ASK THE RABBI

You are wise to seek information and perspective to overcome natural feelings, which the gemara (Sanhedrin 94a) foresaw for some descendants of gerim to have about their identity for generations. (Mentors should ensure that conversion candidates consider such things). However, objectively, this ignores the 98+% “full part of the cup.”

 The Torah commands 36 times to treat a ger with love and not harm him (Bava Metzia 59b). This is partly because the average ger has social obstacles to overcome, after leaving family and needing to “learn the ropes.” It is also an expression of Hashem’s affection for one who choses to embrace a challenging path to serving Him to the fullest. A midrash (Shochar Tov 146:9) describes it beautifully with a mashal of a king who had special love for a deer that would follow his flock to their pen even though it is naturally undomesticated.

Potentially offensive sources are centered in two areas. Rav Yehuda Halevi (The Kuzari) speaks of certain special spiritual qualities that come from a Jew’s lineage, as a descendant of the forefathers. Not all agree. Some (Rav Soloveitchik, Al Hateshuva, p. 136; Rav Kook) posit that a ger receives all he needs, including connection to the forefathers, by joining the Jewish people through conversion (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 53:19). Some posit that gerim have Jewish-typical “neshamot,” just that they entered the world in a manner that required them to find their way back (Maharal, Tiferet Yisrael 1). The gemara (Shabbat 146a) indeed says that converts’ souls were present at Sinai and were thus awarded the relevant spiritual gains. (It is unnecessary to be as genetically Jewish as you, but it does not hurt.)

The Kuzari (I:115) says that while a ger draws close to Hashem, he will not be a prophet (the Rambam disagrees; the gemara, Sanhderin 39b, says the prophet Ovadia was a ger). The Kuzari posits that a ger cannot make it to the highest pinnacle. But we do not even have prophets now, and there have only been a few handfuls of prophets! Should I feel lacking that I can never have the kedusha of a kohen?! By exceeding expectations, a sincere, observant convert likely reaches a higher level than a (clear) majority of born-Jews. (Of course, the whole premise of the Kuzari is highly pro-geirut!)

A ger has limitations on positions of power (especially, being king – Kiddushin 76b). While one could attribute this halacha to the Kuzari approach, there are indications of other reasons (see Yevamot 102a): Given a percentage of insincere converts (see Rambam, Issurei Biah 13:18), we are to protect ourselves from giving too much power before we can confirm a newcomer’s loyalty (note, the US Constitution disallows a naturalized citizen to be president; the Jews suffered from such kings in the Second Temple). Also, there is likely, due to poor middot, to be fall-out from a convert exerting dominion over a born-Jew (see Sota 43a). This is not only hurtful, but can also include aspersions on the ger’s motives (see Yevamot 24b).

In all regards, when a ger marries into Jewish society, no limitations apply to his offspring (Kiddushin 76b). Actually, King David did not come from the giyoret Ruth by chance; this was a crucial part of the divine plan (see Bava Kama 38b; Assufot Ma’arachot, Bereishit I, p. 204.) Unkelos was a ger; Shmaya and Avtalion came from gerim, ... (Gittin 57b). A sincere convert’s expectation should be: Hashem and upstanding Jews will love and revere you greatly – you deserve it. But expect time for adjustment in some aspects of life. Members of the next generation should and usually do feel on equal footing with their peers. This is the mainstream Torah approach, consistent with Halacha and basic sources.

: Regarding enforceable monetary obligations, a commitment to use a worker is not binding unless an act of kinyan was made or the worker came to start the job (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 333:1). Coming to give an estimate does not count, but to do preparatory evaluation can count. If due to your agreement to hire Reuven, he turned down another offer and he cannot now find replacement work, you must pay based on the damage your job offer caused (ibid. 2). However, it is rare that a job that takes a few hours and the worker chooses the time would require such a worker to turn down another job (see Pitchei Choshen, Sechirut 10:(9)). If any of these grounds for obligation might exist, we cannot give you any sort of ruling, without both sides presenting their sides for us to rule.

 If there was no binding obligation but one did not keep his word, the mishna (Bava Metzia 75b) says there are ground for tar’omet (being disgruntled). This is parallel to mechusar amana, when one backs out of an agreement to purchase something, and this is a (serious) moral deficiency.

There are several grounds that might relieve you of this status. First, the decision to employ Reuven must have been complete after the critical employment conditions were settled (compare to the rules of mechusar amana – Shulchan Aruch, CM 204:6; Pitchei Choshen, Kinyanim 1:(4)). It is unclear to us (maybe to you too) if this point was reached.

Another relevant matter is Reuven’s high fee. If a po’el (roughly, one who is paid by time) overcharges, the homeowner cannot void his obligation due to mispricing, as a po’el is analogous to a slave, to whom the laws of ona’ah do not apply (Shulchan Aruch, CM 227:33). The Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 36) rules that ona’ah applies to a kablan (one who is paid by the job), like Reuven. On the other hand, not all agree (see Maggid Mishneh, Mechira 13:15), and according to some, ona’ah does not apply to work done on something connected to the ground (see Pitchei Teshuva, CM 227:26).

On the other hand, the question whether ona’ah applies or not may be irrelevant here. Regarding the case of mechusar amana, the Rama (CM 204:11) cites two opinions as to whether one may back out if the transaction is no longer worthwhile because of a price change. The final p’sak is unclear (Shach ad loc. 8). The S’ma (333:1) reasons that the same opinions would apply to a worker’s possible tar’omet. The Aruch Hashulchan (ad loc. 1) says that an employer may back out if he found out the worker is unqualified without the moral stain of tar’omet. Similarly, if one found out the work was significantly overpriced, this should be grounds to remove the tar’omet even if the formal rules of ona’ah do not apply.

This being said, it is hard to trust one partial opinion, like that of Shimon, to conclude that Reuven is objectively, grossly overcharging. Perhaps Shimon needs the job badly and is offering a large discount. Maybe Reuven’s work (regarding what he has planned, how he performs it, or materials) is on a different level than Shimon’s.

In summary, it is likely that you are not morally bound to employ Reuven, and in a case of doubt on a moral, not legal obligation, there is room for leniency (see Chashukei Chemed, Sanhedrin 67a). On the other hand, you might consider the lack of clarity, both about the halacha and the story, and you do not know what points Reuven might raise. Therefore, it would be noble to discuss the matter openly with Reuven. Feel free to contact us again with your findings.

The gemara (Berachot 4b) cites R. Yochanan as instructing to recite the pasuk “Hashem sefatai tiftach ...” (=HST) (Tehillim 51:17) in the beginning of SE and “Yehiyu l’ratzon …” (ibid. 19:15) at its end. The former asks for divine assistance in davening effectively, and the latter requests that Hashem receive the tefilla favorably. While this was apparently instituted well after Shemoneh Esrei was composed (see Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim V:24), it, to at least some degree, has become incorporated with SE. The gemara (ibid.) asks why HST does not create a break between “Ga’al Yisrael” and SE and answers that SE with the pasuk has become “similar to a long tefilla.”

 To the extent that YL and HST are equivalent bookends, we would expect YL to come right after SE, like HST comes right before SE (note that one may not say “Ki shem Hashem ekra …” after YL- Mishna Berura 111:1). Indeed, some Rishonim (see Beit Yosef, OC 122 in the name of Rabbeinu Yona and the Ra’avad) say that YL should be said right after SE, before any other tachanunim (special requests) are said, and this is how the Shulchan Aruch (OC 122:2) rules.

However, this approach is not clear cut for a few reasons. For one, adding tachanunim to SE is important and connected enough to SE to be permitted even in the midst of SE (Shulchan Aruch, OC 119:1). Actually, Rabbeinu Yona (above) says this is a reason that it is only recommended and not crucial for YL to be before tachanunim, as we see the requests are not totally like moving on from SE  and therefore not a serious break before YL.

Also, the presumed fact that YL is a step in finishing SE may weaken subsequent requests. Additionally, if YL is first, then when do we ask Hashem to accept the tachanunim favorably? The Shulchan Aruch (OC 122:2) answers the latter claim – one may say YL a second time after the tachanunim.

An instructive source is the gemara (Berachot 29b) regarding one who left out Ya’aleh V’yavo. If he is still in the midst of SE, he goes back to R’tzei; if he finished SE, he must go back to the beginning of SE. The gemara says that someone who has finished SE proper but usually recites tachanunim afterward is not considered finished until after the tachanunim. Rabbeinu Yona (ibid.) asks why the gemara doesn’t use YL as the marker of the end of SE and concludes that it is because YL is recited before tachanunim. However, this gemara also can teach us the extent to which tachanunim, when recited, are an integral part of SE. This motivated the Gra (cited by many Acharonim, including Ishei Yisrael 23:208) to conclude that one should not recite YL before tachanunim.

We should point out that tachanunim include two different things in our experience. Although we generally view EN as a set part of the end of SE, this is a misnomer. The gemara (Berachot 16b-17a) cites personal prayers that various Amoraim used to say at the end of their SE. EN happens to be one of them (approximately). This may explain why EN, as well as HST and YL are in singular, as they are personal, as opposed to SE proper which is in plural. Practice has developed to choose EN as standard (albeit not required – see Mishna Berura 122:6) tachanunim. The Aruch Hashulchan (OC 122:8) says that while reciting the prayers of all of the Amoraim would be wrong, separating YL too far from SE, it is appropriate to say one. Alternatively or additionally we can all recite our own personal requests (Shulchan Aruch, OC 119:1). There is not a fundamental difference between the two.

The Aruch Hashulchan also suggests (ibid. 6) that a reason that EN was chosen is that it actually concludes with YL. This brings us to perhaps the most common practice and recommended Acharonim (see Mishna Berura 122:3) practice (although not the only legitimate one – see Darchei Moshe, OC 122:2). One recites YL twice: 1) right after SE; 2) at the end of EN, which anyway is the way the original EN concluded.

After seeing ostensibly conflicting sources on making requests of Hashem on Shabbat and seeing some distinctions that poskim raise, we can address your question about your friend’s shidduch needs.

 The Yerushalmi (Shabbat 15:3) forbids davening for needs on Shabbat. It asks on this rule from the part of Birkat Hamazon in which we ask for sustenance and answers that this is tofes berachot (most explain this means that the requests are part of a set beracha, not a special request). Most authorities (see Chiddushei Harashba, Shabbat 113b; Mishna Berura 288:22) explain that Shabbat is a day of happiness, and davening for needs highlights the pain in his life. Midrash Tanchuma (Vayeira 1) says that this is the reason we remove the middle thirteen berachot of Shemoneh Esrei, as when going through the standard requests, one may feel the poignancy of a given need. Another approach sees the matter as related to daber davar, not talking about things that are extraneous to the focus of Shabbat (see She’eilat Yaavetz I:64).

The gemara (Berachot 21a) provides an apparent side reason for the lack of Shemoneh Esrei’s middle berachot on Shabbat – “the Rabbis did not want to toil people due to the honor of Shabbat.” Therefore, if one started a weekday beracha on Shabbat, he completes it. This implies that other than taking time, the section of requests is not objectionable.

Other sources focus on danger-related needs. The gemara (Ta’anit 19a) cites opinions on steps of “calling out” one can take due to security concerns, including “screaming” in prayer if marauders have surrounded the city, as opposed to blowing shofars. The gemara in Shabbat (12a-b) reports that it was with a sense of “no choice” that the Rabbis permitted visiting the sick on Shabbat. The gemara (ibid.) also discusses the language one should use regarding the ill – blessing him within the totality of sick people and stating that we do not pray too forcefully on Shabbat.

We will review some distinctions raised to navigate when requests are more likely to be permitted. 1. When the request relates to a minor and/or future need it is not upsetting (Mahari Bei Rav in Shut Avkat Rochel 12). 2. In the other direction, when the need is great and, particularly, cannot be pushed off, it is permitted to call out to Hashem. While this primarily relates to life-threatening situations (Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 288:9-10), it can also apply to a severe shortage of food (ibid.). 3. Regarding the sick, even if the matter is not immediately life-threatening, a Mi Sheberach may be done using the correct formula (Mishna Berura 288:28; see above). 4. If the subject of the request is not present, emotional distress is less likely (Mahari Bei Rav ibid.). 5. It may be permitted to request divine help with something it is permitted to do on Shabbat (B’tzel Hachochma V:41 – apparently a minority opinion; see Dirshu 288:33 in the name of the Chatam Sofer).

Let us analyze your case. According to most distinctions, it would be forbidden to make the specific request for your friend. If you are davening regularly, she is presumably, in your subjective eyes, already in a concerning state. On the other hand, assuming she is, baruch Hashem, healthy, she is not in an acute situation that warrants davening on Shabbat before it is “too late.” Tefillot of this nature do not need to be consecutive to be effective, and davening with feeling six days a week, while showing respect for Shabbat on the seventh, will iy”H be effective. On the other hand, some (minority) opinions may permit it (based on distinctions 4,5), especially if you word the request to follow the Mi Sheberach language. If you generally make the request after reciting Tehillim privately, the best solution is to leave out the request and recite the Tehillim, with her (and/or other needs) in mind as a recipient of the z’chut (Halichot Shlomo, Tefilla 14:(19) permits this).    

One must treat a sefer Torah with great respect (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 282:1), but the halachot mentioned there do not talk about grounds for taking it out of the aron.

 The main halacha about moving a sefer Torah is in the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 135:14, based on the Yerushalmi (Yoma 7:1). It is forbidden to bring a sefer Torah to a new location even to be used for its purpose – kri’at haTorah. It is a bizayon (disgrace) to bring the sefer Torah to people; people should come to it (ibid.)!

Possible exceptions to the rule are discussed: 1. Bringing the sefer Torah to a very prominent person, like the kohen gadol (ibid.); the Rama (OC 135:14) applies to normal important people. 2. If people, especially a minyan, are unable to come to the place of the sefer Torah (the Shulchan Aruch, OC ibid. seems to forbid, but the Be’ur Halacha (op. cit.) presents the argument that this is not correct). 3. Things are done to make the sefer Torah’s stay more mechubad (e.g., have an aron kodesh ready for it; keep it there for a while; use it for laining several times) (see Rama ibid., commentators ad loc.). 4. The sefer Torah is privately owned (see Har Tzvi OC I:71); 5. The sefer Torah is designed to serve as a roving sefer Torah (see opinions in Living the Halachic Process III, F-1, regarding the propriety of a sefer Torah brought regularly for a set minyan on the train).

We presented the above list, which do not apply to your question, in order to share our general dilemma. Is the concept of bizayon the basis for Chazal forbidding specifically moving a sefer Torah from place to place even for good purposes, but taking from the aron to the bima is permitted even for a neutral purpose? If so, why not show a sefer Torah to a sweet kid who will someday learn Torah?! Or is there generally a high bar of respect for the sefer Torah, which precludes even positive actions, if they are not in line with what the Torah is supposed to be used for? If so, with all due respect and affection for two-year olds, their love for a sefer Torah is like that for a shiny new toy (confirmed after consultation with early childhood experts) and in light of the high bar, it is a bizayon to take it out.

I have seen few and unimpressive sources on this matter. One forbade taking a sefer Torah out to practice laining (see Hamaor, vol. 83); Piskei Teshuvot 135:5 understood that some prohibit doing an unnecessary laining). While all permit taking out sifrei Torah for dancing on Simchat Torah (at least as long as they stay inside – see discussion on taking outside or moving from shul to shul in Yabia Omer VII:56 and elsewhere) but some say that the minhag to lain at night is to strengthen the justification for taking them out. It is hard to determine which approach is accepted, but the simple reading of the Shulchan Aruch (YD 282:1) is that there is a broad high bar in addition to specific applications that classical sources discussed.

One can argue that there is value in showing off the sefer Torah to people. The gemara (Yoma 70a) relates how individuals would bring their sifrei Torah on Yom Kippur to the Beit Hamikdash to show its beauty. One of the explanations why this was permitted is that doing so honored the sefer Torah. Some apply this idea broadly (Gur Aryeh Yehuda, YD 24), while others limit it to special cases like the Beit Hamikdash (see Beit Avi IV:126, opposing a glass-case display of a sefer Torah in a Jewish museum). While we would be supportive of taking out a sefer Torah to show a group of unaffiliated Jews to try to impress/inspire them, it is difficult to justify for a small child who has and will iy”H see it throughout his life. There are many other ways to build excitement about Torah, and a toddler can be told and rewarded for accepting (on his level) that the sefer Torah is so kadosh that we take it out only for kri’at haTorah.

At this point, we expect that much of the physical celebration will have to be toned down due to the Torah’s mandate to protect ourselves/each other. But your question has a practical dimension and gives pause to consider what we celebrate on ST.

 Your question is based on the possibility that some ST practices are due to our “making a siyum” on the Torah reading. Indeed siyumim do justify joyful actions that are otherwise forbidden, (e.g., eating on Ta’anit Bechorot, eating meat during the Nine Days).

Do any ST practices need special justification? V’zot Haberacha is the Torah portion for the last day of Sukkot (Megilla 31a) and is not only the next parasha up but also connects Moshe’s beracha to Shlomo’s beracha at the end of Sukkot (Avudraham, Shemini Atzeret). But reading Bereishit and the multiple aliyot need a link to the special event. The same is true for those who lain at night and the minhag to take out all of the sifrei Torah when we are not going to read from all of them (see Rama, Orach Chayim 669:1). Dancing on Yom Tov is also permitted only because of the celebration (Teshuvot Hageonim 314).

If only individuals, but not a whole shul, miss a parasha there would be no question for the individuals to act like everyone else. Otherwise, we would need new rules for many people, who miss due to illness, travel, etc. most years. Indeed, kri’at haTorah is a public mitzva (Ramban on the Rif, Megilla 3a) and thus relates to the community. Your question is pertinent when a majority of the shul missed parshiyot (see Mishna Berura 135:7).

The matter of finishing up also has an individual element, which you can fulfill. The halacha of shnayim mikra v’echad Targum requires you to read the parasha twice and learn it with Unkelus and/or Rashi every week (Shulchan Aruch, OC 285:1). While it is best to complete this practice each Shabbat, one can make it up until ST (ibid. 4). In that way, those who miss have a level of siyum, parallel to the communal one.

A possibly related machloket to our question is what a shul does when reopening after missing parshiyot. The Rama (OC 135:2, based on the Ohr Zarua) says that they must make up a missed parasha. The Meiri expounds that we do not say “what was, was,” in order that at the year’s end they will have finished everything. On the other hand, many (including the Magen Avraham 135:4) rule like the Maharam Mintz that one makes up only one parasha at most; if more was missed, we would not be bothered that parshiyot were missed. Others require to make up as many as needed (Mishna Berura 135:6 cites both opinions). One can claim they disagree whether it is important to have read every parasha by year’s end. We can (but need not – beyond our scope) reason as follows: If your shul held by the strict opinion, they made up the missed parshiyot. If they did not find that necessary, apparently they hold that the “hole” in the Torah reading is not significant.

Clearly, the minhagim of ST, which have developed over centuries (see Hamoadim Bahalacha p. 135-141) are connected to that which WE finish the Torah. However, in the absence of sources to the contrary (which I have not found), we must presume that the fact that it is time for Klal Yisrael to finish the Torah makes it a time to celebrate. Various practices and sources indicate that the focus is on honoring the Torah (see Netzer Mata’ai 6; Pnei Aharon, OC 10) and thanking Hashem for our opportunity to learn it, not celebrating our diligence in finishing our reading. Therefore, even when communities miss multiple parshiyot, whether European Jews during World War II, Jews behind the Iron Curtain or, l’havdil, us this year, ST is still a time for heart-felt joy and special practices, in honor of the Torah and our strong connection to it.

[We invite people to look at our website for our recommendation, based on professionals, for blowing shofar in shul. Presently we urge: only 30 kolot done outdoors (100 kolot for an outdoor minyan), with a mask held down by a rubber band to the opening of the shofar. This may be changed based on updated scientific findings.]  

 The basic mitzva of shofar blowing is independent of tefilla and minyan and is fulfilled with 30 kolot (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 590:1-2). Chazal added another element, with additional kolot, and connected it to Mussaf of Rosh Hashana, i.e., malchuyot, zichronot, and shofarot (Rosh Hashana 34b).

The gemara continues that the Mussaf blowing was instituted for the tzibbur, not the individual, as rule the Shulchan Aruch and Rama (OC 592:2). There are different opinions as to whether an individual at home may blow within his silent tefilla if he desires, or whether that is too sensitive a juncture (see S’dei Chemed vol. IX, pp. 92-95). One might want to connect this to the divergent minhagim (see Yechaveh Da’at VI:37) over whether in shul, 30 kolot are also blown during the silent Mussaf in addition to the 30 during chazarat hashatz. However, some reason that the silent tefilla of everyone in shul is considered a public tefilla, which is what justifies the shofar blowing then (see ibid.).

Is there a point of doing more than 30 at a different time? The Chazon Ish (OC 137:4) suggests two possible ways to view the tekiot during tefilla – it is a mitzva of shofar, enhanced by the tefilla; the shofar is a means to enhance the public tefilla. He suggests that the sign of which side is correct is whether it is permitted to talk between the beracha and the later tekiot – if it is forbidden, it is a sign that the Rabbinic requirement is related to the mitzva of shofar, rather than to that of tefilla. However, he argues that even if it is a mitzva of shofar, this element was only instituted in connection to a public tefilla and does not apply to those who did not take part in it.

As you alluded to, the clear minhag is that those who are excused from being in shul due to illness or taking care of children hear only 30 kolot. One can argue we do not want to impose on the one doing the chesed of blowing to do 100 each time (a daunting task, especially considering how small the pool of candidates is) or expect too much of the sick and elderly, or factor in the exemption from shofar regarding women. If you are happy blowing more, after davening, perhaps there is only possible gain?

Note that the “more is not the merrier” regarding tekiat shofar. The Rama (OC 596:2) says that one must not blow after fulfilling the mitzva for no good reason. In Living the Halachic Process (V, D-1) we discussed the two main objections: it is under the prohibition of musical instruments on Shabbat/Yom Tov; it may be problematic adding on to a mitzva (bal tosif). Is there enough reason here to blow more?

Piskei Teshuvot (592:3) claims that the desire to have 100 kolot, an old minhag (found in the Aruch, Tosafot (Rosh Hashana 33b), and championed by Kabbalists (see Shelah, quoted by Mishna Berura 596:2) justifies it. However, he does not cite sources regarding our case. It is likely that 100 kolot were instituted for the tzibbur, who are anyway obligated in 60-90 kolot. Therefore, we would not recommend for you to blow any more than an extra set of tashrats to fulfill the main doubt left after 30 kolot (one or two breaths – see Shulchan Aruch, OC 590:4). If it is important for you to do more, we are not saying it is forbidden. This year, in many communities, with extra (outdoor) minyanim, people will be able to hear 100 kolot from their balconies or on the street, at a safe distance from others.

We invite people to look at our website for our recommendation, based on professionals, for blowing shofar in shul. Presently we urge: only 30 kolot done outdoors (100 kolot for an outdoor minyan), with a mask held down by a rubber band to the opening of the shofar. This may be changed based on updated scientific findings.]  

 The basic mitzva of shofar blowing is independent of tefilla and minyan and is fulfilled with 30 kolot (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 590:1-2). Chazal added another element, with additional kolot, and connected it to Mussaf of Rosh Hashana, i.e., malchuyot, zichronot, and shofarot (Rosh Hashana 34b).

The gemara continues that the Mussaf blowing was instituted for the tzibbur, not the individual, as rule the Shulchan Aruch and Rama (OC 592:2). There are different opinions as to whether an individual at home may blow within his silent tefilla if he desires, or whether that is too sensitive a juncture (see S’dei Chemed vol. IX, pp. 92-95). One might want to connect this to the divergent minhagim (see Yechaveh Da’at VI:37) over whether in shul, 30 kolot are also blown during the silent Mussaf in addition to the 30 during chazarat hashatz. However, some reason that the silent tefilla of everyone in shul is considered a public tefilla, which is what justifies the shofar blowing then (see ibid.).

Is there a point of doing more than 30 at a different time? The Chazon Ish (OC 137:4) suggests two possible ways to view the tekiot during tefilla – it is a mitzva of shofar, enhanced by the tefilla; the shofar is a means to enhance the public tefilla. He suggests that the sign of which side is correct is whether it is permitted to talk between the beracha and the later tekiot – if it is forbidden, it is a sign that the Rabbinic requirement is related to the mitzva of shofar, rather than to that of tefilla. However, he argues that even if it is a mitzva of shofar, this element was only instituted in connection to a public tefilla and does not apply to those who did not take part in it.

As you alluded to, the clear minhag is that those who are excused from being in shul due to illness or taking care of children hear only 30 kolot. One can argue we do not want to impose on the one doing the chesed of blowing to do 100 each time (a daunting task, especially considering how small the pool of candidates is) or expect too much of the sick and elderly, or factor in the exemption from shofar regarding women. If you are happy blowing more, after davening, perhaps there is only possible gain?

Note that the “more is not the merrier” regarding tekiat shofar. The Rama (OC 596:2) says that one must not blow after fulfilling the mitzva for no good reason. In Living the Halachic Process (V, D-1) we discussed the two main objections: it is under the prohibition of musical instruments on Shabbat/Yom Tov; it may be problematic adding on to a mitzva (bal tosif). Is there enough reason here to blow more?

Piskei Teshuvot (592:3) claims that the desire to have 100 kolot, an old minhag (found in the Aruch, Tosafot (Rosh Hashana 33b), and championed by Kabbalists (see Shelah, quoted by Mishna Berura 596:2) justifies it. However, he does not cite sources regarding our case. It is likely that 100 kolot were instituted for the tzibbur, who are anyway obligated in 60-90 kolot. Therefore, we would not recommend for you to blow any more than an extra set of tashrats to fulfill the main doubt left after 30 kolot (one or two breaths – see Shulchan Aruch, OC 590:4). If it is important for you to do more, we are not saying it is forbidden. This year, in many communities, with extra (outdoor) minyanim, people will be able to hear 100 kolot from their balconies or on the street, at a safe distance from others.

Your question is general, as will be the focus of our answer. Realize that details can make a big difference. 

Pledges of a gift can obligate on various tracks. One follows rules of monetary laws: Only after a kinyan (act of finalization) to obligate himself or transfer an item can the gift be enforced. However, if one asserts that he will give his friend a modest present, he has a halachically recognized moral obligation to do so (Bava Metzia 49a). When the intended recipient is poor, the moral obligation exists even for a significant present (Rama, Choshen Mishpat 243:2). In that case, the basis of the moral obligation is “religious,” under the laws of oaths (nedarim) (Yerushalmi, Bava Metzia 4:2; Shut Harama 47). Indeed the idea of nidrei tzedaka is derived (Nedarim 7a) from a pasuk on oaths (Devarim 23:24). Jewish schools that promote Torah values and observance are considered a proper recipient of tzedaka funds (see our article of Va’eira 80).   

Each element has rules as to when it applies and why a pledge might not be binding. When one becomes obligated based on neder, he can often (see one of the exceptions in Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 228:21) remove the neder with hatarat nedarim – he professes regret about having made the oath, and the assembled “court” can uproot it. The neder part of a pledge to tzedaka can similarly be undone (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 258:6); the process is called sh’eila. However, the fact that this neder is for the direct benefit of the worthy recipient, and thus backing out erases his rights, impacts in a few ways. For one, once the donation reaches the gabbai, the pledge cannot be undone (ibid. see Arachin 6a). This largely parallels the rules of kinyan, as the gabbai is considered “the hands of the poor” (see Tosafot ad loc.; Bava Kama 36b). Also, while she’ila can work if done, poskim warn not to agree to nullify the pledge (Shut Haradbaz IV:134; Pitchei Teshuva, YD 258:8). However, this idea does not totally shut the door to undoing the vow. In the parallel discussion of nidrei hekdesh, the Shulchan Aruch and Rama (YD 203:4) say that one should do hatarat nedarim only in the case of dochak (roughly, pressure or difficulty). Therefore, for example, if a rich person pledged a large donation and before giving it, he lost his wealth to the point that it is not feasible to follow through, there are grounds for sh’eila.

Another scenario in which a pledge does not have to be fulfilled is when it was based on a mistake (ta’ut or shegaga). The concept that ta’ut nullifies obligations/agreements applies both to monetary matters and to nedarim (see Shulchan Aruch, YD 232:6). In such cases, hatara is not even necessary. It is not always clear when the mistake is definite or significant enough to void the obligations. One of the cases in the Rama (ibid.) is a slip of the tongue regarding currency (e.g., stated $1,000 when he meant 1,000 NIS). The Chatam Sofer (Shut YD 237) talks about a more subtle case – the donor thought the recipient’s needs were well beyond their true level. The Shvut Yaakov (I:72) discusses one who promised to support a group of ostensibly righteous Torah learners, and it turned out that that many of them were far from righteous. He demonstrates that in principle this is a ta’ut, but in practice one should be cautious before reneging. The two latter sources both suggested being on the safe side by doing hatara even in cases in which they should not need it. Tzedaka U’mishpat 4:76 discusses at length cases of ongoing commitments in which over time things changed for the recipient (e.g., became rich, died) that change the rationale for the donation.

In summary, a pledge to a Jewish school is generally binding, but practically there may be reasons why it is not. In an actual case, one should carefully discuss the specific merits with a rabbi who can help put the facts and the halacha in proper perspective.

At first glance, whether you violated tzad (trapping) with your cage is the subject of a machloket between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel (Shabbat 17b). The former says that one may not put out traps before Shabbat unless he can assume the prey will be caught before Shabbat. Beit Hillel, like whom we pasken, says a broad rule that one does not violate melachot on Shabbat when the apparatus he set up before Shabbat “works” on Shabbat. (It is not clear that Beit Shammai refers to placing a trap several days before Shabbat, as the chances the animal will be caught on Shabbat are small – see Meiri ad loc.). In certain cases, Beit Hillel prohibits Rabbinically setting up such a system, due to concern the situation will cause one to personally mistakenly violate Shabbat. For example, it is forbidden to keep partially cooked food on the flame on Shabbat unless one does something to mitigate the chance of mistake (Shabbat 36b). Chazal did not find grounds for such a gezeira here.

 Indeed, some melachot come in pairs, but the list (Shabbat 73a) does not include a counterpart to tzad. Usually, undoing a melacha is forbidden when it is preparatory to redoing the main melacha. I sewed poorly, so I rip the stitches to redo them. The wall is weak, so I take it down to redo. There may also be cases where the “undoing” has special significance, like extinguishing a fire in order to use the ashes (see Rambam, Shabbat 12:2). The classic case of tzad is normally to trap something in order to kill it and use the carcass, and Chazal did not view letting an animal free as connected to the possibility of re-trapping or something significant and/or related to construction of the Mishkan.

Animals are muktzeh on Shabbat (Beitza 2a). Although you were happy the mouse found was contained in the cage (see Mishna Berura 309:27), it did not become a permanent bassis l’davar ha’asur because the mouse was not there when Shabbat started (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 310:7); there may be other reasons for this determination (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 309:4 and Mishna Berura 309:21).

The cage not being a bassis is of limited value because when you carried it, the mouse was still there. In such cases, one may move the cage only under specific circumstances (see details in Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 20:47). We have to divide your case into two possibilities. If you would have let the mouse out even if you would not be allowed to take the cage outside, then moving it was for your sake, to remove the mouse from your house. If so, you could have moved indirectly, e.g., carrying by means of a permitted utensil (Shulchan Aruch, OC 311:8).

If you would not have let out the mouse in the house, moving indirectly is not enough, because you are moving it for the sake of the muktzeh item (ibid.) – getting it somewhere you could release it. Let us assume (I lack expertise to determine if keeping a mouse in a small cage is tza’ar ba’alei chayim (=tbc)) that there was tbc. Does it help? The gemara (Shabbat 128b) allows placing cushions under an animal to alleviate its pain, as tbc overcomes the Rabbinic prohibition of mevatel kli meiheichano. There is a machloket if tbc also waives muktzeh (Mishna Berura 305:70), and it is hard to give a broad ruling (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 27:54). Perhaps it might have helped to put something not muktzeh of more value on the cage (see Mishna Berura 310:37; Shulchan Aruch, OC 309:3) before moving it. There are serious complicating factors (beyond our scope - see Orchot Shabbat 19:288; Living the Halachic Process II, C-21), but in the face of tbc, it might be justified.