ASK THE RABBI

Two gemarot regarding similar mitzvot are instructive. One (Menachot 43a) asks about Rav Yehuda’s consistency regarding tzitzit. He had his wife wear tzitzit because he saw it as a non-time-based mitzva (i.e., it applies 24/7), but he made a beracha on them every morning, as if each day were a new mitzva! The gemara answers that he posited that one who takes a break in an ongoing mitzvot makes a new beracha when resuming it. The source is Rabbi’s opinion (Sukka 46a) that one makes a beracha on tefillin each time he puts them on. The latter gemara tells of Rava making a beracha on tefillin every time he left the bathroom and those who made a beracha each time they “handled” them.

The Tur (Orach Chayim 8) understands the gemara about making a beracha upon handling tefillin as referring to a case where it slipped totally out of place, which made a beracha necessary upon its return. At first, he equated that case to one removing his tallit and returning it. However, he concludes that when one purposely removes tzitzit or tefillin with the plan to promptly return it relatively soon, he does not make a new beracha. The Beit Yosef (OC 8) argued based on the gemara about making a beracha on tefillin after the bathroom, despite the intention to return them soon, showing that after any break in the performance of tefillin or tzitzit, we need a new beracha (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 8:14; OC 25:12).

For Ashkenazim, the ruling is more complicated. The Rama (Darchei Moshe, OC 8:6) dismisses the proof from the beracha on tefillin after the bathroom, because the fact that it is forbidden to wear tefillin in the bathroom magnifies the break in the mitzva. In contrast, since one may wear tzitzit in the bathroom, and fundamentally even a tallit, the break for a bathroom visit does not require a new beracha. The Rama (OC 8:14) accepts a different distinction. If one takes his tallit off but keeps his tzitzit on, the mitzva continues sufficiently to make a new beracha unnecessary; if he takes both off, he needs a beracha. According to this, if one takes off his tzitzit (with no tallit on), then even if he returns it relatively quickly, he would seem to need a new beracha. Many have difficulty with this distinction, considering that the beracha on each garment is independent and that regarding tefillin the Rama (OC 25:12) does not require a beracha even though no tefillin remain on (see Nachalat Tzvi 8:14).

Despite the positions of the Shulchan Aruch and Rama, most Sephardi and Ashkenazi Acharonim (see Mishna Berura 8:37; Aruch Hashulchan, OC 8:21; Yalkut Yoself, OC 8:52) say that if one is planning to put tzitzit back on relatively soon, he need not make a new beracha. This is to a great extent because, given that there are respected opinions not to make a beracha, we say safek berachot l’hakel (in a doubt whether to make a beracha, we refrain from it).

The most basic exemptions from the prohibition of bishul akum are when the cooked food is not fit for fancy settings and when the food was fit to be eaten before the cooking (Avoda Zara 38a). The general logic for both is likely, as you said, that the prohibition is only when the cooking reaches the bar in importance, thereby heightening the danger that the association between a Jew and non-Jew will go further than it should (see Tosafot ad loc.). While your understanding of the rationale of the halacha of ne’echal chai is correct, when looking for rulings on whether a food belongs to the prohibition or the exemption, that rationale is not nearly as important as the Talmudic parameters.  

The gemara’s language is: “All that is [fit to be] eaten the way it is, raw” is not included in bishul akum. There is an opinion that edibility is measured by the practices of the one who wants to eat, but the accepted approach is that it follows a cross-section of people of one’s society (see Chelkat Binyamin 113:5). In any case, the poskim (see Ritva ad loc.; Shach, Yoreh Deah 113:19) agree that it does not have to be equally good or customary to eat the food raw; it just must be a viable option. Accordingly, even if the cooking is important, the prohibition of bishul akum may still not apply because the food could have been eaten beforehand.

The parameters are very different for berachot on such foods. For vegetables that are clearly preferred cooked or not cooked, respectively, the beracha for the preferred manner is Borei Pri Ha’adama and for the less preferred is Shehakol (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 205:1). This “favoritism” in berachot is even when either option is fully viable, just that the “demotion” comes when there is a “change for the worse” relative to the classic option (Rama ad loc.).

The comparison between bishul akum and berachot is apt not to a change of beracha but to the cancellation of a beracha. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 202:2) says that regarding a food that generally receives a beracha, if an individual piece of that food is “unfit to eat even al y’dei hadechak (if there is a need to eat it),” then there is no beracha. If such a food could be remedied by cooking and a non-Jew did so, it would indeed be forbidden as bishul akum.

It is unclear whether the cutoff point is the same in the two areas. The Shulchan Aruch (YD 113:12) cites two opinions as to whether a food that is “edible” raw only al y’dei hadechak is subject to bishul akum. If it is permitted in that case, then both areas are similar in that we draw the line at totally not edible. In borderline cases, there is logic to distinguish between berachot and bishul akum. In the former, the fact that one is eating it raw can be an indication that it is edible (achshevei), whereas the fact one is cooking can slightly strengthen the outlook that cooking was needed.

Regarding bishul akum, poskim deal with apparent contradictions on borderline edibility. The gemara (ibid.) says that if a Jew cooked food until ma’achal ben drusa’i, then further cooking by a non-Jew does not forbid it. This is difficult for the stringent opinion above because after the first stage, it is edible only al y’dei hadechak. The Bach (YD 113) answers that bishul akum applies even to marginally edible food, but if it was brought to that point in a permitted manner, the prohibition does not apply.  There is also an apparent contradiction in the Shulchan Aruch, as despite the two opinions above, he outright forbids eggs and bitter dates cooked by a non-Jew (YD 113:14, 15), even though they could be eaten beforehand al y’dei hadechak! The Taz (ad loc. 14) distinguishes between levels of dechak.

We will start our discussion with the fundamental halachic principles.

One halachic component of Ma’ariv on MS is the tefilla of Ma’ariv, like every night. There are legitimate opinions that one can daven Ma’ariv from plag haMincha (long before sunset – Berachot 27a). However, the more accepted practice (Erev Shabbat may be different) is to wait until the day is over. For some (especially Sephardim), this is from sunset, but it is better to wait until tzeit hakochavim (see Mishna Berura 233:9), which is at least around 14 minutes after sunset, but most communities who wait for tzeit during the week assume it is between 18 and 25 minutes after sunset (not the 35+ minutes for the end of Shabbat). From a tefilla perspective, this is true also on MS.

The issue is the Shabbat element. The need for tosefet Shabbat is not only in the beginning of Shabbat but also at its end (see Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 293; Mishna Berura 293:5). However, it is a short time, and the main reason for the significantly later time than “weekday tzeit hakochavim” on our calendars is out of concern, in such a serious matter, that our assumed tzeit hakochavim is too early. Fundamentally, both tosefet and special concern do not apply to Ma’ariv (see Mishna Berura 293:1), and therefore it is permitted according to basic Halacha to daven Ma’ariv a little early.

Does Havdala (Ata Chonantanu) in Shemoneh Esrei complicate matters? The Shulchan Aruch (OC 293:3, based on Berachot 27b) allows davening Ma’ariv toward the end of Shabbat if there is sufficient need. This includes Havdala in Shemoneh Esrei and likely even Havdala over wine (without making the beracha on light or doing melacha). The Maharshal, accepted by many poskim (see Mishna Berura 293:9) objected to davening so early because it looks strange to daven Ma’ariv of MS on Shabbat and because it could confuse people into doing melacha too early. However, we do not find that type of concern to Ma’ariv at a normal Ma’ariv time and when Shabbat is likely over me’ikar hadin. It does not look strange, and the concern for doing melacha is much less of a problem, at least if Shemoneh Esrei is over only after melacha is permitted.

In practice, though, the codified minhag (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 1; see Mishna Berura 1) is not to daven Ma’ariv before Shabbat is considered out. The Beit Yosef (ad loc.) connects the idea to the gemara (Shabbat 118b) that praises those who extend Shabbat longer than necessary. Let us put the connection in perspective. Davening Ma’ariv is one of the strongest ways to usher in a new day (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 261:4 regarding accepting Shabbat and Mishna Berura 188:32 regarding precluding saying R’tzei at Shabbat’s end). Therefore, besides Ata Chonantanu, davening Ma’ariv ends Shabbat to the extent possible, which somewhat negates tosefet Shabbat. The Pri Megadim (MZ 293:1) presents the same basic idea in other terms: we don’t want it to look as if Shabbat is a burden. There are also minhagim such as stretching out V’hu Rachum (Rama, OC 293:3) and the halachic discussions of perhaps doing Chanuka lights before Havdala (see Mishna Berura 681:3) to extend elements of Shabbat a little longer.

Therefore, the minyan you refer to is not forbidden, but standard practice and sources view it as against the minhag and distasteful under normal circumstances. When one has a pressing need, it is legitimate to end Ma’ariv at the time one can do melacha, and it is then a good question whether to daven at home or whether a large community should provide a “side minyan” due to the likelihood that there will be enough people with special needs. We do not pass judgment on an individual who takes part or a community that has such a minyan, but it would be unusual for a proper shul to have its main minyan early.

The gemara (Bava Batra 97a-b) indeed says that only wine that is fit (b’di’eved suffices) for nesachim is valid for Kiddush and discusses various cases, but not yayin mevushal (=yymv). Another gemara (Avoda Zara 30a) says that a non-Jew’s touching of yymv does not make it forbidden, and this is likely because it is not fit for nesachim. Rashi (Shut 88) rules that yymv does not count as wine to the extent that its beracha is Shehakol. Tosafot (Bava Batra 97a) understands Rashi’s rationale as being because the cooking makes it deteriorate, but derives from a Yerushalmi that yymv is wine and is valid even for Pesach’s arba’ah kosot. The Rambam (Shabbat 29:14) disqualifies yymv for Kiddush because it is not fit for nesachim. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 272:8) cites both opinions, but prefers the lenient one. The Rama (ad loc.) supports the lenient opinion if one does not have uncooked wine of equal quality. Concerning the beracha, we clearly rule that it is Borei Pri Hagafen (Shulchan Aruch, OC 202:1).

We can understand why you want to be machmir to avoid yymv for Kiddush. However, most people are not machmir, and it is worthwhile to respect that and understand the likely rationale. For one, nowadays “yymv” usually means pasteurized (lower temperature than what we would normally consider cooking). Poskim dispute whether pasteurization is considered yymv. Regarding styn, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 123:3) is somewhat lenient on the degree of cooking (see Yabia Omer VIII, YD 15), and Rav Moshe Feinstein is lenient if it reaches 175° F; Rav SZ Auerbach is stringent regarding styn on pasteurized wine (Minchat Shlomo I:25). Stringency regarding styn indicates leniency regarding Kiddush. Furthermore, the reason that a lot of kosher wine is yymv is that it is difficult for the public to ensure that they will not have styn problems, sometimes with little warning. Therefore, for a shul or a family to have a policy of using yymv makes enough sense to be at least as important as using it because of its superior taste (see Rama above).    

Adding in sugar is equivalent to the classical poskim’s discussion of adding honey. While the Rambam (ibid.) is confident about yymv being a problem for Kiddush, he is equivocal about wine with added honey. This likely has to do with the addition being done to improve the taste or that is a minority of the wine. Apparently, even Rashi would agree that we would follow the majority and make Borei Pri Hagafen (see Rama, OC 202:1). So in some ways, if one wants to be machmir but has a choice between yymv and sweetened wine, the latter could be preferable (Kitzvei Harim 51). This is strengthened by the likelihood that one bought the sweetened wine because he prefers the taste. If sweetened non-yymv has a problem of styn (see below), yymv could have at least one advantage, as discussed above.

Does added sugar remove the problem of styn? There are some grounds to claim that the styn leniency of yymv does not apply to sweetened wine (see Rosh, Avoda Zara 2:13). However, the Rambam (Ma’achalot Assurot 11:10) equates the two in this regard based on fitness for nesachim. The Shulchan Aruch (YD 123:4) rules that sweet additives remove the problem of styn if it changes the taste. It is very unclear how to figure out whether a wine qualifies for this leniency. In practice, while many kosher wines write on the label that is yymv, to indicate no styn, I have never seen a hechsher that wrote that is sweet enough to remove styn. We would not recommend making assumptions on these grounds unless it is a drink that has so much of additives that it does not come across as a normal wine.

We will try to keep the dikduk as simple as we can. Indeed, in third person singular (he/him), nehiya is past (all came to be by His word) (see Devarim 4:32), and nehiyeh is present (all comes to be …). (In first person plural (we), nehiyeh is future (we will be)). The question is whether we want to use the language of past or present

We can seek precedent from other berachot.  The gemarot regarding Hamotzi (Berachot 38a) and Borei Meorei Ha’esh (ibid. 52b) assume that we want these berachot to focus on the past. Rashi explains – the bread we are about to eat was already extracted from the soil. One can say the same thing about Shehakol – the chicken or candy I am eating was produced in the past. Rav Yaakov Emden (Mor U’ktzia, OC 167) goes a step further, claiming that the “all” that Shehakol refers to is broad, and that generally things came into existence at Creation, even if the specific food we will eat is relatively recent. Indeed, a majority of poskim (see Shaarei Teshuva 204:20) and of practice (survey of sources, siddurim and people) is as you have done – “nehiya.”

However, significant logic and a sizable minority of sources support “nehiyeh.” The Chochmat Manoach (Berachot 38a; cited by the Magen Avraham167:8) points out that most berachot employ a present tense verb (see below) at the end of almost all berachot (even those that focus mainly on the past). Take birkat hatorah as one of many examples. We speak of bachar banu … v’natan lanu (past tense references to matan Torah) but end off “… noten hatorah (noten is present tense – gives/is giving). Therefore, he and the Me’il Tzedaka (42) advocate saying nehiyeh. The Me’il Tzedaka’s and Magen Avraham’s final positions are not clear. One can also take issue with Rav Yaakov Emden’s chiddush that Shehakol focuses on Creation. Why should all other birchot hanehenin focus on the specific food and this one focus on Creation? It is more likely that we use general terminology for specific foods that do not fit into a specific category. Regarding Talmudic precedent, the Magen Avraham also cites a Yerushalmi (Berachot 8:5) that one should not learn from Borei Meorei Ha’esh because the language should be appropriate for commemorating the original creation of fire. Regarding Hamotzi, the Beit Yosef (OC 167) knew a version of the gemara that Hamotzi is in the present, and the Me’il Tzedaka explains our text as just wanting to avoid future tense, but these positions are of a small minority.

What do we do with the gemara’s contention that Hamotzi uses past tense? Don’t we know from “Dikduk 101” that hotzi is past, motzi is present, and yotzi is future?! The answer is that “Hamotzi,” and “Borei,” … in various berachot are not verbs but nouns. We are giving Hashem the title of “the extractor” of bread, “the creator” of foods, ... In Hebrew, the noun/title is formed by using a present verb form. Now, one can earn a title by what he did in the past, is doing in the present, or will do in the future (or any combination of them). The gemara posits that the title must be compatible with the past tense. In contrast, in Shehakol, “nehiya” is not a title but a real verb. Therefore, if one uses the present tense, he is stressing the present (much more than borei does), which the gemara seems to object to.

One is yotzei the beracha with either form he uses. In kriat hatorah, subtle meaning changes are problematic, but regarding berachot, the deciding factor is the basic idea. While the gemara (Berachot 40b) cites an opinion that changing a beracha’s formulation disqualifies it, that is for major changes. Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 167:10 shows how far one can be off and be yotzei.

The degree to which the presumption of needing a half hour of lighting is correct is central to this question. On the one hand, if the lights go out within this time, it is not necessary to relight them (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 673:2), which implies that the act of lighting is the important thing, not the light’s longevity. On the other hand, when lighting, we must have enough oil to last a half hour (Shulchan Aruch, OC 675:2), and if one lights in a place where the wind will blow it out before the end time, it is like not putting in enough oil (Magen Avraham 673:12; Mishna Berura 673:25). These halachot imply that the time lit is important. The explanation is that the lighting has to be done with the ability to last a half hour, but it is not critical that it actually lasts.

What happens if there was physical potential for half an hour but human intervention after the lighting was done shortens the duration? The Rashba (Shut I, 539) says that if one accidentally extinguished the light early, he does not need to relight it. From here, the poskim diverge. Some (including the Pri Megadim, MZ 673:2; Avnei Nezer OC 503; simple reading of the Shulchan Aruch, OC 973:2) say that if one purposely extinguished the candles, he needs to relight them. A minority posit that even if one extinguished them purposely, one still fulfills the mitzva and does not have to relight them (see S’fat Emet, Shabbat 21b). Some understand that while one has to relight them, he might still have fulfilled the mitzva beforehand, as evidenced by the machmirim (including the Pri Megadim) who say that when relighting, one should not make a beracha (see Minchat Shlomo II, 51).

Some say that while even intentional extinguishing may not uproot retroactively the mitzva that was ostensibly fulfilled at the time of lighting, it is qualitatively worse when one lit with the intention to extinguish them within the half hour. Minchat Shlomo (ibid.) compares it to one who physically performs a mitzva but has in mind not to fulfill the mitzva. Others compare it to not having enough oil (see Divrei Sofrim, Chanuka p. 126). Several grounds upon which to say that one fulfills the mitzva include the following (see Nitei Gavriel, Chanuka, Shut 1). Not all distinguish based on the original intention; there may be conflicting opinions in the gemara (Shabbat 21b) on whether there is a minimum time for the candles to be lit, especially if we light inside. These points are particularly important when there are no alternatives (see ibid.).

The point, though, is that you have many potential alternatives. We will start with the more technical. 1) Arrange a “flame-sitter” for the remaining needed time. 2) If (for you to determine) you can safely leave lit candles (at least one), you almost certainly fulfill the mitzva and definitely if they are visible by others. 3) Light the candles outside that night. 4) Light when you come home – in many places, 10 PM is valid for lighting candles, due to late traffic nowadays. Even if it is too late for public pirsumei nisa, most poskim (see Mishna Berura 672:11; Living the Halachic Process IV, D-7) allow lighting when you come home with a beracha for people who light inside. There are clear preferences to lighting at the standard time, for a few reasons, (z’rizin…; opinions that afterwards it is too late; issues with eating before lighting – see Mishna Berura 672:10). However, it is more important to embrace the greater chance to fulfill the mitzva later than to light at the correct time and plan to extinguish it early. (The halachically creative can contemplate plans of action that include “fancy footwork,” which likely include positive and negative halachic consequences. This is not the proper forum to specify or analyze them.)

The Rambam (Shabbat 23:7) says that washing dishes is forbidden (based on Shabbat 118a) because it is “like fixing” the dishes, but since it is forbidden only if done for use after Shabbat, it must be based on hachana, which tells us about how the Rambam defines it. The Ra’avad (ad loc.) argues that it is forbidden because he is toiling on Shabbat for a weekday.

The halachot of hachana are elusive, because several gemarot and accepted rulings of Rishonim seem to ignore it. There are opinions that only “transformative” actions (seemingly following the Rambam’s approach) or more taxing activities (seemingly following the Ra’avad’s) (see the development of Eliya Rabba’s (308:8) thesis in Pri Eliezer III, p. 616) or actions that finish a process (see Chayei Adam II, 153:6) are included. While in cases with lenient characteristics and/or need, poskim entertain leniencies (see ibid.; Mishna Berura 667:5), in general we apply hachana expansively, following the Magen Avraham (667:3), who forbade even bringing wine for Havdala on Shabbat.

If changing mantels had halachic rules, it might impact your question. For example, if it needed to be done by the next laining, we could compare it to rolling a sefer Torah on Shabbat to the right place for the upcoming Yom Tov’s laining, which most poskim forbid (Mishna Berura 667:5). However, we have not found such halachot and don’t believe they exist. Rather, people (some more than others) like to be “on the right page” chronologically. The shul looks unprofessional if the chagim and/or Yamim Noraim adornments are still around much thereafter and for some gabbaim and/or shuls, doing it promptly is significant as a matter of pride.

We can now compare it to a different case. Although it is forbidden to make a bed on Shabbat to sleep in it on Motzaei Shabbat (Shabbat 113a), it is permitted to straighten it out so that it is aesthetically appropriate according to the household’s Shabbat standards (Magen Avraham 302:6; Mishna Berura 302:19). Poskim presume the same is true even if it is more significant for him as preparation for sleep that night. On the other hand, there seems to be a proof, from the halacha (see above) not to wash dishes on Shabbat after one finished his last meal that to permit potential hachana based on Shabbat, that benefit must be quite significant (at least in comparison to the weekday benefit). One can ask: Besides having utensils for the next meal, don’t people prefer not having dirty dishes around their kitchen?! Apparently, in comparison to the positive benefit of having clean dishes, not having dirty dishes around is not halachically significant.

Here, it would not seem to be significant to have the “right” mantels on at this point. On the other hand, it is not really significant later either, as it does not have to be done by the next laining, and being “on the right page” ostensibly applies on Shabbat too. However, this argument appears incorrect. The aesthetic or pride element exists at all only when the aron kodesh is open, as otherwise the mantels should not be on anyone’s mind. Therefore, one could change all of the mantels before Mincha even though the shul is going to read from only one sefer, because the gabbai has a reasonable interest in having the right look when the aron is open. However, after Mincha, there is no real benefit.

It is difficult to claim the action of switching the mantels does not fall under the realm of hachana. It is not trivial in terms of time/effort, there was no special need, and it was clearly for after Shabbat. While the switching might be less transformative for the sifrei Torah than washing is for dishes, at least the great majority of poskim would forbid it.

We start with sources (including a thorough teshuva by the Machazeh Eliyahu 5-6), from which we gleaned many of our sources. However, we must also think in terms of common practice and feasibility.

The halachic issues are exposing holy articles to private parts and to excrement. Regarding the former, the pasuk (Devarim 23:15) requires separation between uncovered private parts and holy things (see Shabbat 150a). The gemara (Shabbat 120b) says that one upon whose flesh Hashem’s Name is written may not bathe because it is forbidden to stand naked in front of the Name of Hashem. The Magen Avraham (45:2) extends this prohibition to wearing tefillin or bringing Torah texts into a place where people are undressed. The Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (24:30) says based on this that one may not erect a partition before holy sefarim on Shabbat to allow removing a baby’s diaper because it is a halachically necessary wall.  

However, there are strong grounds to distinguish between an adult and a baby. While the Shulchan Aruch (OC 75:4) forbids reciting Kri’at Shema before the private parts of a young child, the Rama (ad loc.) permits it until the age of 3 for a girl and 9 for a boy. Even those who forbid it, do so as a chumra l’chatichila (Mishna Berura 75:5) because of its impact on one’s thoughts (not as an objective erva), and this should not be a problem for holy articles (see Radbaz V,1028; Machazeh Eliyahu ibid.). While the Rama (OC 275:12) cites a minhag not to leave a naked child before Shabbat candles because of disgrace to the mitzva, it is illogical to apply the minhag to changing a diaper. (When Shabbat candles alone provided light, were parents expected to change diapers in the dark?!!).

The other issue is the excrement in the diaper. (Only at the age of several months is a baby’s stool problematically unseemly – Shulchan Aruch, OC 81:1.) One is forbidden to bring holy things such as tefillin into a bathroom (Shulchan Aruch, OC 43:1). However, the problem is likely not the excrement itself, but the status of the place and/or the possibility he will relieve himself while there. Indeed, the Magen Avraham (43:11) permits (when necessary) going into alleyways with excrement with tefillin on. It is also more lenient when the exposure of the holy article to the unseemly matter is passing (Be’ur Halacha to 43:5; Shut Ramah Mipanu 59). The Machazeh Eliyahu (ibid.) proves that the exposure is not forbidden from the fact it is permitted to urinate with tefillin on if it is not in a set bathroom (Shulchan Aruch ibid.), even though sources indicate that is at least as bad as exposure to excrement.

How can we be so lenient considering the prohibition to recite holy things within the vicinity of excrement (Berachot 25a; Shulchan Aruch, OC 79:1)? The Machazeh Eliyahu explains that it is not the proximity between the holy utterings and the unclean surroundings but when a person’s domain is impacted by an unclean area, he becomes unfit to engage in holy things. If an area becomes taken over by the excrement, then holy things cannot be done there, but a limited amount of time in which a room contains excrement does not have this impact.

What will one following stringent opinions do about mezuzot? Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (ibid.) presents a not-simple leniency – the wrapping of the mezuza, which many anyway do, counts as a separation. We believe that the stringency is unnecessary in the first place, as above. Furthermore, the way our houses now have sefarim, Torah-based wall hangings, etc. all over the place makes it impractical to be machmir regarding changing diapers, and it also makes the encounter not offensive. It is not surprising that the broad practice is to not require precautions when changing diapers in regular areas. We hope our homes are blessed with several children and many sefarim and that changing diapers does not cause undue difficulty.

The gemara (Menachot 36a) lists LT as the beracha for the shel yad and AMT for shel rosh, but one way of learning the gemara is that one makes two berachot only if he speaks between putting on the two (see Rashi ad loc.; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 25:5). For Ashkenazim, when one speaks, he needs to repeat LT along with AMT for the shel rosh (Rama ad loc.).

There is much discussion on related perplexing matters, including the following. Why, for Sephardim, is there one beracha for two mitzvot (shel yad and shel rosh – see Rambam’s Sefer Hamitzvot, Aseh 12-13)? A major approach (see Mahari Halevi in Taz, OC 25:6) is that while there are two mitzvot, they are very similar and also intrinsically designed to be connected. Why, for Ashkenazim, can there be (if one speaks) two berachot for the shel rosh? There are different positions as to why there are two different berachot for the shel yad. Tosafot (Berachot 60b) says that LT is formulated as a beracha for the beginning of the process of putting on tefillin and AMT is for the end of the process. Mahari Halevi (ibid.; see earlier sources in Rosh, Tefillin 15) explains how each tefillin require both berachot, with each adding a different element (see also Aruch Hashulchan, OC 25:10), but they were instituted in a way that normally LT “extends forward” and AMT “stretches backward.”

After this small glimpse at the fundamental analysis of the berachot, we approach sources on our case – when one recited AMT on the shel yad. Most poskim (see Machazik Beracha 25:7) assume that AMT works b’di’eved for Sephardim as the single beracha. Certainly, according to the Mahari Halevi (but likely even for others), AMT takes effect if said while putting on the shel yad as well. Despite this, if one catches the mistake before fastening the shel yad, it is best to recite LT before fastening it so that beracha is said at its right time (Michtam L’David, OC 12). Rav Shabtai Ventura (cited ibid. 11) assumes that when one thought he was making his first beracha on the shel yad, it does not work for the shel rosh, which makes it necessary to make both berachot on the shel rosh – LT because it was not done yet and AMT because he lacked intent for the shel rosh. Michtam L’David argues forcefully because we assume that both berachot relate and work for both tefillin. Therefore, he says that in our case one only recites LT on the shel rosh. The Michtam L’David is accepted by the Sha’arei Teshuva (25:5), Chida (Machazik Beracha ibid.), and the Malbim (Artzot Hachayim 25:5).

The Michtam L’David includes a chiddush. We have already seen why not to repeat AMT, namely, because it already took effect and counts for the shel rosh as well. One could have said, then, that there is no need to say LT for the shel rosh, as the shel rosh already has a beracha so why recite an additional, less than fully appropriate, beracha? However, the Michtam L’David is supported by the halachot that one who spoke between the shel yad and shel rosh repeats LT (Rama, OC 25:9) and that one who has only tefillin shel rosh makes both berachot (ibid. 26:2). (One might be able to deflect these proofs, but that is beyond our present scope.)

In the final analysis, you should have followed the prevalent opinions among the Acharonim and said only LT when putting on the shel rosh. (Presumably, in deference to those like Rashi who say there is only one beracha on the two tefillin, one should say baruch shem k’vod malchuto … after putting on the shel rosh with LT – see Rama, OC 25:5.)

Fundamentally, a pull-apart challa is at least one lechem. However, whether even a standard challa with a weak connection between different parts of it is considered complete depends on whether when you lift it by its smaller part, the weight of the heavier part does not cause it to break (Mishna Berura 167:11). Even though “a challa is only as strong as its weakest link” (and here there are many), usually if the challa is not very big, it will pass the test. If it does not, then you will need it to be considered multiple complete lechamim, which we will now discuss.

The Shoel U’Meishiv (I,I:167), discussing a baker whose challot come out stuck together, rules that even if one leaves them connected, they count as multiple challot because the norm is to separate them well before consumption. Orchot Chayim (Spinka, 274:1) brings those who disagree, and the Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (55:6) does not clearly decide between the opinions. The Shoel U’meishiv apparently did not apply his leniency to one baking special challot whose purpose is to be separated only after making Hamotzi. Therefore, if you want to count this challa as multiple lechamim, you should separate the sections before the beracha (see Chazon Ovadia, Shabbat II, p. 176). Even if one could consider them multiple challot while connected, it is unclear why one would not follow the recommended procedure of having one on top of the other, which is not so feasible when connected (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 274:1).

The remaining question is: if we consider the pull-apart challa one loaf, then if we pull it apart, does it become multiple incomplete loaves? This point is a machloket dating back a couple hundred years. The Machatzit Hashekel (274:1) says it depends on intention. If one did not intend that they should connect during baking but they did, they are separate, complete challot. Presumably, even if they definitely will stick together to some degree, if that is as a matter of circumstance and not desired, it is not a problem. If the intention was that they bake connected and separate them later, he leaves it as an unsolved question whether after separation they are considered complete. Rav Meir Arik (Minchat Pitim, OC 274:1) posits that they are complete even if they were purposely stuck together.

A related application arose with the advent of machine matzot. The matzot were baked as sheets of multiple matzot, perforated before baking to make it easier to cut after the baking. (The contemporary production lines I saw are different.) There is a big machloket as to whether each matza is valid for lechem mishneh or whether the sheet was one lechem and the individual matzot are incomplete pieces (see opinions in Lechem Ish 3:19). In some ways our case is more lenient because each section was at one point a separate piece of dough, which were joined together and will be separated back to the original pieces. On the other hand, the matza is more likely to look fully complete in its final stage.

In summary, if the sections were separated relatively cleanly from each other before Hamotzi, most poskim assume that each (group of) section(s) is a kikar of lechem (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata ibid.; Chazon Ovadia ibid.; this is the apparent implication of Shulchan Aruch, OC 168:3). If they separated in a way that one section is complete plus some of its neighboring piece is stuck to it and the latter piece is incomplete, then only the former is a kikar (it is preferable to remove the extra challa to make it look more complete (see ibid.)).