but considers many possibilities – it was stolen; it was lost; he misremembered how much there was; or it will show up soon. In your case, you are unsure what your father knows/suspects. It is at least proper, if not required, for your father to become aware that he has more money at his disposal than he thought he had prior to the return, and this would fulfill your basic obligation.  

Let us now put things in broader moral perspective. A main discussion in the halachic sources is on whether if the questionably returned object gets lost, the thief is still obligated. This is likely linked to when one fulfills the positive mitzva to return the stolen object (Vayikra 5:23), which significantly weakens the theft’s stain and consequences (see Makkot 16a). Indeed, one cannot get atonement for repenting on sins between man and man without rectifying the wrong to the extent possible, e.g., by returning what was stolen (Rambam, Teshuva 2:9). One must also appease a victim over the hurt (practical and/or emotional) caused by the sin (ibid.). Regarding theft, if one takes something and returns it five minutes later without the owner’s knowledge, there is no hurt. If someone has $15,000 stolen for years, he might have lost opportunities when it was needed, and/or spent unpleasant time looking for it and worrying, and/or have been upset wondering if someone stole it, who, and why, etc. Therefore, it behooves the thief to ask explicitly for forgiveness.

However, we accept Rav Yisrael Salanter’s premise (see Living the Halachic Process I, H-5) that an atonement seeker must not cause the victim additional pain in the process. On the one hand, $15,000 in cash just appearing could raise confusion, suspicions, and sometimes technical problems. It might work to “admit it anonymously” (e.g., by hiring a lawyer to give the money without divulging your identity; sending an anonymous email on where to find the money) along with a heartfelt request for forgiveness. Hiding your identity even due to embarrassment is justifiable, especially if it makes it more likely for you to act promptly (see Gittin 55a; Shulchan Aruch Harav, CM, Gezeila 8). Considering how much upset knowing that any confidante robbed him will cause and whether he will suspect someone else, other alternatives may be better. (Giving extra tzedaka is anyway recommended.) B’hatzlacha in choosing the best way to rectify your stumble; hopefully your father’s nachas from you will bring great rectification.  

The two major categories of situations in which doing melacha is permitted are: 1. When the purpose of the work is appropriate for Chol Hamo’ed, e.g., it enhances the chag, it is for a mitzva or communal needs. 2. Davar ha’aved – i.e., if the work will not be done on Chol Hamo’ed, a loss will be incurred. While davar ha’aved permits even to perform “expert work” (Mishna Berura 545:35), it is forbidden to purposely set up the situation whereby the work will be needed specifically on Chol Hamo’ed (Shulchan Aruch, OC 538:1) While the classic cases are of loss to possessions (see ibid. 537-8), poskim posit that defying an employer’s work policy in a way that will likely result in firing or disciplinary steps is also davar ha’aved (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 67:11), which seems to be your case.

All things being equal, it is proper to arrange matters so that one’s yearly vacation time includes [as much of] Chol Hamo’ed [as possible]. Halacha is aware that in practical life, often “all things are not equal,” including in regards to choosing vacations (see Zichron Shlomo, ruling #18 of Rav Moshe Feinstein; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 67:14). To deal with the many “moving pieces” in such matters, it is best to discuss borderline cases with one’s personal rav. We will focus on what you asked: assuming you may work because of davar ha’aved, can you receive payment for it, or is the payment gain rather than preventing loss?

The primary problem with working on Chol Hamo’ed is any melacha you must do, but you are correct that being paid complicates matters. The gemara (Mo’ed Katan 12a) says that the workers in the Exilarch’s house were allowed to benefit from their work on Chol Hamo’ed because it was not in the form of classical pay. The Rosh (Mo’ed Katan 2:9) infers from this that it is forbidden to pay the worker even when his actions are permitted on Chol Hamo’ed because the pay makes it “like mundane matters.”

The problem of receiving reward differs from the parallel issue on Shabbat and Yom Tov, which is even when the person is inactive. Here it is a problem only if the pay relates to activity with a problematic element, with the pay tipping the scale towards stringency (see Noda B’yehuda II, OC 104; Chut Shani, OC 542:1). Some sources focus their requirements on the Jewish employer who employs a Jew, (see language of the Shulchan Aruch, OC 542:1 and Be’ur Halacha ad loc.). While one might think that there would not be a problem if the employer is not Jewish, there are indications that there is a problem from the worker’s perspective (see discussions in Chol Hamo’ed K’hilchato, p. 307, Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 66:(164)).

If your work is not based on melacha or tiresome work, payment may be permitted (Noda B’yehuda ibid.). Also, the Rama (OC 542:1) rules that when one’s work needs to be done because of the employer’s davar ha’aved, the worker can charge for it; the Be’ur Halacha (ad loc.) allows relying on this only when there is no good alternative. Arguably, since you are working due to davar ha’aved, you too can get paid for it. This seems the assumption of several poskim discussing allowing employees to work to avoid being fired, who do not raise the caveat of not being paid for it. While perhaps they refer to workers who are paid a flat amount, not by the hour, this distinction is unproven conjecture.

In any case, since you have a set job, it is permitted to receive the pay because it is b’havla’ah (“swallowed up” by inclusion with other earning – see Shulchan Aruch, OC 306:4), even if you are paid per hour (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 28:65). According to most poskim (ibid. 66:40; Moadim U’zmanim IV:301, against Chut Shani, OC 242:21), this works also for Chol Hamo’ed.

In the final analysis, you may get paid.

While it is not simple to apply the gemara’s rules on when one is required to do hashavat aveida (returning lost objects, =hshav) to modern cases, it appears the Jewish bus company is obligated. Between the brand of air pods, the bus (or possibilities of buses) it was left on, and the date, there is enough of a siman.

Presumably, a clear majority of air pods in the stash were lost quite a while ago, and if their owners did not come to claim them yet, most of them are after yei’ush. This alone does not erase the bus company’s obligation to return them because yei’ush must precede the finder’s taking them (Bava Metzia 21b). However, Tosafot (Bava Kama 66a) posits that yei’ush has taken hold, just that the finder cannot remove the existing obligation of hshav. According to the simple understanding of Tosafot, that obligation is not transferred to you if you received them after yei’ush (see Kehillot Yaakov, Bava Metzia 25). While you should not facilitate the company’s abrogation of hshav, it should suffice for you if they have legitimate grounds (see below) to believe they have done all they need to.

However, there is another approach to the matter of yei’ush after the finder finds it. The Ramban (to ibid. 26a) and Ritva (to ibid. 21b) explain that the obligation of hshav makes the finder a shomer for the loser. Consequently, the object is considered in the loser’s possession, in which case we say that yei’ush has no impact. Accordingly, the yei’ush will not help regarding you either. Without bringing further analysis (see K’tzot Hachoshen 259:1; Imrei Moshe 37), it is difficult to justify taking the air pods based on the standard rules of yei’ush. We now look for other ideas.

We have discussed (see Living the Halachic Process III, I-12 & IV, I-4) that operators of venues who are concerned about being overburdened with lost objects can stipulate to those who frequent them how long they will hold onto them. This probably works based on mechila (relinquishing) of the right to hshav. It is proper to stipulate in an explicit manner so the losers will accept the provision. However, it is plausible that those who use a large transportation system realize that they have lost and found policies and implicitly accept them.

This idea is augmented by other plausible grounds for leniency. While one is expected to exert himself to do hshav, he is not required to outlay money that will not be returned for it (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 265:1). Large bus companies often provide lost and found services that cost money (labor and space) as part of their customer service, and it is likely they are not required to do so (at least, for free). Therefore, if they agree to do so voluntarily, they should be able to set their own reasonable policies, even if their policy would not be halachically valid if they were fully obligated in hshav.

Finally, the idea of allowing people to essentially swap air pods (you can take Reuven’s and if Revuen asks for his, he can take Shimon’s) could possibly conform with the halacha for a case where it is not feasible or required (based on sheer volume) for the company to keep lost items forever. In some cases, it is permitted for the finder to sell the object and be prepared to give the proceeds to the loser (Shulchan Aruch, CM 267:23-25). While the policy you describe is different from that halacha, it seems primarily equivalent (i.e., there is a plan by which the loser will be compensated, likely to his satisfaction).

Therefore, for a combination of the grounds mentioned, we can justify the company’s policy as a win-win situation for almost all and allow you to take someone else’s lost object.

It is good that you realize that guns not only protect but also can cause danger to its owners and their surroundings. We of course are not experts in the tradeoffs for each specific case, but will try to provide a general Torah perspective. Torah Judaism is often based on finding the critical balance, and we start with your well-chosen sources. Although the Shulchan Aruch (427:8) says literally to remove and guard from any “stumbling block that can endanger a life,” we are not actually commanded to remove the dangerous things, but to manage them properly so that the danger is removed or sufficiently limited. Roofs and pits are dangerous, but they serve purposes; therefore, the roofs are to be fenced and the pits covered (ibid. 7). One may own and use oxen, but they must be guarded when proven necessary (see Shemot 21:29).

The Torah requires Jews to be prepared to protect each other. including from attacking enemies or bandits (see Rambam’s Sefer Hamitzvot, Lo Ta’aseh 297; Yereim 196). One is allowed to use force even to repel a burglar, even though this could cause the death of either the burglar or the homeowner (see Rashi to Shemot 22:1; Magen Avraham 329:5). To make this feasible, the average person needs a weapon, and every time period has its example. In fact, when Chazal discuss going to repel an attack, it talks about taking weapons, even on Shabbat (Eruvin 45a).

On the other hand, weapons are not glorified in Jewish thought and practice. We find an aversion between things of special sanctity and weapons. Metal could not be used in building the Beit Hamikdash because of its use for swords (Shemot 20:21; Melachim I, 6:7). One should avoid (when possible) having (uncovered) weapons in a shul (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 151:6; Mishna Berura ad loc. 22). Connection to the sword is fundamental to Eisav’s being (Bereishit 27:40), whereas Yaakov was a peace lover who used weapons only as necessary (see ibid. 22 and ibid. 32:8-9 with Rashi).

The main difference between the prohibition of having a dangerous animal and the permissibility of having weapons is that the animal is liable to act without its owner’s approval, whereas a person is presumed to use his weapons properly until proven otherwise. Also, even dangerous animals are permitted, based on special need (a dangerous location) and/or precautions (always tied up) (Bava Kama 83a; Shulchan Aruch, CM 409:3).

This does not mean that it is wise for any given individual to possess guns. Accidents occur, guns can be stolen, and their presence can “up the ante” of a conflict. Some prefer more defensive precautions, e.g., pepper spray, connectivity with security services. But the weighing of plusses and minuses depend on the time and place, as well as the individual’s circumstances, skill, and training.

It is interesting to contrast the firearm policies of the United States and the Jewish State. In America, the Second Amendment guarantees (on some level – let’s avoid debate) the rights to “bear arms,” even when few have served in the armed forces. In Israel, where a high percentage of the population has/does serve, one needs special circumstances to be eligible for a private gun license. It also requires significant training in usage and safety precautions. Israeli society has shown repeatedly that, in our circumstances, it is crucial to have guns in any vicinity, but not in the hands of every citizen.

While we leave the details to experts, we agree that the safety of Jewish communities and individuals may be enhanced by more access to firearms than in the past. An individual should consider his specifics to determine whether he is best served by having a gun.

It is a fair assumption that the videoing process only included Rabbinic prohibitions. We will see the significance of that below.

We will start with the assumption that the video was done by a Jew. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 318:1) rules like the middle opinion in Ketubot 34a, that if one violated Shabbat intentionally, the result of his action is forbidden for the violator forever but is permitted for others after Shabbat. The Mishna Berura (318:5) comments that while the household of the violator may not use that which was done even after Shabbat, others can, including people whom the violator had in mind when he violated Shabbat. Therefore, ostensibly, even your relative might be permitted to benefit from the video.

However, we must consider two issues. The K’tav Sofer (OC 50), regarding a restaurant, posits that while generally a Shabbat violator may sell the food he cooked on Shabbat, that is because he is penalized for his violation in that he cannot eat the food himself. However, in a case of someone who regularly cooks on Shabbat to sell to customers, the penalty must preclude his doing according to plan, so that it is forbidden for him to sell. Consequently, it is forbidden to buy from him. While this could forbid the celebrants to pay the videographer, this does not impact their showing it to you.

The bigger issue is the question of when Shabbat “ends” in this regard. There are opinions that anyone who wants to benefit needs to wait bichdei sheya’asu (the amount of time it would take to get the result if one started after Shabbat). This question is critical here, because one cannot video the bar mitzva after Shabbat, so requiring bichdei sheya’asu would forbid it forever. This concept is found regarding a non-Jew who did work on behalf of a Jew, even in cases that the Jew did not improperly tell him to do so (Beitza 24b). Two possible reasons are advanced for this halacha. Rashi (ad loc.) says that it is in order to not benefit from work done on Shabbat. Tosafot (ad loc.) says that it is to reduce the chance one will ask the non-Jew to do work. The Pri Megadim (Eshel Avraham 325:22) reasons that Rashi’s reason should apply to a Jew who regularly violates Shabbat, whereas according to Tosafot’s reason, we do not expect a religious Jew to ask a Shabbat desecrator to do work on Shabbat. The Mishna Berura (ibid.) adds a reason not to say bichdei sheya’asu for a Jew’s violation – a Jew will not listen to a request to do melacha. One can argue that this does not apply to regular Shabbat violators. The Pri Megadim leaves the matter unresolved, and there is not a consensus among contemporary poskim (in Bemareh Habazak I:31 we leaned toward leniency; Orchot Shabbat 25:(25) leans toward stringency). Bichdei sheya’asu is also less likely to apply to Rabbinic violations (see Mishna Berura 325:42).

If a non-Jew did the videoing, it should definitely require bichdei sheya’asu. On the other hand, the extension of the prohibition to benefit to all Jews is only for Torah-level violations, whereas for Rabbinic ones, it is only for the non-Jew’s intended beneficiaries (Shulchan Aruch, OC 325:8). The Mishna Berura (ad loc. 38) includes members of the recipient’s household and some of his guests in the prohibition, but based on primary sources (see Beit Yosef, OC 515), it is likely that a “relative” viewing the video is not included.

We have seen significant grounds for leniency; there are additional, creative grounds, but we do not wish to commit them to writing. Therefore, if you feel that watching the video helps maintain a good relationship with the family, not only may you watch the video, but you should do so. May your relationship help bring increased appreciation and observance of mitzvot to the bar mitzva and his family.

Since this case is no longer practical, we can discuss more freely both principles, and possible arguments relating to this specific case.

There are two bases for obligation to pay for a service one person provides to another: agreement to pay; payment for neheneh (benefit). One of the major sources about pay for neheneh is the gemara (Bava Metzia 101a), which discusses someone who planted trees in his friend’s field without permission. The gemara concludes that if the field is fit for planting, we estimate how much the work is worth, and if it is not, the worker gets the lower of possible payments. According to Rashi (ad loc.) and the S’ma (375:2), this means the lower between expenses outlaid and benefit provided. In other words, when there is benefit but it was not done in a way that should be appreciated, there is no payment beyond expenses.

There are subjective factors that help determine whether a job was called for. For one, the Rama (Choshen Mishpat 375:4) rules that if the field that was planted was owned by a man who usually does the work himself, the outside help is considered largely uncalled for. Even though most people would appreciate the work, the main benefit is saving the owner from hiring another worker, so when he does his own work, the owner only has to pay for the benefit of not having to toil. In the other direction, according to the Shulchan Aruch (CM 375:3) if the owner “built on” the work that was done, he cannot subsequently claim that he did not gain from it. The Shach (ad loc. 3) cites dissenters. One has to weigh the circumstances in each case.

Let us analyze your case. One could claim that the work was done with the beneficiaries’ knowledge, and therefore they should be responsible. However, this is wrong because their silent acquiescence was based on a misunderstanding, and agreement b’ta’ut does not obligate. The lack of protest could have some significance. There is an opinion that even when a recipient did benefit, he is exempt if he warned that he refuses to pay (see discussion in Pitchei Choshen, Sechirut 8:(64)), and here they at least did not warn.

Should we characterize the performance as fitting, since people enjoyed it, and enjoyment is valued at weddings? I have attended many weddings and am hard-pressed to remember such a performance. Most people pay good money for a band, and participants often do creative shtik, but professional shtik is uncommon in the circles I know, even at weddings at which expense is not a factor. Therefore, it would be difficult for the entertainer to prove that he deserves more than a return of expenses, which are presumably small.

Furthermore, benefit refers to net benefit (e.g., regarding the field, the vegetation planted must be preferable to alternatives). Even if many people enjoyed, others could have been appalled by such a childish performance at a wedding. Also, the time taken on it may have taken away from “valuable” eating, dancing, interacting, etc. time. Therefore, it is again hard to ascertain that there was benefit.

In all, it is unlikely that the families could be forced to pay any significant amount of money for this uninvited performance. Although the propriety of the entertainer’s actions was very questionable, paying him a not insulting amount might have been a proper act of chessed and/or avoiding machloket. (Others might argue that such a person must not be encouraged to do such things.)

The gemara (Chulin 107a) provides some of the rules for the kli (utensil) used for netilat yadayim, including that it must be able to hold a reviit of water. Potentially pertinent for your question, it says that it is unfit for use if it has a hole of a koness mashkeh (i.e., not only is the hole big enough for water to seep out through it, but water would even seep into the cup through the hole from an external pool of water.)

There is a machloket Rishonim as to the reason for the disqualification (see Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 159). According to the Semag, a cup with a hole of that size is not considered a kli (utensil) in regards to various halachic matters including netilat yadayim. According to the Rosh, the cup is generally a kli, but the area above the hole is considered beyond the confines of the kli (as it does not reliably hold water above that point). The issue is that the water must be poured onto the hands from the walls of the kli. One practical difference between the opinions is whether one can pour water onto the hands from the hole, not from the top of the cup. According to the Rosh, that is fine because you are pouring from the top of the kli-part of the cup (the cup should be able to hold a reviit up to the height of the hole). According to the Semag, the cup is totally lacking in status due to the hole, and it does not matter how high the hole is or from where the water is being poured. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 159:2) rules like the lenient Rosh that one can do netila through the hole. On the other hand, many Acharonim are machmir if the cup is made from pottery/ceramics (Mishna Berura 159:10). (We imagine your cup is ceramic, as metal and plastic ones rarely “chip.”)

Your case has elements of relative leniency and of relative stringency if the chips are big enough to be considered a hole. On the one hand, if there are only small chips on the top of the cup, it is hard to believe that this would disqualify the cup from being a kli, as it does not impede the use of the cup to hold liquid in any serious way. On the other hand, as opposed to the case of a hole in the middle of a cup, where the water will only go through the hole, from where will you pour the water? If you do it randomly or purposely from the not chipped places, then you are pouring from a place that extends beyond the height of a complete circumference of cup, which, based on what we have seen should be a problem. The Mishna Berura (159:12) says that while it is not ideal to use a cup with a piece missing on top, if that is the only available cup, one should pour out from the chipped part, which is lower. Practically speaking, though, unless it is a broad or deep chip, it will be hard to pour only or even mainly through the crack.

Perhaps the following will help. The Eshel Avraham (to Magen Avraham 159:4) says that if the height of the cup is not uniform but that fact is not clearly recognizable to the eye, it is not a problem to pour from the higher side. His main logic is that “the Torah was not given to angels,” who can be exact. He also points out that, anyway, the surfaces upon which a cup normally sits are not exactly straight, so that slightly higher and lower is meaningless. Piskei Teshuvot (159:10) says that the same thing is true for slight height differences due to a chip. It is not clear to me how far one can take this comparison. If there is a slight dent in a plastic or metal cup, it is indeed hard to tell the height difference. Regarding ceramics, though, it is much more common for even small chips to make the area of the chip noticeably lower than the area right around it.

Therefore, in general, the best thing to do is to insert a filler material to more or less reverse the chipping. Although some sources discuss using filler of the same material (see Taz, OC 159:1), anything that works securely should be fine (see practical approach of Chazon Ish, OC 21:5).

When the fifteenth of Adar, celebrated as Purim in cities that were walled at the time of Yehoshua (notably including Yerushalayim), falls on Shabbat, when some of the mitzvot of Purim are inappropriate, the various mitzvot of the day are spread over three days, as we will explain. We will start conceptually and then review day-by-day activities.

Even in such a year, conceptually, the main day of “Shushan Purim” is still 15 Adar, even though it is the least “eventful” of the days. Therefore, matters that are connected directly to tefilla, and are not problematic on Shabbat, are done on Shabbat. This includes reading the story of the battle of Amalek (the last 9 p’sukim of Beshalach) as maftir and the special haftara and reciting Al HaNissim in Shemoneh Esrei and Birkat HaMazon.

Megillat Esther is not read on Shabbat for one of two reasons (Megilla 4b). Rabba says that it is out of fear that someone will carry the megilla in the public domain and thus desecrate Shabbat. Rav Yosef says it is because at the time of the megilla reading, poor people look forward to receiving charity, which they cannot do on Shabbat. As the rule is that Megillat Esther is never read later than the fifteenth of Adar (based on the words, “and they shall not pass,” see Megilla 2a) the reading is pushed forward to Friday, 14 Adar. One who is celebrating Purim Meshulash should be extra careful to hear the megilla with a minyan in such a year (Mishna Berura 690:61), as when megilla is read early, it requires a minyan.

Matanot la’evyonim (presents to the poor) follow suit and are given on Friday (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 688:6). After all, according to Rav Yosef, that was the reason to read the megilla early, and even Rabba must accept some level of linkage between reading the megilla and giving matanot la’evyonim (see Megilla 4b).

The seuda (festive meal) is held on Sunday, 16 Adar, according to most authorities (Shulchan Aruch ibid.). The Yerushalmi (Megilla 1:4) learns that it is not held on Shabbat because it must be a seuda whose obligation can be attributed only to Chazal’s decision at the time of Mordechai and Esther. On Shabbat, of course, there is a mitzva to have a festive meal irrespective of Purim. Therefore, it says to delay the seuda. There are opinions that one can/should have a Purim meal on Shabbat, and so some make an effort to have more food and wine than usual at the Shabbat-day meal (Purim Meshulash (Diblitzki) 5:11). At the Sunday meal, Al HaNissim is not recited, at least not in the body of Birkat HaMazon (see Mikraei Kodesh, (Harari) Purim 15:(34) in the name of Rav Yisraeli).

The mitzva of mishlo’ach manot (presenting foods to a friend) is apparently linked to the Purim seuda, and thus we give them on Sunday (Mishna Berura 688:18). Those who want to be have a Purim seuda on Shabbat (see above) can attempt to fulfill mishlo’ach manot as well by giving to a neighbor or having a guest at the meal.

Visitors to Yerushalayim over Shabbat (even if they celebrated a full Purim on Friday) are obligated (according to most authorities - see Mikraei Kodesh ibid. 15:30) to do the mitzvot of both Shabbat and Sunday (wherever they are on Sunday) even if they leave Yerushalayim soon after Shabbat. This is because the obligations of Sunday are tashlumin (a make-up date) for what ideally should have been done on Shabbat (Purim Meshulash 8:15). (One should give the mishlo’ach manot to one who is obligated in the mitzvot of Sunday). Based on the same logic, one who comes to Yerushalayim after Shabbat is not obligated (ibid.).

There is no construct through which to obligate Reuven. We will examine those that are close and see how they fall short.  

Responsibility for a worker: When a worker damages a neighbor in the process of doing a job, the basic halacha is that the worker alone is obligated, except possibly if he is paid on the basis of time (see Rama, Choshen Mishpat 306:2; Pitchei Choshen, Sechirut 7:25).  Common practice is for the employer to take responsibility, and this practice may be binding (see Eretz Hemdah ruling 79062; Dinei Avoda (Sadan) p. 434). Even so, this is only when the worker in the midst of work on the employer’s behalf, certainly not when he steals, all the more so if it is after the work is done. Even if a slave damages, his master is not obligated, all the more so, for a simple worker (Bava Kama 87a).

Creating a theft danger: There is a machloket whether one who knocked down the door of someone’s stable, enabling an animal to escape, is obligated to pay for the loss (Shulchan Aruch, CM 396:4). The Yam Shel Shlomo (Bava Kama 6:3) explains that the reason to obligate is that opening the door is a direct action to undo that which is keeping the animal in. This does not apply to just improving the chances for someone from without to succeed at stealing.

A neighbor’s obligation to remove danger (nizkei sh’cheinim): The Ramah (Bava Batra 1:18) obligates someone who did not fence off his property, thereby allowing robbers to come in and steal from his neighbor, whereas the Rosh (Bava Batra 2:17) exempts him. The Ramah compares this to the case in which Levi owns a wall separating his field from that of Yehuda, and Yehuda informs Levi that that the wall fell down so that their different crops will become kilayim. In that case, if Levi does not act, he must pay for the lost crops (Bava Kama 100a-b). The Rosh counters that the obligation is only when the mechanism that creates the problem begins immediately, which is not the case with robbers. The Rama (Choshen Mishpat 155:44) cites both opinions without a clear ruling. However, this cannot obligate Reuven, because even the Ramah requires Shimon to warn him, which he did not do.

Comparison to moser (garmi): The gemara (Bava Kama 116b-117b, codified in Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 388:2) has a construct called moser, which obligates Levi to pay for causing Yehuda’s things to be stolen by criminals. The classic case is when Levi gives (without being severely coerced) criminals information about Yehuda’s property, which encourages and/or aids their ability to steal his property. The gemara raises the question whether this obligation is a normal application of the laws of garmi (semi-direct causation of damage) or a special penalty. The more accepted opinion is that it is a normal application (see Maggid Mishneh, Chovel U’mazik 8:1).

While our case has similarity, the following are crucial differences that are important in the laws of garmi (whose parameters are very complex and elusive). Reuven did not realize that his hiring of pnt would bring about a theft (see Shach, CM 386:6). It was not necessarily likely that the hiring would cause the theft (it is unlikely that every neighbor of a place that pnt worked at is robbed). There is no “act of damaging” comparable to the moser’s informing the criminal. Therefore, we cannot use moser as a model for obligation without a source, of which we are not aware.

Therefore, we do not see any grounds to halachically obligate Reuven (in some cases, voluntary payment might be laudable).