ASK THE RABBI

The mitzva of neirot Shabbat has a dual purpose – to provide an atmosphere conducive to a pleasant Shabbat (Rambam, Shabbat 5:1); to show respect for Shabbat (see ibid. 30:5). Regarding electric lights, there are two main questions to consider: 1. Is turning on the light considered an action that “fits the mold” of the mitzva? 2. Is the fuel/light combination valid for neirot Shabbat?

Quality of the action: To oversimplify, when one switches on a light, he connects wires in a way that allows electricity to flow to the fixture and operate it. Acharonim debated whether that is considered a direct act or if we view it as gerama (indirect causation) – just a removal of the separation between the sides. We agree with the approach that views this as direct (see Yabia Omer II, Orach Chayim 17), which indicates leniency here but in the context of Shabbat prohibitions obligates people fully for what is accomplished by connecting an electric circuit. Others also claim (see the Rambam’s language – Shabbat 5:1) that there is no need for an action of lighting, but of making sure that lights are lit (Tzitz Eliezer I, 20:11; see Har Tzvi, OC I:143). According to this approach, it is not important whether turning on the light is a direct action.

Source/type of light: Some question whether electricity fits the prototype of the mitzva. Levushei Mordechai (OC III, 59), using Chanuka candles as a precedent, argues that it is invalid because it lacks a classic fuel that one needs to light. Others distinguish between Chanuka, which is commemorating a specific event involving oil, whereas regarding Shabbat, the main thing is the desired light (Yabia Omer ibid.). An interesting “proof” (see ibid.) that one does not need a classic fuel is the story of the miraculous lighting of Shabbat lights from vinegar (Ta’anit 25a). Rav SZ Auerbach is cited (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 43:(22)) as saying that the source of the light must be present at the time of lighting, which exists in a battery-operated light, but not the home’s electricity, which needs constant refreshing from outside. Also, the light does not look like that of a flame (Tzitz Eliezer ibid. is concerned that it looks like a torch). These issues can apply even to an incandescent light, where the light comes from a hot, glowing filament, all the more so to other technologies such as fluorescent and LED. Still, those who focus on the result of a nice atmosphere that helps people and provides honor for Shabbat, should not care about the scientific distinctions on how the light is created.

Regarding bottom line, there is no question that one who cannot light standard candles should use electricity, putting them on at the time of candle lighting with the intention of using it for the mitzva. It is also clear that this suffices to not apply the minhag (Rama, OC 263:1) that one who forgot to light one week, has to add an additional candle the rest of her life. (If it was truly not possible to light candles, she is anyway exempt from this penalty because of the extenuating circumstance – Mishna Berura 263:7).

The existence of significant opinions on both sides of the debate whether one fulfills the mitzva could lead us to a conclusion that it is better not to make a beracha (see Radiance of Shabbat p. 12). However, we agree with the approach that part of relying on this best possible solution is to make the beracha as well (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata ibid.). Realize that part of the mitzva is that it should be clear that one is lighting for the mitzva. In our days, while there is a challenge raised by the fact that most of our light for Shabbat is provided by electric lights (see idea of a halachic solution for this - ibid. 34), the candles have the advantage of being clearly done for Shabbat. When one is putting on normal electric lights he would have had even without a mitzva, the beracha seems to have added value.

While any amount of food requires a beracha rishona (=br) before it, there is a ba only after eating a k’zayit (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 210:1). If one eats small amounts of foods with different berachot acharonot that combine to form a k’zayit, he recites the “lower beracha” (usually, Borei Nefashot) (Magen Avraham 210:1).

The question is how to view a single food made up of different ingredients. Regarding br, when a food significantly contains (not as filler) wheat or other flour of the “five minim” (=5mn) along with even a majority of foods with other berachot, one recites only Mezonot (or Hamotzi), which covers even the non-Mezonot ingredients (Shulchan Aruch, OC 208:2).

Regarding ba, in one place, the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) says that the ba for such a food is Al Hamichya even if the flour is clearly a minority. In another place (ibid. 9), he writes that if there is not a k’zayit of flour within a pras (eight k’zeitim) of food, one recites only Al Hamichya on bread made from it, and if cooked, only Borei Nefashot rather than Al Hamichya. So, we see that the ba can be reduced due to the presence of a predominance of other ingredients. How much it is affected is disputed, as the Gra (ad loc.) says that without a k’zayit within a pras worth the ba is always Borei Nefashot. The Mishna Berura (ad loc. 47) contends that in order to make the higher beracha, the Shulchan Aruch requires not only a one eighth concentration but that one needs to eat a k’zayit worth of the 5mn flour. Conceptually, this means that a minority of flour is central enough to a complex food to control its overall identity and justify a “higher-level” ba, but the other foods are not subsumed enough to counts towards the ba of the 5mn flour.

There is significant machloket to what extent to limit the power of flour regarding ba. The Magen Avraham (208:15) says that the latter, more limiting Shulchan Aruch refers to the mixing of multiple types of grain but that other non-Mezonot ingredients team up with flour to reach the necessary k’zayit. The Chayei Adam (I, 50:21) is among those with misgivings over the Magen Avraham’s distinction. The Mishna Berura (208:48), in noting that the common practice is to recite Al Hamichya after a k’zayit of a piece of cake, even though it has less than a k’zayit of flour, gives the following explanation. Since “spices” (e.g., sugar, oil) are there to improve the prominent flour base, they are counted toward the k’zayit. Another idea is that the minimum amount of liquid needed to turn the flour into dough (but not the extra that makes it loose batter) counts toward the k’zayit (V’zot Haberacha, p. 236). The Chazon Ish (OC 26:8) similarly distinguishes between ingredients that are kneaded along with the flour, which count toward the k’zayit, and ingredients that are added after the kneading (e.g., the chocolate in rugelach). In the other direction, in cases where ingredients form a very distinct filling, e.g., in apple pie, it is accepted that it does not count toward the k’zayit (V’zot Haberacha, p. 47).

In summary, while it is unclear whether a k’zayit of flour is needed to call for Al Hamichya, common practice is that a k’zayit of cake (not including filling) suffices. Other factors give a boost to the practice. First, while the most accepted measure of a k’zayit is 27 cc. (appr. 1 fl. oz.), it may be smaller, so that there may be an actual k’zayit of flour in a piece that is not that much larger than a “standard k’zayit.” Also, Teshuvot V’hanhagot (II:133) posits that the b’di’eved situation favors Al Hamichya. He claims that since a k’zayit of food requires some ba and since cake is associated with the flour element, one would be yotzei with Al Hamichya even if Borei Nefashot is preferable. In contrast, if Al Hamichya is necessary, Borei Nefashot does not suffice. While eating additional cake is a logical halachic solution for the doubt, it may be unwise healthwise.

Your friend can fulfill his basic mitzva in this way (Mishna Berura 676:9). If your neighbor comes home very late, it is a good question whether it is better for him to light himself then or have you do it for him at a “better” time (see Living the Halachic Process VI, D-7). We will leave that decision to him and his rabbis.

In general, “Reuven” recites a beracha before doing a mitzva on behalf of “Shimon” (Rambam, Berachot 11:13, mentioning the mitzvot of mezuza, hafrashat ma’asrot, ma’akeh, and mila). This is because birchot hamitzvot relate to the mitzva’s action, not its fulfillment (Minchat Shlomo II:58). However, the way Reuven and Shimon team up in the fulfillment of the mitzva can differ significantly from mitzva to mitzva. We will give some examples.

All valid mohalim are halachically capable of doing mila to Shimon’s son, with Shimon just being the one with a specific obligation to do so. If Reuven does the mila, he fulfills the mitzva for himself, irrespective of whether Shimon asked him or fulfills his mitzva (see Shach, Choshen Mishpat 382:4).  In contrast, Reuven needs Shimon’s authorization to take off ma’asrot and the mitzva’s impact applies to Shimon. In both cases, Reuven makes the beracha (Rambam ibid.; Derech Emuna, Terumot 4:1). Therefore, we would expect that if Reuven lights Chanuka candles in Shimon’s house, he would make the beracha.

The complication begins with the Bach, cited by the Magen Avraham (676:4) and Mishna Berura (675:9). He seems to say that one who already lit Chanuka lights can light for a woman (his case) but can make the beracha only if she is listening, because it is “the responsibility of a person’s body.” If Shimon listens, it is as if he makes the beracha himself. Rav SZ Auerbach, while puzzled why Chanuka lights are different from other mitzvot, explains that since the mitzva devolves on Shimon’s house, which does not relate to Reuven, Reuven cannot make the beracha for himself.

There are other understandings of the Magen Avraham (Mikraei Kodesh (Frank) Chanuka 23; Igrot Moshe (OC I, 190) and Chovat Hadar 1:(42) generally concur). They say that the first beracha, i.e., a standard birkat hamitzva, can be made even if the home’s resident is not there. The need for Shimon’s presence concerns only the berachot of She’asa Nissim and Shehecheyanu (on the first night). This is because these berachot are connected to the experience of seeing the publicizing of the miracle, and they can only be made by or in the presence of the one to whom the mitzva applies. (If Reuven will not have an opportunity to make these berachot in his home, it is a different story.)

A precedent for these berachot being separate from the mitzva of lighting per se is found in the Shulchan Aruch (OC 676:2) – if someone has not lit or is connected to a lighting, he should make She’asa Nissim and Shehecheyanu when he sees someone else’s candles. What is the subject of considerable debate is whether when members of one’s household light on his behalf, he needs to make She’asa Nissim and Shehecheyanu himself (see Mishna Berura 676:6; ibid. 677:14).

Let us move on to practical suggestions. The indications are strong enough that you should definitely not recite She’asa Nissim and Shehecheyanu at your neighbor’s house, and therefore, he should try to find Chanuka lights upon which to recite them. Regarding Lehadlik Ner, it is very difficult to decide whether you can recite it. Therefore, it is usually best to light at your neighbor’s home right after lighting at your own home, in which case the beracha goes on both venues (Acharonim, including Dirshu 675:15, in the name of Rav Elyashiv). An exception would be when your neighbor is abroad, in Central or Western Europe, in which case, you should light at a time when it is night where he is (see Living the Halachic Process VI, D-8). In that case, it is safer not to make any of the berachot.      

There are a few halachic questions to deal with, including the extent to which lishma (intent for the mitzva) is needed. The gemara (Menachot 42b) says that the spinning of tzitzit strings must be done lishma, as the Shulchan Aruch rules (Orach Chayim 11:1). There is a machloket whether there is a lishma requirement for the attachment/tying of the tzitzit strings. The Rambam (Tzitzit 1:12) says that lishma is not required for that. He implies (see Beit Yosef, OC 14) that the proof is from the fact that a pasuk is needed to disqualify a non-Jew from attaching them (Menachot 42a), even though generally a non-Jew’s action relating to mitzvot is not considered lishma. The Rosh (Tzitzit 14) rules that the tzitzit must also be attached/tied lishma. Indeed, intuitively, this would be expected because tying is a more integral part of making the tzitzit and maybe even a major part of the mitzva (see Tosafot, Yevamot 90b) and should thus definitely require lishma. The Rambam may reason that it is not situationally clear that the spinning is for mitzva strings, so one needs positive lishma, whereas attaching the tzitzit to the garment is situationally clear that it is for the mitzva (Shut K’tav Sofer, OC 2). The bottom line is unclear. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 14:2) rules that if one attached the tzitzit without proper intention, he can rely on the Rambam to wear the garment, but that there is enough doubt about it that he should not recite a beracha on the mitzva.

Another area of doubt is what is needed to ensure things were done lishma. In the context of spinning, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 11:1) requires that one “say in the beginning of the spinning that he is doing it for the purpose of tzitzit or that he tell the woman ‘spin for me tzitzit for a tallit.’” The Mishna Berura (ad loc. 4) stresses that this entails explicit speech, not sufficing with clear thought, and leaves it as an unsolved question whether, after the fact, if there was correct thought but no statement, the tzitzit could be used.

Putting the two matters together, the Be’ur Halacha (to 14:2) says that when there was proper intention without a statement of intent when attaching the tzitzit, one can assume the tzitzit are valid and make a beracha on them. He adds an additional reason for leniency – the standard assumption that the action was done for the mitzva is stronger for attaching the tzitzit than for spinning the strings. You spoke in your questions of a p’sak received, that going to a tzitzit making center may be even better than the Be’ur Halacha’s case, as the surroundings bolster the logical assumption of lishma.

Your question comes down to whether your case is like the Be’ur Halacha’s or is even better. It is likely better for the following reason. He received instruction that it should be done lishma, which we saw in the Shulchan Aruch (11:1) is equivalent to making the statement yourself. What is not fully clear is whether the break in time and place between the instruction and the performance breaks the transference of lishma. It is very possible that the formal impact of the declaration passed (see Moadim U’zmanim 59), but the logic of it being on one’s mind would remain. (If he had started right away and continued at home, it would be somewhat simpler (see Chazon Ish, OC 6:10).).

In short, the kashrut of the tzitzit stands on very strong ground. It still would be respectful and prudent to inform/ask the people in charge of these operations, who are in touch with the IDF rabbinate, to see if they agree that it meets their standards.

Personal concerns can significantly affect the best choice for you. These include the impact on your wife’s morning, your sleep needs, and the subjective quality of your tefilla. Since you do not raise these issues, we will focus on the generic halachic issues, starting with the issue of davening before netz (sunrise).

The optimal time to daven Shacharit is “as vatikin” – starting Shemoneh Esrei as the sun rises (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 89:1). One can fulfill the mitzva as early as alot hashachar (72 minutes or more before sunrise), but this is on the level of b’di’eved and is recommended only for those in extenuating circumstances, e.g., they must be on the road at the optimal time (ibid. 8). Soon after alot hashachar, there is also a problem that it is, under normal circumstance, too early to recite Kri’at Shema and its berachot (ibid. 58:1,3), which is to precede Shemoneh Esrei. The starting time for Kri’at Shema is called misheyakir, some 50 minutes before netz (with variations due to various opinions and geographical adjustments). What is less clear (see Igrot Moshe, OC IV, 6; Minchat Yitzchak IX, 10) is whether davening at any time before netz is only b’di’eved (see Yalkut Yosef, OC 89:14) or is after misheyakir fine, and it is just less preferable than vatikin (Shut Pri Yitzchak I, 2). “Fine” can come in different gradations (see Ishei Yisrael 13:2).

The next question is whether and/or to what degree it is objectionable to get involved in an activity like taking children to daycare before Shacharit. Among the things that are forbidden before Shacharit is “involvement in one’s affairs” and traveling (Berachot 14a; Shulchan Aruch, OC 89:3). Arguably, taking children to daycare is both. However, there are possible leniencies.

Taking care of children, intrinsically, and as help to one’s wife, is likely an involvement of mitzva (see Halichot Shlomo, Tefilla 2:5; Living the Halachic Process, VII, H-1), which is permitted before davening (see Mishna Berura 89:36). This may apply to taking to good daycare. Also, there are indications that short trips are not considered traveling (see Living the Halachic Process VI, A-1). On the other hand, while simple help in the house with children might not be involved enough to qualify as involvement in affairs, presumably taking children to daycare is usually a formal and serious enough chore to be considered involvement. The Rama OC 89:3) cites an opinion that if one recites Birchot Hashachar beforehand, it is permitted to do tasks and travel. While we avoid relying on this alone (ibid.), poskim factor in reciting Birchot Hashachar first regarding borderline cases of activity (see Ishei Yisrael 13:23-24). There is also a possibility that if one has a set time for a minyan, then fitting in tasks before that time is permitted (Halichot Shlomo, Tefilla 2:(8)).

Putting our findings into perspective, neither davening between misheyakir and netz nor taking kids to daycare before davening is ideal, nor highly objectionable. It is often difficult to find sources and decide between two b’di’eved situations. (That said, if one must do real work early, he should first daven even before netz (Tefilla K’hilchata 3:(63)).) It is logical to consider subjective factors to help decide, and you can change schedules from day to day according to need. It may be worthwhile to consider how likely you are to come late to minyan if you take the kids first, or have to leave a little early if you take them later.

After weighing the factors, we suggest the following. If your community is like many, where main minyanim are in the pre-netz time slot (but Shemoneh Esrei is after misheyakir), at least during much of the year, and you sometimes attend such a minyan for convenience, it seems better to start the day by davening first with a clear mind. If you have set as a priority not to daven before netz, then take the kids first.

We have to investigate two independent topics, and then be practical about preferences in navigating the “conflict.”

Removing tefillin before Musaf: The idea of taking off tefillin before Musaf appears in the Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 25) as a minhag. He does not cite a source, and in looking for a reason, proposes that since Kedusha of Musaf is introduced (for Sephardim and Nusach Sephard) with a reference to Hashem’s keter (crown), it is inappropriate that we should be wearing our “crown” – tefillin. He cites Chol Hamo’ed’s lack of tefillin as a similar idea. The Rama (ad loc.) says that it although it follows that in places that do not recite “Keter …” in Kedusha, one should leave his tefillin on, the minhag is still to take them off. The same should apply to one who is davening without a minyan and thus Kedusha. The Taz (ad loc. 16) does not find the minhag compelling because Musaf should not elevate more than Chol Hamo’ed, and still many have the minhag to don tefillin then. The Levush (ad loc. 13) says that it is because Musaf, which mentions the day’s special korbanot, gives it an aura of Yom Tov. (I will add a supplementary point. Since we are careful to have tefillin on only for Kri’at Shema, Shemoneh Esrei (=SE), three Kedushot and four Kaddeishim (see Rama ibid.), by Musaf, there is little need to keep them on (see Mishna Berura 25:55).). Most poskim treat removing tefillin before Musaf as a not very important minhag (ibid. 61), despite strong Kabbalistic sources (see Kaf Hachayim, OC 25:94) that elevate its importance.

Hefsek (interruption) in tefilla: While hefsek in SE is severe (Berachot 33a), there are different levels of hefsek. The most severe is to speak, whereas walking to a different place is more lenient and permitted for significant but modest need (Mishna Berura 104:10). While performing actions can be even more lenient, it depends how involved the action is. It seems clear that certain actions are too trivial to require special permission (e.g., wiping off some sweat). The Shulchan Aruch (OC 97:4) allows adjusting one’s tallit but not returning it if it fell (unless the situation harms his concentration – Mishna Berura, ad loc. 16; see also Mishna Berura 96:7 regarding picking up a siddur that fell to the floor). Taking off tefillin thus seems to require real need.

There is a machloket among poskim if one can do actions to enhance tefilla that if not done, will not cause a critical lacking in it (see Ishei Yisrael 32:21 regarding going to get a siddur to help with Al Hanisim; SE is valid without it). One could then say that if tefillin on during Musaf has some sort of negative impact on SE, then it should be appropriate to remove them within it, to fix the rest of SE. If it is just a mild preference to take them off and especially if the issue relates more to the tefillin than to the tefilla, then it is no worse than the siddur on the floor, and one should remove it only after SE. While one can bring arguments one way or the other, the Mishna Berura (25:61) states clearly that since removing the tefillin is just a minhag, one who forgot does not remove them during SE.

After the fact, do not be too concerned that you removed them. Simple, well-intentioned hefsek does not disqualify SE (Shulchan Aruch, OC 104:6; see Mishna Berura ad loc. 25). Furthermore, it is possible that in your lack of certainty, you were considered one whose concentration is affected (see Mishna Berura 96:7, Ishei Yisrael 32:5; see Piskei Teshuvot 25:28 regarding this case). A compromise semi-removal, which some Acharonim advocate in borderline cases (see Kaf Hachayim, OC 25:99) would have been even easier to justify. One can move the tefillin shel rosh out of a position of mitzva relevance and slip a sleeve or cloth under the shel yad to make a chatzitza. This is likely not a hefsek (see above).

There is no need to use a tallit to wrap a sefer Torah. Certainly, when it is in the aron kodesh, it is uncommon to drape anything on a sefer Torah other than its mantle; the aron provides the necessary honor and/or protection. It is more common that when it is being transported or placed down for a while, we like to cover it, which is probably a combination of protection and honor. When this is done, it is common to use a tallit, which presumably gives more honor to the sefer Torah by not only covering it, but doing it with a particularly honorable object. However, even if the sefer Torah was being kept out of the aron, any respectable covering would be fine. Therefore, the tallit’s purpose for covering the sefer Torah is not a significant factor.

On the other hand, there is not a serious halachic requirement to wear a tallit during davening. It is possible that it is important for one davening Shacharit to show he is fulfilling the mitzva of tzitzit, which is mentioned as part of the tefilla (compare to Berachot 14b, see Tosafot ad loc.), but this is fundamentally accomplished by his pair of tzitzit. Indeed, if wearing a tallit during Shacharit were particularly important, Ashkenazim would not have the minhag that single men do not wear them (see Living the Halachic Process III, F-7). Still, the minhag of those who wear a tallit has some significance, as does the human element of a visitor being embarrassed or feeling that he is missing something. Therefore, the “greater purpose” is likely to be for the visitor.

What still deserves attention is the matter of taking something away from a sefer Torah to be used for a person. If the tallit is designated for ongoing use for the sefer Torah, it becomes sanctified as a tashmish kedusha, which should not be used for matters of lower kedusha (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 154:6), irrespective of the mitzva importance of the new usage. A tashmish kedusha has higher kedusha than an object used for a mitzva (Megilla 26b).    

However, an object does not become a tashmish kedusha by being used on a temporary basis (Mishna Berura 154:11), and even when it is more permanent, an understanding that it should not be set aside for the kedusha sometimes works (see Shulchan Aruch ibid. 8). So, one should check whether the nature of the designation of this tallit for the sefer Torah was intended to be ongoing before using it for other things.

Another question is of situational disgrace to the sefer Torah by taking the tallit directly from the sefer Torah to a person’s back. We find halachic precedent for this concern from the matter of taking a light from a Chanuka candle (other than the shamash) to use to light another (Shabbat 22b). Using the candle for something else can be bizuy (degradation of a) mitzva. While we fundamentally allow this, because it is for the purpose of the mitzva, there are various opinions about cases that are arguably less mitzva-tied (Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 674:1). The Rama makes a distinction that is instructive for us. After the candle has been lit long enough for the mitzva to be completed, it becomes permitted to use it. It is difficult to determine whether halachically, during use that does not sanctify it long term, bizuy to the sefer Torah applies, but we would have recommended the following “compromise,” which seems balanced and safe for the letter and spirit of the law.   

Remove the tallit when the sefer is in the aron, and, if possible, replace it with another nice cloth if the congregation wants it covered. After a few minutes, give the no-longer-in-use tallit to the visitor, and after davening, do not return the tallit immediately to the sefer Torah, thereby lessening the image of the visitor taking the “sefer Torah’s tallit.” If, at some point, someone returns it, that is fine.

We will first identify a roll of aluminum foil’s muktzeh status. An object that is not fit for use on the present Shabbat is muktzeh. If it is a usable “utensil,” but its main use is for forbidden purposes, it is a relatively lenient form of muktzeh called kli shemelachto l’issur. If it is not yet a utensil (or a food) and making it one would require a Shabbat violation or a pre-Shabbat designation for permitted usage, it is the more severe muktzeh machamat gufo (intrinsic muktzeh) (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:38; Rama ad loc. 7).   

Aluminum foil is not used when on its roll; rather, one cuts a piece to size for its present purpose, which is then a usable utensil. Since it is forbidden to cut such a piece (see Orchot Shabbat 19:125), we view the roll according to its present stage – as an unusable object (ibid.). (A roll of toilet paper, though, is not muktzeh (ibid. 126) because when there are no viable alternatives, there are halachic ways to use the toilet paper (see Living the Halachic Process I, C-16)).

When a muktzeh item rests on an otherwise non-muktzeh object, the “base” can take on the muktzeh item’s status, based on a concept called bassis l’davar ha’asur (Shulchan Aruch, OC 310:7). There are several conditions for the status of bassis to exist: 1) The muktzeh was on the base when Shabbat entered (ibid.; Mishna Berura 266:26). 2) The muktzeh was placed with the intention that it would remain there on Shabbat in a significant manner (Shulchan Aruch, OC 309:4; see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 20:520). 3) The muktzeh item(s) is more “important” than non-muktzeh items that also rest there (Shulchan Aruch, OC 310:8).

From your description, it sounds like conditions 1 and 2 are met, so the question depends on whether the aluminum foil (and other muktzeh items) is more important than the non-muktzeh. In this context, a kli shemelachto l’issur is treated as non-muktzeh. Since such items may be moved for usage purpose and when they are in the way (ibid. 308:3), the drawer may be opened to make available the objects you wish to use and then closed.

The individual homeowner’s perspective on importance is the determinant (Mishna Berura 310:33). A prominent early source, the Magen Avraham (277:8), posits that challa is more important than the candles on the table. However, regarding more exact parameters, there are many opinions (see Orchot Shabbat 19:(414)). Some suggest that importance depends on overall value to the person (i.e., if he could choose what to hold on to, which would it be, so that price is crucial) (Q&A 14 of Rav S.Z. Auerbach in Tiltulei Shabbat). Other opinions stress functionally in the specific context (Igrot Moshe, OC V, 22.17 assumes that glasses are more important than a relatively large amount of money, but only if it is his only pair). Still others consider the relationship between the objects and the specific bassis (Shevet Halevi VIII:52 says that a challa is more important than candles/candlesticks on a table where one eats). Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (20:55) posits that it is crucial for the permitted object to be necessary for Shabbat. In any case, these parameters are unlikely to make a difference in a drawer used for general storage, where many things could possibly be used at this time.

Usually, when a muktzeh item does not make the base a bassis, we should still shake off the muktzeh before further moving the base, if this is feasible (Shulchan Aruch, OC 310:8). However, it is not feasible to simply shake out a cabinet drawer. While moving the muktzeh aluminum foil along with the drawer seems regrettable, no halachic construct forbids keeping it in the drawer when it does not create a bassis (see Orchot Shabbat 19:(386)).

Although your description seems to indicate no problem of refu’ah (medical actions) on Shabbat, your wife was correct that smearing a cream onto one’s skin is forbidden on Shabbat. This is clear when one wants a film of cream to be on the skin for a while, but is likely true even if will be absorbed relatively quickly (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 33:13). It is possible to dab small lumps of cream and let them spread out by themselves. However, we will address your excellent question regarding normal application.

You may be aware that even after accepting upon herself the halachot of Shabbat, a wife may ask her husband who did not yet do so to do melacha for her. The gemara (Shabbat 151a) allows Reuven to tell Shimon who is in the techum Shabbat of Reuven’s produce to look after it, even though Reuven is out of the techum himself. The Rashba (ad loc.)  derives from this that one who has accepted Shabbat can tell a Jew who did not yet do so to do melacha on his behalf. The Ran (Shabbat 64b of the Rif’s pages) says that one may not generalize based on the gemara regarding techum, where there is a special way to get to the distant place (burgenin), but elsewhere one may not ask someone to do something that he may not. The Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 263) counters by stressing that the one who accepted Shabbat could have not accepted Shabbat early. The Shulchan Aruch and Rama (OC 263:17) accept the Rashba’s leniency, including physically benefiting on Shabbat from that which was produced on his behalf.

Your question, then, is whether the leniency of letting Reuven, who did not accept Shabbat, do melacha for Sarah, who accepted it, applies even if Sarah will be directly involved in the melacha (e.g., have the cream applied to her skin). I did not find a source on this case, but sources on parallel matters should suffice, as the question is general: is direct involvement but, primarily, as an object (i.e., another person does the melacha to him) make one considered a partner in the action (which in your case, would be chillul Shabbat for your wife).

One equivalent matter is when a non-Jew is allowed to do a melacha to heal a sick Jew, where a Jew, including the sick person, may not do that same thing (Shulchan Aruch, OC 328:17). The Rama (ad loc.) says that in such cases, one “may assist [the non-Jew] a little, for assistance is not [halachically] significant.” This follows the rule found in various gemarot that “assisting is not significant” (see Beitza 22a; Shabbat 93a). Admittedly, some point to a gemara (Makot 20b) that seems to indicate the opposite – one who lets someone cut his hair in a forbidden manner is punished like the one who cut it. The Taz (OC 228:1) reconciles the sources by distinguishing between cases where the person having the violation done to him needs to do something to enable the one acting to do the violation. The Taz thereby rejects the Rama’s (OC 228:3) permission to have a non-Jew pull a Jew’s tooth when necessary, because the Jew has to open his mouth. However, most poskim agree with the Rama, not the Taz (see Mishna Berura 328:11, 61). (Many say that forbidden haircuts is more stringent in this regard than melacha on Shabbat – see Nekudot Hakesef (the Shach) to Taz, Yoreh Deah 198:21).

Another question about whether one having melacha done to him is considered a halachic “collaborator” is when a woman who did not cut her nails needs to go to the mikveh on Shabbat. Most poskim allow a non-Jew to cut them (see Nekudot Hakesef ibid.; the Taz is again stringent); Be’ur Halacha 340:1; Yalkut Yosef, OC 340, Gozez 11).

The standard p’sak is thus that your wife could even maneuver herself to help you apply the cream. However, it was probably simple enough to apply it without her needing to do anything, in which case, even the Taz would permit it.

Asking your question takes bravery, as we understand that the prospect of not being able to duchen would be a great disappointment.

We will start with the strict requirements. BK must be done standing (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 128:14). The gemara (Sota 38a) learns this from the Torah’s connecting of the kohen’s beracha to his service in the Mikdash, which must be done standing. Because standing is a full requirement, if one leans on something during BK, it is invalid (Mishna Berura 128:51). However, one may lean a little, as long as removing the thing he is leaning on would not make him fall (see Zevachim 24a; Mishna Berura 94:22). It is also absolutely required for kohanim to lift their hands in the subscribed manner for BK (Shulchan Aruch ibid.; Sota 38a). This makes balance more difficult. You thus must figure out if you can use the wall for balance/security and “pass this test.”

Realize that there are legitimate corners to cut to help you qualify. The Mishna Berura (128:52) accepts the Ktav Sofer’s (OC 13) idea that the kohen needs to lift his hands only when he pronounces each individual word; he can rest in between. The same thing should be true regarding standing – one may lean as he likes in between pronouncing the words (Even Yisrael VII:10; Dirshu 128:70).  

Let us rule out another question. A kohen may not duchen with blemishes on visible parts of the body because they distract the congregation’s attention (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 30). Arguably, people could view your cane as distracting. However, this is not a problem. First, this is a questionable assumption. Second, if people are used to a distraction, e.g., the situation has existed for 30 days, it is no longer distracting (ibid.). Furthermore, since the cane is not in your hand during BK, it is not a halachic issue.

We did not find discussion on the presumably most physically difficult part of the process – turning around during the beracha, which kohanim do with the hands already up. We will share two good solutions for this challenge, after discussing the practice of turning around. The most important parts of davening are done facing the aron kodesh, and it is improper, without a good reason, to stand with one’s back to it. However, Halacha made BK, at which the kohanim address the congregation, an exception (see Sota 40a). However, the kohanim turn to the congregation only when they need to, right before BK. The matter of timing of turning around and raising the hands is not intrinsic to BK, unlike the above matters. In fact, there is a machloket whether to turn around before the beracha (… asher kid’shanu … levarech …) or after it, and the present minhag is to turn in the middle of the beracha (see Aruch Hashulchan, OC 128:20). There is also a machloket whether to lift the hands before or after the beracha (see opinions in Va’ani Avarchem 19:2).

Given the fact that these questions of timing are just a matter of minhag, in your situation you can do what is physically best for you (you do not need to worry that other kohanim will resent your acting differently). Specifically, you can turn with everyone else, but holding your cane, and not raise your hands until you finish turning around and making the beracha. You can also turn, with the cane and at more leisure, before the beracha, and then put down the cane and raise your hands sometime before the BK itself.

In summary, you can appraise whether you can stand well enough at the critical times and figure out how to use legitimate corner cutters. You must make sure you are not endangering yourself concerning a dangerous fall. The wall may be a good solution, but something like a heavy shtender in front of you may be more effective and safer. Do not be embarrassed to ask for help to set things up best. Your lifetime of past and future berachot gives you rights!