ASK THE RABBI

One must treat a sefer Torah with great respect (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 282:1), but the halachot mentioned there do not talk about grounds for taking it out of the aron.

 The main halacha about moving a sefer Torah is in the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 135:14, based on the Yerushalmi (Yoma 7:1). It is forbidden to bring a sefer Torah to a new location even to be used for its purpose – kri’at haTorah. It is a bizayon (disgrace) to bring the sefer Torah to people; people should come to it (ibid.)!

Possible exceptions to the rule are discussed: 1. Bringing the sefer Torah to a very prominent person, like the kohen gadol (ibid.); the Rama (OC 135:14) applies to normal important people. 2. If people, especially a minyan, are unable to come to the place of the sefer Torah (the Shulchan Aruch, OC ibid. seems to forbid, but the Be’ur Halacha (op. cit.) presents the argument that this is not correct). 3. Things are done to make the sefer Torah’s stay more mechubad (e.g., have an aron kodesh ready for it; keep it there for a while; use it for laining several times) (see Rama ibid., commentators ad loc.). 4. The sefer Torah is privately owned (see Har Tzvi OC I:71); 5. The sefer Torah is designed to serve as a roving sefer Torah (see opinions in Living the Halachic Process III, F-1, regarding the propriety of a sefer Torah brought regularly for a set minyan on the train).

We presented the above list, which do not apply to your question, in order to share our general dilemma. Is the concept of bizayon the basis for Chazal forbidding specifically moving a sefer Torah from place to place even for good purposes, but taking from the aron to the bima is permitted even for a neutral purpose? If so, why not show a sefer Torah to a sweet kid who will someday learn Torah?! Or is there generally a high bar of respect for the sefer Torah, which precludes even positive actions, if they are not in line with what the Torah is supposed to be used for? If so, with all due respect and affection for two-year olds, their love for a sefer Torah is like that for a shiny new toy (confirmed after consultation with early childhood experts) and in light of the high bar, it is a bizayon to take it out.

I have seen few and unimpressive sources on this matter. One forbade taking a sefer Torah out to practice laining (see Hamaor, vol. 83); Piskei Teshuvot 135:5 understood that some prohibit doing an unnecessary laining). While all permit taking out sifrei Torah for dancing on Simchat Torah (at least as long as they stay inside – see discussion on taking outside or moving from shul to shul in Yabia Omer VII:56 and elsewhere) but some say that the minhag to lain at night is to strengthen the justification for taking them out. It is hard to determine which approach is accepted, but the simple reading of the Shulchan Aruch (YD 282:1) is that there is a broad high bar in addition to specific applications that classical sources discussed.

One can argue that there is value in showing off the sefer Torah to people. The gemara (Yoma 70a) relates how individuals would bring their sifrei Torah on Yom Kippur to the Beit Hamikdash to show its beauty. One of the explanations why this was permitted is that doing so honored the sefer Torah. Some apply this idea broadly (Gur Aryeh Yehuda, YD 24), while others limit it to special cases like the Beit Hamikdash (see Beit Avi IV:126, opposing a glass-case display of a sefer Torah in a Jewish museum). While we would be supportive of taking out a sefer Torah to show a group of unaffiliated Jews to try to impress/inspire them, it is difficult to justify for a small child who has and will iy”H see it throughout his life. There are many other ways to build excitement about Torah, and a toddler can be told and rewarded for accepting (on his level) that the sefer Torah is so kadosh that we take it out only for kri’at haTorah.

At this point, we expect that much of the physical celebration will have to be toned down due to the Torah’s mandate to protect ourselves/each other. But your question has a practical dimension and gives pause to consider what we celebrate on ST.

 Your question is based on the possibility that some ST practices are due to our “making a siyum” on the Torah reading. Indeed siyumim do justify joyful actions that are otherwise forbidden, (e.g., eating on Ta’anit Bechorot, eating meat during the Nine Days).

Do any ST practices need special justification? V’zot Haberacha is the Torah portion for the last day of Sukkot (Megilla 31a) and is not only the next parasha up but also connects Moshe’s beracha to Shlomo’s beracha at the end of Sukkot (Avudraham, Shemini Atzeret). But reading Bereishit and the multiple aliyot need a link to the special event. The same is true for those who lain at night and the minhag to take out all of the sifrei Torah when we are not going to read from all of them (see Rama, Orach Chayim 669:1). Dancing on Yom Tov is also permitted only because of the celebration (Teshuvot Hageonim 314).

If only individuals, but not a whole shul, miss a parasha there would be no question for the individuals to act like everyone else. Otherwise, we would need new rules for many people, who miss due to illness, travel, etc. most years. Indeed, kri’at haTorah is a public mitzva (Ramban on the Rif, Megilla 3a) and thus relates to the community. Your question is pertinent when a majority of the shul missed parshiyot (see Mishna Berura 135:7).

The matter of finishing up also has an individual element, which you can fulfill. The halacha of shnayim mikra v’echad Targum requires you to read the parasha twice and learn it with Unkelus and/or Rashi every week (Shulchan Aruch, OC 285:1). While it is best to complete this practice each Shabbat, one can make it up until ST (ibid. 4). In that way, those who miss have a level of siyum, parallel to the communal one.

A possibly related machloket to our question is what a shul does when reopening after missing parshiyot. The Rama (OC 135:2, based on the Ohr Zarua) says that they must make up a missed parasha. The Meiri expounds that we do not say “what was, was,” in order that at the year’s end they will have finished everything. On the other hand, many (including the Magen Avraham 135:4) rule like the Maharam Mintz that one makes up only one parasha at most; if more was missed, we would not be bothered that parshiyot were missed. Others require to make up as many as needed (Mishna Berura 135:6 cites both opinions). One can claim they disagree whether it is important to have read every parasha by year’s end. We can (but need not – beyond our scope) reason as follows: If your shul held by the strict opinion, they made up the missed parshiyot. If they did not find that necessary, apparently they hold that the “hole” in the Torah reading is not significant.

Clearly, the minhagim of ST, which have developed over centuries (see Hamoadim Bahalacha p. 135-141) are connected to that which WE finish the Torah. However, in the absence of sources to the contrary (which I have not found), we must presume that the fact that it is time for Klal Yisrael to finish the Torah makes it a time to celebrate. Various practices and sources indicate that the focus is on honoring the Torah (see Netzer Mata’ai 6; Pnei Aharon, OC 10) and thanking Hashem for our opportunity to learn it, not celebrating our diligence in finishing our reading. Therefore, even when communities miss multiple parshiyot, whether European Jews during World War II, Jews behind the Iron Curtain or, l’havdil, us this year, ST is still a time for heart-felt joy and special practices, in honor of the Torah and our strong connection to it.

[We invite people to look at our website for our recommendation, based on professionals, for blowing shofar in shul. Presently we urge: only 30 kolot done outdoors (100 kolot for an outdoor minyan), with a mask held down by a rubber band to the opening of the shofar. This may be changed based on updated scientific findings.]  

 The basic mitzva of shofar blowing is independent of tefilla and minyan and is fulfilled with 30 kolot (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 590:1-2). Chazal added another element, with additional kolot, and connected it to Mussaf of Rosh Hashana, i.e., malchuyot, zichronot, and shofarot (Rosh Hashana 34b).

The gemara continues that the Mussaf blowing was instituted for the tzibbur, not the individual, as rule the Shulchan Aruch and Rama (OC 592:2). There are different opinions as to whether an individual at home may blow within his silent tefilla if he desires, or whether that is too sensitive a juncture (see S’dei Chemed vol. IX, pp. 92-95). One might want to connect this to the divergent minhagim (see Yechaveh Da’at VI:37) over whether in shul, 30 kolot are also blown during the silent Mussaf in addition to the 30 during chazarat hashatz. However, some reason that the silent tefilla of everyone in shul is considered a public tefilla, which is what justifies the shofar blowing then (see ibid.).

Is there a point of doing more than 30 at a different time? The Chazon Ish (OC 137:4) suggests two possible ways to view the tekiot during tefilla – it is a mitzva of shofar, enhanced by the tefilla; the shofar is a means to enhance the public tefilla. He suggests that the sign of which side is correct is whether it is permitted to talk between the beracha and the later tekiot – if it is forbidden, it is a sign that the Rabbinic requirement is related to the mitzva of shofar, rather than to that of tefilla. However, he argues that even if it is a mitzva of shofar, this element was only instituted in connection to a public tefilla and does not apply to those who did not take part in it.

As you alluded to, the clear minhag is that those who are excused from being in shul due to illness or taking care of children hear only 30 kolot. One can argue we do not want to impose on the one doing the chesed of blowing to do 100 each time (a daunting task, especially considering how small the pool of candidates is) or expect too much of the sick and elderly, or factor in the exemption from shofar regarding women. If you are happy blowing more, after davening, perhaps there is only possible gain?

Note that the “more is not the merrier” regarding tekiat shofar. The Rama (OC 596:2) says that one must not blow after fulfilling the mitzva for no good reason. In Living the Halachic Process (V, D-1) we discussed the two main objections: it is under the prohibition of musical instruments on Shabbat/Yom Tov; it may be problematic adding on to a mitzva (bal tosif). Is there enough reason here to blow more?

Piskei Teshuvot (592:3) claims that the desire to have 100 kolot, an old minhag (found in the Aruch, Tosafot (Rosh Hashana 33b), and championed by Kabbalists (see Shelah, quoted by Mishna Berura 596:2) justifies it. However, he does not cite sources regarding our case. It is likely that 100 kolot were instituted for the tzibbur, who are anyway obligated in 60-90 kolot. Therefore, we would not recommend for you to blow any more than an extra set of tashrats to fulfill the main doubt left after 30 kolot (one or two breaths – see Shulchan Aruch, OC 590:4). If it is important for you to do more, we are not saying it is forbidden. This year, in many communities, with extra (outdoor) minyanim, people will be able to hear 100 kolot from their balconies or on the street, at a safe distance from others.

We invite people to look at our website for our recommendation, based on professionals, for blowing shofar in shul. Presently we urge: only 30 kolot done outdoors (100 kolot for an outdoor minyan), with a mask held down by a rubber band to the opening of the shofar. This may be changed based on updated scientific findings.]  

 The basic mitzva of shofar blowing is independent of tefilla and minyan and is fulfilled with 30 kolot (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 590:1-2). Chazal added another element, with additional kolot, and connected it to Mussaf of Rosh Hashana, i.e., malchuyot, zichronot, and shofarot (Rosh Hashana 34b).

The gemara continues that the Mussaf blowing was instituted for the tzibbur, not the individual, as rule the Shulchan Aruch and Rama (OC 592:2). There are different opinions as to whether an individual at home may blow within his silent tefilla if he desires, or whether that is too sensitive a juncture (see S’dei Chemed vol. IX, pp. 92-95). One might want to connect this to the divergent minhagim (see Yechaveh Da’at VI:37) over whether in shul, 30 kolot are also blown during the silent Mussaf in addition to the 30 during chazarat hashatz. However, some reason that the silent tefilla of everyone in shul is considered a public tefilla, which is what justifies the shofar blowing then (see ibid.).

Is there a point of doing more than 30 at a different time? The Chazon Ish (OC 137:4) suggests two possible ways to view the tekiot during tefilla – it is a mitzva of shofar, enhanced by the tefilla; the shofar is a means to enhance the public tefilla. He suggests that the sign of which side is correct is whether it is permitted to talk between the beracha and the later tekiot – if it is forbidden, it is a sign that the Rabbinic requirement is related to the mitzva of shofar, rather than to that of tefilla. However, he argues that even if it is a mitzva of shofar, this element was only instituted in connection to a public tefilla and does not apply to those who did not take part in it.

As you alluded to, the clear minhag is that those who are excused from being in shul due to illness or taking care of children hear only 30 kolot. One can argue we do not want to impose on the one doing the chesed of blowing to do 100 each time (a daunting task, especially considering how small the pool of candidates is) or expect too much of the sick and elderly, or factor in the exemption from shofar regarding women. If you are happy blowing more, after davening, perhaps there is only possible gain?

Note that the “more is not the merrier” regarding tekiat shofar. The Rama (OC 596:2) says that one must not blow after fulfilling the mitzva for no good reason. In Living the Halachic Process (V, D-1) we discussed the two main objections: it is under the prohibition of musical instruments on Shabbat/Yom Tov; it may be problematic adding on to a mitzva (bal tosif). Is there enough reason here to blow more?

Piskei Teshuvot (592:3) claims that the desire to have 100 kolot, an old minhag (found in the Aruch, Tosafot (Rosh Hashana 33b), and championed by Kabbalists (see Shelah, quoted by Mishna Berura 596:2) justifies it. However, he does not cite sources regarding our case. It is likely that 100 kolot were instituted for the tzibbur, who are anyway obligated in 60-90 kolot. Therefore, we would not recommend for you to blow any more than an extra set of tashrats to fulfill the main doubt left after 30 kolot (one or two breaths – see Shulchan Aruch, OC 590:4). If it is important for you to do more, we are not saying it is forbidden. This year, in many communities, with extra (outdoor) minyanim, people will be able to hear 100 kolot from their balconies or on the street, at a safe distance from others.

Your question is general, as will be the focus of our answer. Realize that details can make a big difference. 

Pledges of a gift can obligate on various tracks. One follows rules of monetary laws: Only after a kinyan (act of finalization) to obligate himself or transfer an item can the gift be enforced. However, if one asserts that he will give his friend a modest present, he has a halachically recognized moral obligation to do so (Bava Metzia 49a). When the intended recipient is poor, the moral obligation exists even for a significant present (Rama, Choshen Mishpat 243:2). In that case, the basis of the moral obligation is “religious,” under the laws of oaths (nedarim) (Yerushalmi, Bava Metzia 4:2; Shut Harama 47). Indeed the idea of nidrei tzedaka is derived (Nedarim 7a) from a pasuk on oaths (Devarim 23:24). Jewish schools that promote Torah values and observance are considered a proper recipient of tzedaka funds (see our article of Va’eira 80).   

Each element has rules as to when it applies and why a pledge might not be binding. When one becomes obligated based on neder, he can often (see one of the exceptions in Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 228:21) remove the neder with hatarat nedarim – he professes regret about having made the oath, and the assembled “court” can uproot it. The neder part of a pledge to tzedaka can similarly be undone (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 258:6); the process is called sh’eila. However, the fact that this neder is for the direct benefit of the worthy recipient, and thus backing out erases his rights, impacts in a few ways. For one, once the donation reaches the gabbai, the pledge cannot be undone (ibid. see Arachin 6a). This largely parallels the rules of kinyan, as the gabbai is considered “the hands of the poor” (see Tosafot ad loc.; Bava Kama 36b). Also, while she’ila can work if done, poskim warn not to agree to nullify the pledge (Shut Haradbaz IV:134; Pitchei Teshuva, YD 258:8). However, this idea does not totally shut the door to undoing the vow. In the parallel discussion of nidrei hekdesh, the Shulchan Aruch and Rama (YD 203:4) say that one should do hatarat nedarim only in the case of dochak (roughly, pressure or difficulty). Therefore, for example, if a rich person pledged a large donation and before giving it, he lost his wealth to the point that it is not feasible to follow through, there are grounds for sh’eila.

Another scenario in which a pledge does not have to be fulfilled is when it was based on a mistake (ta’ut or shegaga). The concept that ta’ut nullifies obligations/agreements applies both to monetary matters and to nedarim (see Shulchan Aruch, YD 232:6). In such cases, hatara is not even necessary. It is not always clear when the mistake is definite or significant enough to void the obligations. One of the cases in the Rama (ibid.) is a slip of the tongue regarding currency (e.g., stated $1,000 when he meant 1,000 NIS). The Chatam Sofer (Shut YD 237) talks about a more subtle case – the donor thought the recipient’s needs were well beyond their true level. The Shvut Yaakov (I:72) discusses one who promised to support a group of ostensibly righteous Torah learners, and it turned out that that many of them were far from righteous. He demonstrates that in principle this is a ta’ut, but in practice one should be cautious before reneging. The two latter sources both suggested being on the safe side by doing hatara even in cases in which they should not need it. Tzedaka U’mishpat 4:76 discusses at length cases of ongoing commitments in which over time things changed for the recipient (e.g., became rich, died) that change the rationale for the donation.

In summary, a pledge to a Jewish school is generally binding, but practically there may be reasons why it is not. In an actual case, one should carefully discuss the specific merits with a rabbi who can help put the facts and the halacha in proper perspective.

At first glance, whether you violated tzad (trapping) with your cage is the subject of a machloket between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel (Shabbat 17b). The former says that one may not put out traps before Shabbat unless he can assume the prey will be caught before Shabbat. Beit Hillel, like whom we pasken, says a broad rule that one does not violate melachot on Shabbat when the apparatus he set up before Shabbat “works” on Shabbat. (It is not clear that Beit Shammai refers to placing a trap several days before Shabbat, as the chances the animal will be caught on Shabbat are small – see Meiri ad loc.). In certain cases, Beit Hillel prohibits Rabbinically setting up such a system, due to concern the situation will cause one to personally mistakenly violate Shabbat. For example, it is forbidden to keep partially cooked food on the flame on Shabbat unless one does something to mitigate the chance of mistake (Shabbat 36b). Chazal did not find grounds for such a gezeira here.

 Indeed, some melachot come in pairs, but the list (Shabbat 73a) does not include a counterpart to tzad. Usually, undoing a melacha is forbidden when it is preparatory to redoing the main melacha. I sewed poorly, so I rip the stitches to redo them. The wall is weak, so I take it down to redo. There may also be cases where the “undoing” has special significance, like extinguishing a fire in order to use the ashes (see Rambam, Shabbat 12:2). The classic case of tzad is normally to trap something in order to kill it and use the carcass, and Chazal did not view letting an animal free as connected to the possibility of re-trapping or something significant and/or related to construction of the Mishkan.

Animals are muktzeh on Shabbat (Beitza 2a). Although you were happy the mouse found was contained in the cage (see Mishna Berura 309:27), it did not become a permanent bassis l’davar ha’asur because the mouse was not there when Shabbat started (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 310:7); there may be other reasons for this determination (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 309:4 and Mishna Berura 309:21).

The cage not being a bassis is of limited value because when you carried it, the mouse was still there. In such cases, one may move the cage only under specific circumstances (see details in Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 20:47). We have to divide your case into two possibilities. If you would have let the mouse out even if you would not be allowed to take the cage outside, then moving it was for your sake, to remove the mouse from your house. If so, you could have moved indirectly, e.g., carrying by means of a permitted utensil (Shulchan Aruch, OC 311:8).

If you would not have let out the mouse in the house, moving indirectly is not enough, because you are moving it for the sake of the muktzeh item (ibid.) – getting it somewhere you could release it. Let us assume (I lack expertise to determine if keeping a mouse in a small cage is tza’ar ba’alei chayim (=tbc)) that there was tbc. Does it help? The gemara (Shabbat 128b) allows placing cushions under an animal to alleviate its pain, as tbc overcomes the Rabbinic prohibition of mevatel kli meiheichano. There is a machloket if tbc also waives muktzeh (Mishna Berura 305:70), and it is hard to give a broad ruling (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 27:54). Perhaps it might have helped to put something not muktzeh of more value on the cage (see Mishna Berura 310:37; Shulchan Aruch, OC 309:3) before moving it. There are serious complicating factors (beyond our scope - see Orchot Shabbat 19:288; Living the Halachic Process II, C-21), but in the face of tbc, it might be justified.

I did not find poskim who deal with this question, which is not surprising, because the ability to work and pay at such a distance is new, and nowadays people do not usually pay for such jobs right away (see below). We must analyze the matter at its roots.

 We will start with the general issue of time differences. Obviously, a person does mitzvot according to his time, but what about when they relate to someone or something with a different time? We cannot deal with all halachic applications, but the general rule is that the person deciding how to act follows his own time. Let us mention a couple of examples. At least fundamentally, one may operate in a place where it is not Shabbat on behalf of one for whom it is Shabbat or operate equipment where it is Shabbat (see this column, Bamidbar 5774). One may not own chametz when he is in a place where it is Pesach even if the chametz is in a place where it is not Pesach. In the opposite case (it is on Pesach for the object, not the person), Igrot Moshe (OC IV:94) says that it is fundamentally permitted (he claims it creates a Rabbinic problem, while some say it is fully permitted).

On the other hand, it seems obvious that although a father is obligated to do/arrange a brit mila on his son’s eighth day, if the two are many time zones apart, he would have it done on his son’s eighth day. Why is that obvious? The mitzva of mila is focused on the baby. The father’s mitzva is as a facilitator. A proper facilitator has to act in synch with the baby who is becoming nimol and being impacted in the process. It may not always be simple to determine upon whom the focus is. In Living the Halachic Process (I, D-13) we discussed the possibility that matanot la’evyonim need to be given at a time when it is Purim both for the giver and the receiver.

So on whom is the focus regarding an employer paying a worker promptly (i.e., before the next change of day/night after receiving the product – Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 339:6)? Is it the worker who may need the money promptly, or is it the employer, who must not procrastinate (or both, so that the time requirements of both must be met)? While philosophically, Chazal considered this mitzva crucial, likely due to the needs of the worker (see Devarim 24:15), the mitzva includes unusual halachot that focus on feasibility for the employer. For example, if a craftsman finished his work and informed the client, the payment clock does not start until the client receives it (ibid.; see opinions in Pitchei Choshen, Sechirut 9:(31) about cases where the employer improperly refuses to receive it). Also, if the employer does not have money available, he does not violate bal talin (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 10). In both cases, the worker may need the money as desperately as usual, but we follow the employer’s situation, if he is not stalling from his perspective. These are some of the indications (not proofs) that the basic halachot are based on the mandate on the employer not to procrastinate – apparently based on his circumstances.

These halachot are not usually practical because of another surprising leniency. If the worker knows that the employer usually has cash flow only on the market day or that he usually doesn’t pay anything until he has calculated how much he owes, he is not obligated to pay right away. Also, it is only when the worker has asked (or assumed to want) immediate payment that the mitzva to pay promptly is activated (ibid.). Therefore, since in most cases, workers are not paid for several days after they give the work they did, the employer/client can keep within the normal range (see also Shach ad loc. 2). Of course, it is laudable to try (when feasible) to be ahead of the curve in paying workers (see Rav Pealim IV, CM 7), but the exactness you refer to is rarely needed.

In normal times (for which we yearn), we likely would take the whole minyan and the particular “path blockers” to task for gross inconsideration. However, it is scientifically/statistically clear that the existence of outdoor minyanim with proper spacing has, nationally, saved lives. While people can argue whether it is better for people whose only safe place for a minyan disturbs others should daven at home, Jewish society is expected to make certain special allowances for shuls (see Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 156:3). In the “old days,” people would debate the pros and cons of minyanim on (El Al) planes. But nowadays, without ideal options, some (including high risk men) would end up davening in unsafe and/or illegal minyanim. Especially since you are not complaining, we will be melamed z’chut and assume that the minyan overall finds the right balance of meeting needs and focus on your dilemma about passing through.

The first issue we will dispatch of is whether a woman may be in close proximity to men davening. Our community does not require mechitzot for even a minyan in places that are not set for tefilla, including shiva homes and airplanes (see Living the Halachic Process, V, A-9; Rav Moshe Feinstein, cited ibid., distinguishes between places that are open or closed to the public). It is unclear how long a minyan must operate in a makeshift location to qualify as set. However, even when a mechitza is needed, a woman may pass through, if necessary. Rav Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC V:12) reports that individual women have always been allowed to enter to, for example, collect tzedaka. While he says this should be done only on an ad hoc basis, your situation is especially valid case.

Whether there is or is not a mechitza, men may not daven or learn aloud if a woman not dressed according to the halachot of tzniut is in their sight (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 75). We do not feel a need to review for you what this entails, and this need not be a problem at all.

Finally, we address the halacha of not walking in front of someone who is davening Shmoneh Esrei (Shulchan Aruch, OC102:4-5). (During chazarat hashatz, it is only an issue regarding the chazan). Most agree that the issue of walking in front of a davener concerns harming his concentration. What if he does not mind? Just as the davener may not do things to harm his own kavana, so too he may not allow others to do so to him (see similar idea in Bava Kama 91b). However, there are a few grounds for leniency. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 102:4) rules that one may pass near someone from the side, and the Mishna Berura (ad loc. 16) is inconclusive on whether passing diagonally in front is a problem. In a case of need, one can rely on the lenient opinion. Here, there are multiple levels of need. You need to pass by for your need. If we would not allow you and your neighbors to do so, then it would be unreasonable to have the minyan there, which we are assuming is important.

On a more fundamental level, the Da’at Torah (to OC 102:5) says that if a davener blocks a “thoroughfare” (even in shul), it is comparable to one who was buried in a public area, and therefore he allows people to walk by. One certainly cannot create an off-limits zone that prevents from entering or exiting their own building. Therefore, what you did was absolutely justified. (Whether people may daven in such a location given that others may walk by is beyond our present scope). Your normal attempt to not disturb is an act of tzidkut; people helping others with their practical and spiritual needs is crucial in navigating this crisis.

The gemara (Sota 40a) lists various recitations of praise to Hashem, proposed by different Amoraim, for the tzibbur to say as the chazan recites Modim (the Yerushalmi Berachot 1:5 has different proposals). The gemara concludes with the idea that we therefore say all of them. The Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 127) posits that it is called Modim D’Rabbanan because it combines sayings of several rabbis. The idea of the recitation, along with the unique practice of bowing along with the chazan (see how the Yerushalmi ibid. connects it to the recitation) is that at the moment of the main praise of Hashem, the tzibbur must be actively involved to show their agreement and not imply disagreement (see Aruch Hashulchan,OC 127:1; Teshuvot V’hanhagot II:60).

The first nine words of the regular Modim and Modim D’Rabannan are identical. According to the original, short versions, the tzibbur would miss no more than a very little of Modim by reciting it, and it would serve like a long amen. In fact, several Acharonim assume that if the chazan or even one saying the silent amida recited Modim D’Rabbanan, he would not have to go back because they did the right beginning and end of the beracha and the middle is similar enough (see Eliya Rabba, OC 127:1; Halichot Shlomo 8:28; Yechaveh Da’at (Chazan) III:17). You (and others) are bothered with missing part of Modim, which deserves a minyan. Indeed, some Acharonim, starting with the Eliya Rabba (ibid.) and including more recent authorities (some are cited in Ishei Yisrael 24:(124)), instruct the chazan to say the first (joint) words slowly or wait for the tzibbur to finish. There is another minhag (cited ibid. 125) that the chazan says the beginning of Modim quietly, as there is no point in saying it out loud if no one will be listening.

However, these are not the more accepted opinions. The Mishna Berura (127:3) rules like earlier Acharonim and the simple reading of the gemara that the chazan continues Modim despite the tzibbur’s recital of Modim D’Rabbanan and that he should do so out loud (ibid. 124:41). The Mishna Berura provides two reasons for the latter: 1) Chazarat hashatz was instituted for those who do not know how to daven on their own, and they would be listening to the chazan rather than saying Modim D’Rabbanan; 2) Ten people need to hear the chazan. The Mishna Berura does not explain how #2 can be accomplished if people are reciting something else. Halichot Shlomo (8:(40)) suggests that one can speak and listen at the same time to two similar things. This seem to work better on a halachic rather than a practical level. If one is saying the same basic thing as the chazan, he is considered part of the minyan. (We substantiated this elsewhere – soon to appear as Living the Halachic Process VI, A-6, regarding one who starts Shemoneh Esrei with the tzibbbur’s chazarat hashatz. Admittedly, it is easier to make this claim when they are saying the same words.)

According to what we laid out above, this approach sits well with the historical and logical development of the practice of Modim D’Rabbanan. Chazal saw it not as an independent recitation (see Teshuvot V’hanhagot ibid.) that ends up competing with chazarat hashatz but as a natural accompaniment of this crucial part of chazarat hashatz. Due to this understanding, the Rabbanan did not have a problem extending a few-word response into a longer piece and did not see it as stopping the flow of chazarat hashatz. Because this caused a perception that the tzibbur is not involved in all of chazarat hashatz, practices arose to either give up on the middle of Modim as a joint matter and have the chazan recite it silently or, in the other direction, wait to have everyone listen. But the main minhag accepted by most poskim is that the chazan and tzibbur say different words and still form one unit.

We will start with the simple answer before suggesting a bold position. Objects need to fit into a category of useful objects in order to not be muktzeh, and foods are such a category. The status of food that is not yet edible depends on whether one can permissibly make it edible. So a live chicken is not muktzeh on Yom Tov, because one may shecht and cook it (Beitza 2a). However, an inedible raw food on Shabbat that does not have a permissible way for its owner to make it edible is muktzeh (see Beitza 27a).  

 Therefore, the simple answer to your question is that the raw spaghetti that is not set up before Shabbat to finish cooking on Shabbat is indeed muktzeh, as it is written in Tiltulei Shabbat (Bodner, p. 102) and elsewhere. You could have removed it from the counter, as you did from the floor, by moving it by means of a permitted utensil, assuming that you had a need to remove it in order to properly use the counter (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 311:8; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 22:36).

I am, though, inspired by your son’s actions and my memory as a child and a father of young children, to consider that there are people, primarily children, who like to nosh/nibble on raw pasta. While that is certainly not the norm, might it be enough to make it considered edible?

The gemara (Shabbat 128a) states that raw meat is not muktzeh. Tosafot (ad loc.) explains that this is because the meat can be used to feed domesticated animals. However, the Rambam (Shabbat 26:16) says that the gemara is based on the presumption that raw meat is fit for human consumption, as the Shulchan Aruch (308:31) concludes. Although we talk about meat being nominally edible only at ma’achal ben d’rusai (a third or a half cooked – machloket between Rashi and the Rambam), this does not disprove the Rambam because that refers to nominally edible as cooked, as ma’achal ben d’rusai applies even to foods that are edible raw.

Several other halachot are based on the premise that food need not be commonly eaten raw to avoid muktzeh: A raw egg is not muktzeh (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 328:38). The Magen Avraham (517:2) posits that kernels of rye and barley are not considered muktzeh, even though their beracha is Shehakol, like foods that are generally considered edible only in a different form (see Rama, OC 208:4). We note that in our times, most poskim no longer consider raw meat edible, and therefore it is muktzeh (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 20:28; Tiltulei Shabbat’s citation of Rav Moshe Feinstein #20). But that can be because it is rare to hear of anyone who eats it. So perhaps, a certain, albeit small, percentage of the population who nibbles on raw spaghetti counts like those who nibble on raw grain. (It does not seem pertinent that those who eat raw pasta would not eat a whole package, because any piece therein could be eaten.)

One could argue that spaghetti is worse than raw meat because the dehydrating of the dough in the factories is an act of pushing off their use, which can create muktzeh (see Shulchan Aruch 308:17). However, this is likely not applicable here for a couple of reasons. First, in the gemara’s classic case of removing from use, sun-drying grapes and figs, it only becomes muktzeh because the process makes them inedible to eat (Mishna Berura 310:9). But if we assume that raw spaghetti is edible, then the drying did not remove it from use! Furthermore, the dehydrating did not take food that was ready to be eaten and make it unfit to eat, but took unfit dough, which anyway needed cooking, and made it stable so it could be marketed. (See more on this complicated point in Orchot Shabbat 19:(154).)

Therefore, while we cannot prove that raw spaghetti is edible enough to avoid muktzeh, it might just be so.