ASK THE RABBI

We start with sources (including a thorough teshuva by the Machazeh Eliyahu 5-6), from which we gleaned many of our sources. However, we must also think in terms of common practice and feasibility.

The halachic issues are exposing holy articles to private parts and to excrement. Regarding the former, the pasuk (Devarim 23:15) requires separation between uncovered private parts and holy things (see Shabbat 150a). The gemara (Shabbat 120b) says that one upon whose flesh Hashem’s Name is written may not bathe because it is forbidden to stand naked in front of the Name of Hashem. The Magen Avraham (45:2) extends this prohibition to wearing tefillin or bringing Torah texts into a place where people are undressed. The Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (24:30) says based on this that one may not erect a partition before holy sefarim on Shabbat to allow removing a baby’s diaper because it is a halachically necessary wall.  

However, there are strong grounds to distinguish between an adult and a baby. While the Shulchan Aruch (OC 75:4) forbids reciting Kri’at Shema before the private parts of a young child, the Rama (ad loc.) permits it until the age of 3 for a girl and 9 for a boy. Even those who forbid it, do so as a chumra l’chatichila (Mishna Berura 75:5) because of its impact on one’s thoughts (not as an objective erva), and this should not be a problem for holy articles (see Radbaz V,1028; Machazeh Eliyahu ibid.). While the Rama (OC 275:12) cites a minhag not to leave a naked child before Shabbat candles because of disgrace to the mitzva, it is illogical to apply the minhag to changing a diaper. (When Shabbat candles alone provided light, were parents expected to change diapers in the dark?!!).

The other issue is the excrement in the diaper. (Only at the age of several months is a baby’s stool problematically unseemly – Shulchan Aruch, OC 81:1.) One is forbidden to bring holy things such as tefillin into a bathroom (Shulchan Aruch, OC 43:1). However, the problem is likely not the excrement itself, but the status of the place and/or the possibility he will relieve himself while there. Indeed, the Magen Avraham (43:11) permits (when necessary) going into alleyways with excrement with tefillin on. It is also more lenient when the exposure of the holy article to the unseemly matter is passing (Be’ur Halacha to 43:5; Shut Ramah Mipanu 59). The Machazeh Eliyahu (ibid.) proves that the exposure is not forbidden from the fact it is permitted to urinate with tefillin on if it is not in a set bathroom (Shulchan Aruch ibid.), even though sources indicate that is at least as bad as exposure to excrement.

How can we be so lenient considering the prohibition to recite holy things within the vicinity of excrement (Berachot 25a; Shulchan Aruch, OC 79:1)? The Machazeh Eliyahu explains that it is not the proximity between the holy utterings and the unclean surroundings but when a person’s domain is impacted by an unclean area, he becomes unfit to engage in holy things. If an area becomes taken over by the excrement, then holy things cannot be done there, but a limited amount of time in which a room contains excrement does not have this impact.

What will one following stringent opinions do about mezuzot? Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (ibid.) presents a not-simple leniency – the wrapping of the mezuza, which many anyway do, counts as a separation. We believe that the stringency is unnecessary in the first place, as above. Furthermore, the way our houses now have sefarim, Torah-based wall hangings, etc. all over the place makes it impractical to be machmir regarding changing diapers, and it also makes the encounter not offensive. It is not surprising that the broad practice is to not require precautions when changing diapers in regular areas. We hope our homes are blessed with several children and many sefarim and that changing diapers does not cause undue difficulty.

The gemara (Menachot 36a) lists LT as the beracha for the shel yad and AMT for shel rosh, but one way of learning the gemara is that one makes two berachot only if he speaks between putting on the two (see Rashi ad loc.; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 25:5). For Ashkenazim, when one speaks, he needs to repeat LT along with AMT for the shel rosh (Rama ad loc.).

There is much discussion on related perplexing matters, including the following. Why, for Sephardim, is there one beracha for two mitzvot (shel yad and shel rosh – see Rambam’s Sefer Hamitzvot, Aseh 12-13)? A major approach (see Mahari Halevi in Taz, OC 25:6) is that while there are two mitzvot, they are very similar and also intrinsically designed to be connected. Why, for Ashkenazim, can there be (if one speaks) two berachot for the shel rosh? There are different positions as to why there are two different berachot for the shel yad. Tosafot (Berachot 60b) says that LT is formulated as a beracha for the beginning of the process of putting on tefillin and AMT is for the end of the process. Mahari Halevi (ibid.; see earlier sources in Rosh, Tefillin 15) explains how each tefillin require both berachot, with each adding a different element (see also Aruch Hashulchan, OC 25:10), but they were instituted in a way that normally LT “extends forward” and AMT “stretches backward.”

After this small glimpse at the fundamental analysis of the berachot, we approach sources on our case – when one recited AMT on the shel yad. Most poskim (see Machazik Beracha 25:7) assume that AMT works b’di’eved for Sephardim as the single beracha. Certainly, according to the Mahari Halevi (but likely even for others), AMT takes effect if said while putting on the shel yad as well. Despite this, if one catches the mistake before fastening the shel yad, it is best to recite LT before fastening it so that beracha is said at its right time (Michtam L’David, OC 12). Rav Shabtai Ventura (cited ibid. 11) assumes that when one thought he was making his first beracha on the shel yad, it does not work for the shel rosh, which makes it necessary to make both berachot on the shel rosh – LT because it was not done yet and AMT because he lacked intent for the shel rosh. Michtam L’David argues forcefully because we assume that both berachot relate and work for both tefillin. Therefore, he says that in our case one only recites LT on the shel rosh. The Michtam L’David is accepted by the Sha’arei Teshuva (25:5), Chida (Machazik Beracha ibid.), and the Malbim (Artzot Hachayim 25:5).

The Michtam L’David includes a chiddush. We have already seen why not to repeat AMT, namely, because it already took effect and counts for the shel rosh as well. One could have said, then, that there is no need to say LT for the shel rosh, as the shel rosh already has a beracha so why recite an additional, less than fully appropriate, beracha? However, the Michtam L’David is supported by the halachot that one who spoke between the shel yad and shel rosh repeats LT (Rama, OC 25:9) and that one who has only tefillin shel rosh makes both berachot (ibid. 26:2). (One might be able to deflect these proofs, but that is beyond our present scope.)

In the final analysis, you should have followed the prevalent opinions among the Acharonim and said only LT when putting on the shel rosh. (Presumably, in deference to those like Rashi who say there is only one beracha on the two tefillin, one should say baruch shem k’vod malchuto … after putting on the shel rosh with LT – see Rama, OC 25:5.)

Fundamentally, a pull-apart challa is at least one lechem. However, whether even a standard challa with a weak connection between different parts of it is considered complete depends on whether when you lift it by its smaller part, the weight of the heavier part does not cause it to break (Mishna Berura 167:11). Even though “a challa is only as strong as its weakest link” (and here there are many), usually if the challa is not very big, it will pass the test. If it does not, then you will need it to be considered multiple complete lechamim, which we will now discuss.

The Shoel U’Meishiv (I,I:167), discussing a baker whose challot come out stuck together, rules that even if one leaves them connected, they count as multiple challot because the norm is to separate them well before consumption. Orchot Chayim (Spinka, 274:1) brings those who disagree, and the Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (55:6) does not clearly decide between the opinions. The Shoel U’meishiv apparently did not apply his leniency to one baking special challot whose purpose is to be separated only after making Hamotzi. Therefore, if you want to count this challa as multiple lechamim, you should separate the sections before the beracha (see Chazon Ovadia, Shabbat II, p. 176). Even if one could consider them multiple challot while connected, it is unclear why one would not follow the recommended procedure of having one on top of the other, which is not so feasible when connected (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 274:1).

The remaining question is: if we consider the pull-apart challa one loaf, then if we pull it apart, does it become multiple incomplete loaves? This point is a machloket dating back a couple hundred years. The Machatzit Hashekel (274:1) says it depends on intention. If one did not intend that they should connect during baking but they did, they are separate, complete challot. Presumably, even if they definitely will stick together to some degree, if that is as a matter of circumstance and not desired, it is not a problem. If the intention was that they bake connected and separate them later, he leaves it as an unsolved question whether after separation they are considered complete. Rav Meir Arik (Minchat Pitim, OC 274:1) posits that they are complete even if they were purposely stuck together.

A related application arose with the advent of machine matzot. The matzot were baked as sheets of multiple matzot, perforated before baking to make it easier to cut after the baking. (The contemporary production lines I saw are different.) There is a big machloket as to whether each matza is valid for lechem mishneh or whether the sheet was one lechem and the individual matzot are incomplete pieces (see opinions in Lechem Ish 3:19). In some ways our case is more lenient because each section was at one point a separate piece of dough, which were joined together and will be separated back to the original pieces. On the other hand, the matza is more likely to look fully complete in its final stage.

In summary, if the sections were separated relatively cleanly from each other before Hamotzi, most poskim assume that each (group of) section(s) is a kikar of lechem (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata ibid.; Chazon Ovadia ibid.; this is the apparent implication of Shulchan Aruch, OC 168:3). If they separated in a way that one section is complete plus some of its neighboring piece is stuck to it and the latter piece is incomplete, then only the former is a kikar (it is preferable to remove the extra challa to make it look more complete (see ibid.)).

Kiddush Levana is mentioned by an early Amora (Sanhedrin 42a). Early sources do not connect it to a minyan or to tefilla. The Pri Chadash (226:1) tries to prove it does not require a minyan from the fact that the mishna (Megilla 23b) does not list it as one of the things that requires a minyan. This implies that Kiddush Levana, which does not appear in Tannaic sources, was instituted before that mishna was written. Some point out that the gemara’s language is singular. One way or another, there is insufficient source and/or logic to require a minyan, and the broad consensus is that one fulfills the mitzva even by doing it by himself.

That being said, many Acharonim (see Magen Avraham 426:6) have the minhag to try to have a minyan, applying to it a general rule in ritual matters: b’rov am hadrat melech (=brahm; the greater number of people who take part together, the greater the honor to Hashem). If that is the reason, it is clear why the mitzva counts without a minyan, as brahm is a classical hiddur (improvement to a mitzva) whose absence does not, as a rule, disqualify mitzvot. There is an opinion that because it is a beracha of shevach (praise), and it is seen as greeting the Divine Presence, a minyan is particularly important (Teshuvot V’hanhagot I:205). (The idea of it being a birkat hashevach is not very convincing, as the gemara sounds like it resembles other berachot in which we praise Hashem for natural phenomena (e.g., on thunder, seeing great bodies of water), which are not as a group.) The way the practice has developed, there is another gain in having a minyan, since we recite Kaddish after it (see Kaf Hachayim, Orach Chayim 426:13).

There is a question about what is needed to attain brahm status. There is an opinion in the gemara (Gittin 46a) that three people constitute rabim (many or public) (the other opinion says ten), and the Gra (to OC 422:2) accepts it and applies it to contexts similar to ours (see Rama, OC 422:2). Therefore, the Be’ur Halacha (to OC 426:2, based on Chayei Adam 68:11) says that the difference between doing Kiddush Levana with ten or three is not major. It is likely that the point is that is not mainly a question of what the minimum is for brahm. Rather there are levels of brahm and of hiddur.

Regarding under three, there is likely an advantage doing Kiddush Levana with another person. Rav Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC I, 146) sees precedent in the gemara that the presence of a second person shows one did not chance upon the moon but intentionally encountered it to show appreciation. Also, the Levush (626:1) points out that in order to fulfill the custom of saying “Shalom aleichem,” one needs at least one other person.  

Level of value is relevant regarding competing values. One such value is z’rizin makdimin l’mitzvot (it is best to do mitzvot as early as possible), which generally is more important than brahm (see Rosh Hashana 32b). A third value is specific to Kiddush Levana – it is preferable to do Kiddush Levana on Motzaei Shabbat, mainly because we are usually better dressed then (Shulchan Aruch, OC 426:2). The minhag is clearly to wait for Motzaei Shabbat even though one could have done it earlier. However, some say that if earlier there is a chance to do it with a minyan, whereas he will not have one on Motzaei Shabbat, the two advantages of doing it earlier win out in that case (see Sha’ar Hatziyun 426:20). The Be’ur Halacha (ibid.) says that while it is worthwhile to wait several days (when there is not concern of cloud cover until the middle of the month) to do it with a minyan, if earlier there is a chance to do it with three, the net gain does not necessarily justify the wait.

While we have not exhausted all the permutations and opinions, we have seen the logic and extent of the preference of having several people together for Kiddush Levana.

The answer to your question depends on two issues – how morning Kiddush works; the status of one who knows a beracha was made but did not hear it.

At nighttime Kiddush, the main beracha is Mekadesh Hashabbat. Borei Pri Hagafen, whose point is to make it permitted to drink the wine of Kiddush (and similarly, of Havdala) is of minor importance (see Living the Halachic Process VII, C-16). Therefore, if one did not hear Borei Pri Hagafen, he is yotzei anyway (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 271:4; Mishna Berura 296:33).

The problem is that the morning Kiddush consists only of Borei Pri Hagafen (see Pesachim 106a). The p’sukim we recite are a late and not required addition (see Mishna Berura 289:2). So if one did not hear Borei Pri Hagafen, in what way did he take part in Kiddush?!

There are two approaches in the Rishonim as to the nature of this abbreviated Kiddush that does not even need to mention Shabbat. The Ran (Pesachim 22b of Rif’s pages) suggests that it connects to the night’s full Kiddush, and posits that its beracha functions along the same lines as Kiddush of the night. Rabbeinu David (Pesachim 106a) says that given its content, it cannot serve as a real Kiddush; rather, its function is to elevate the meal’s stature via the wine. Therefore, the drinking is more important than the beracha, which just permits the drinking.

If the drinking is the important thing, why don’t we all have to drink the required amount? Many quote the Brisker Rav as requiring everyone to drink at the morning Kiddush. However, this position encounters difficulties with classical sources (see Tosafot, Pesachim 106a) and contemporary minhag (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 50:9). The Netziv (Ha’amek She’ala 54:4) explains that others connect to the drinking of the one who drinks the requisite amounts, who sets the proper tone for the joint “meal.” Based on this, we might argue that since the “meal” you attended was elevated, missing Borei Pri Hagafen did not preclude your fulfilling Kiddush. On the other hand, the Ran’s approach appears to be more accepted (this column, Bechukotai 5784).

Let us now look at your connection to the beracha to which you answered amen. It is forbidden to recite an amen yetoma (Berachot 47a), e.g., answering without hearing the beracha (Rashi ad loc.). On the other hand, the mishna (Sukka 51b) tells about the davening in the amphitheater in Alexandria, in which they raised flags to prompt people to answer amen. The two main distinctions raised (see Beit Yosef, OC 124) to reconcile the sources are as follows: 1. If one plans to be yotzei with a beracha, he must hear it and must not answer if he does not, but he may answer a beracha he does need to “use for himself” (one answer in the Rosh, Berachot 7:17). 2. The problem is when one does not know which specific beracha was recited, but if he knows, he may answer even if he did not hear it (Rashi & Tosafot, Berachot 47a). The Beit Yosef implies that the two answers are separate – it is not that either factor suffices or that both factors are needed; rather there is one deciding point, with a machloket about which is correct. According to #2, your amen was fine because you knew to what beracha you were answering, and you apparently were even yotzei. According to #1, your amen was an amen yetoma if you intended to be yotzei, and so the beracha could not be motzi you. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 124:8) rules like #1 (admittedly, this is not a unanimous ruling – see Rama and Be’ur Halacha ad loc.).

The best idea was to make your own Kiddush, after first speaking (to ensure Borei Pri Hagefen was necessary). Under extenuating circumstances (e.g., insufficient wine or insulting to the mekadesh, and it was important to eat), there is room for leniency to eat based on the Kiddush (we have to leave out a lot of sources/analysis). If so, Kiddush before your meal at home would be called for, whatever your regular minhag.

We will take a brief look at the Halacha and also the personal side.

The prohibition on simcha for an avel is most severe during shiva, but the gemara (Moed Katan 22b) says that an avel for a parent may not go to a wedding for twelve months. The gemara struggles with a category of happy social interaction called simchat merei’ut (of friendship), and the halacha is that it is forbidden for twelve months (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 391:2).

Two main parameters are crucial on ruling in various cases. 1. How festive is the event? 2. How important is it for the avel to be there? Weddings are the pinnacle of festivity, yet an avel can go to his child’s wedding because a proper wedding is unfeasible without him (see Rama ibid.). The Rama (ibid.) cites a machloket about taking part in the seuda of a brit and pidyon haben (considered low-intensity celebrations) in which the avel is not a principal. The Rama concludes: “The custom is to not eat at any meal in the world for the whole twelve months, if it is outside the house.”

There is a machloket about taking part in a seudat siyum. The Shach (YD 246:27) says that an avel during the twelve months may take part in it (see also Gesher Hachayim I, 22:2:6). The Beit Lechem Yehuda (to YD 391:2) says he may only do so if he is making the siyum, and the Chochmat Adam (166:2) is skeptical about permissibility in light of the Rama’s minhag. I did not find discussion of a seudat hodaya, but it is parallel to a siyum in that they are optional seudot mitzva (see Living the Halachic Process VI,H-3) that are not particularly time sensitive (see Shach ibid.) and are done in a not overly festive manner.

Since, based on the above, it is legitimate for your dil to take part in the seuda, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with inviting her. Even if the stricter opinion is more accepted in her environs, if she believes her parent would want her to be lenient, this is an important factor (see Shach, YD 344:9). There are ways for your dil to take part even if she is generally machmira. Since the main problem is joint celebratory eating rather than assembling with others (see Tosafot, Moed Katan 22b), she can be there for mingling and for the words of Torah and thanks (if there is not music playing). Another possibility, which allows even eating, is for the avel to have a (real) job at the event (see Gesher Hachayim ibid.). On the other hand, whatever is being considered, you should stress to her that you do not want her to alter her practice in this aspect of kibbud av va’em in order to honor you (this is important general advice regarding in-laws).  

You have no outright obligation to make a seudat hodaya, and there are other ways to thank Hashem (including tzedaka and adopting laudable practices, while stating that it is bli neder). Since there is no strict time limit, it can make sense under the right circumstances to put off the seuda for weeks or a couple months so that your dil can take part normally, considering her centrality.

However, in most healthy relationships, it is not expected that an avel’s limitations should change the broader family’s life in a major way. (Depending on family size and sensitivity of its members, it can sometimes even be unwise). “Bending over backward” to make sure the avel does not miss things can also sometimes put pressure on the avel to take part when they do not feel comfortable doing so. We would generally say that open communication and avoiding subtle pressure on the avel is the best way to go about it from your perspective. Hopefully your dil will reciprocate with full understanding if it makes sense for you to go ahead with a seudat mitzva that she may choose not to take (full) part in.

Kiddush and Havdala have similarities in this regard, but also differences.

Kiddush in shul is presented as a given in the gemara (Pesachim 101a), the purpose being to facilitate the mitzva of Kiddush for visitors who eat in shul. Havdala in shul is not mentioned in the gemara, but the Tur (Orach Chayim 295) and Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 1) mandate it to be motzi those who do not have wine at home. Havdala in shul has precedent centuries earlier, as we see in the Mi Sheberach after Yekum Purkan, where we bless those who “give [the congregation] wine for Kiddush and Havdala.”

Kiddush and Havdala in shul share the general question of whether to suspend ritual practices whose original justification are barely relevant in our days. After all, it is rare to have a visitor eat in shul, and it is rare for people to not have wine at home.

The main attack on the old minhag on those grounds is found only regarding Kiddush (see Tur and Shulchan Aruch, OC 269:1). The Tur attacks, on fundamental grounds, the continued practice of Kiddush when there are no guests, but seems resigned to it in practice. He mentions (and rejects) Rav Natrunai’s explanation that we continue the practice because the wine of this Kiddush is therapeutic for an eye malady and not everyone has wine at home. The Shulchan Aruch brings two opinions as to whether to continue the minhag without good reason. He prefers discontinuing it and says that the minhag in Eretz Yisrael is not to do it. (Nusach) Ashkenazi minhag has been to do Kiddush in shul (Mishna Berura 269:4), perhaps powered by the Magen Avraham’s (69:3) approval. Regarding minhag Eretz Yisrael, Rav Frank (Har Tzvi, OC I, 153) said that in Yerushalayim, Kiddush should not be made in shul, but elsewhere in Israel both minhagim are acceptable (see also Dirshu 269:11)

In contrast, regarding Havdala, the Tur and Shulchan Aruch (OC 295:1) take it as a given. While one can argue that it is more common for people to lack wine than for shuls to have eating guests, the main difference is something else. Friday night Kiddush contains berachot which if no one is having a meal at the place will be l’vatala (see Tur, OC 269). In contrast, because Havdala can be made anywhere, there is no fundamental reason for there to be a beracha l’vatala.

The one thing that can go wrong with Havdala in shul is that sometimes no one wants to be yotzei with it. Whoever needs to make Havdala at home should not be yotzei at that time because it is very questionable whether he would then be permitted to make it for his wife and daughters (Mishna Berura 296:36; for explanation, see Living the Halachic Process, II, C-8). Even sons of the family who are in shul usually do not have in mind to be yotzei with the shul Havdala, although they could if they wanted to (see Mishna Berura 596:33). If no one including the one making Havdala is yotzei with it, it too can be a beracha l’vatala. A proper thing, which many shuls do, is to have a single man, e.g., including an over bar mitzva son of one of the families, make Havdala and have in mind to be motzi himself and anyone else who wants to be yotzei. However, the K’tzot Hashulchan (96:(9), accepted by the Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 60:13) says that if no one specifically wants to be yotzei in shul, we should not do it, because it was not formally instituted the way Kiddush was. Those shuls who regularly do Havdala even when there is no need either do not want to figure out each time if someone needs/desires it and therefore assume there is such a person, or they hold that the minhag for Havdala, even if not mentioned in Chazal, is a real takana.

An informal survey I did among American community rabbis finds that all the permutations of practice to do or not do Kiddush and/or Havdala exist, and we have explained how they all can be readily justified.

First, we note that the only question is on the first day of Sukkot (regarding the second day in chutz la’aretz, see Be’ur Halacha to 649:5), regarding which the Torah (Vayikra 23:40) says that one must own the l&e he uses (Sukka 41b). Afterward, it must only not be stolen (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 649:2).

For mitzvot such as l&e, tzitzit, and kiddushin, where one can fulfill the mitzva only if he owns the relevant object, the owner can facilitate his friend’s mitzva if he gives it to him as a mamlh. Not only can this work, but if the owner effectively lends them for these purposes without discussing the halachic mechanism being employed, we generally assume the parties intend to apply the correct mechanism, i.e., mamlh (see Shulchan Aruch in: OC 658:5; OC 14:4; Even Haezer 28:19. Differences might exist between these areas of Halacha based on the natures of the need for ownership – see Taz, OC 14:5). Practically, lending and mamlh are almost identical. Halachically, though, the mechanism of lending keeps the basic ownership unchanged, and mamlh transfers ownership to the recipient, assuming he fulfilled the condition of returning the object properly (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 658:4). Language that ostensibly implies the use of a mechanism other than mamlh, could possibly prevent the recipient’s ability to fulfill the mitzva (see ibid. 3). Giving a l&e with the understanding that the recipient needs to own them to fulfill the mitzva, without saying anything can be better. The matter is questionable if the people (especially the owner) lack the knowledge that ownership is needed, in which case someone should explain what is needed. Details/opinions on the impact of lack of knowledge are beyond our scope (see Magen Avraham 678:3; Halichot Shlomo, Moadim II, 11:7; Dirshu 658:12). But again, silence and general intention work for semi-knowledgeable people.

From discussion of intention and speech we move to actions (i.e., a kinyan), which are required to acquire something. Regarding a present of a l&e, there are two candidates for the kinyan used: 1) Yad (the object’s presence in the recipient’s hand); 2) Hagbaha (lifting the object).

Relying on hagbaha has problems. An acquirer must lift the object either three tefachim or one tefach (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 198:2), and the recipient of the l&e does not always initially lift them at all! On the other hand, some say it suffices that one took it in the air when the object’s position is the requisite height above the floor or table (see opinions in Pitchei Choshen, Kinyanim 6:(18)). Also, one usually lifts the l&e while shaking them. On the other hand, it could be a problem that the recipient probably does not intend to acquire it at that time, and one could ask if the beracha, said before that time, was valid (see Mikraei Kodesh (Harari), Arba’at Haminim, p. 446 – we cannot go into further analysis). A problem with yad is that some say the whole object must be contained within the hand. On the other hand, many say that whatever is within the vertical line of the hand is acquired (see ibid., p. 449).

Others raise the question whether one needs to do two separate actions: an act of acquisition and a separate act of taking the l&e in the hand. Chazon Ovadia (Sukkot p. 420-3) brings opinions in both directions, but accepts the majority that one act of taking the l&e suffices. If one also does na’anuim, there are additional actions for the mitzva.

The minhag is indeed to just pass the l&e from one to the other without statements or formal actions; the minhag should remain. Only when someone is unaware of the need to transfer/acquire the l&e does it pay to make a point of identifying a process of kinyan before making the beracha.

One can look at the religious perspective of a meal on Yom Kippur in two ways: 1. Yom Kippur is a Yom Tov, in which a proper meal could have been a mitzva if not for the greater importance of fasting, so that when one must eat, the mitzvot of a meal apply. 2. Since the broad rule is that we are forbidden to eat, the mitzvot associated with eating were not instituted at all.

Now we will see sources. The Tur (Orach Chayim 618; see Shut Maharam Rutenberg 71) says that one who cannot fast on Yom Kippur recites Ya’aleh V’yavo in Birkat Hamazon. The Taz (OC 618:10) disagrees with the Tur, inferring from a gemara (Shabbat 24b) that we do not mention a special day in berachot/tefillot if the day’s connection to what we are saying is coincidental. As you raised, there are other issues that depend on the correct approach (although each has unique factors also).

The Magen Avraham (618:10) rules that there is no Kiddush at a meal (regarding Kiddush in davening, see Har Tzvi, OC I:155) on Yom Kippur and cites a Shibolei Haleket saying that the prohibition to eat makes the day like a weekday, thus precluding Kiddush and Ya’aleh V’yavo.

Another issue in the poskim is whether to have lechem mishneh. The Magen Avraham (ibid.) cites a Knesset Hagedola who says that since the manna did not fall on Yom Kippur, one who needs a meal should use lechem mishneh. The Magen Avraham disagrees, arguing that lechem mishneh was not instituted for Yom Kippur and that we do not want to make a sick person trouble himself with lechem mishneh. The Machatzit Hashekel raises another issue – did a double portion of manna fall on Erev Yom Kippur?

There is not significant discussion in the poskim on whether, if lechem mishneh is not needed, one should eat bread in order to have a proper meal. Discussions (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 618:10) of what to say in bentching do imply that people are eating bread. However, this does not prove one is required to have bread, because classically bread was a natural staple of meals. In any case, we would add the following. While those who are unable to limit themselves to minimal, slow eating, are not instructed to be particularly careful to not eat more than absolutely necessary, it is halachically counter-productive to eat bread if it is less dietarily productive than other foods one could be eating.

Regarding halacha l’ma’aseh conclusions, most poskim treat this matter as some level of safek as to which general approach is correct (see Mateh Ephraim 618:17; Mishna Berura 618:29). Therefore, on the matter of Ya’aleh V’yavo, the approach is that the pros of doing them outweigh any cons. (Ya’aleh V’yavo, even if not called for, does not create a problematic enough break to endanger Birkat Hamazon’s validity – see Shulchan Aruch, OC 108:12; Machatzit Hashekel ibid.) In contrast, one should not do a full Kiddush, which is said in the day if it was not done at night (Rama, OC 271:8), because of the risk of a beracha l’vatala. Lechem mishneh is not required, and it is unclear whether to prefer it (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 39:31; Dirshu 618:54).

This year there is wrinkle in the matter. Since Yom Kippur falls on Shabbat, even if these mitzvot do not apply at all on Yom Kippur, they would seem to apply because it is Shabbat. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva Eiger (to Magen Avraham ibid.) believes it is likely that all should agree to make Kiddush this year. However, the Ohr Sameach (Avodat Yom Hakippurim 4:1) posits that Yom Kippur takes over the nature of Shabbat, so there is no mitzva to eat or make Kiddush even from the perspective of such a Shabbat. The silence of earlier poskim and the statements of recent Acharonim (see Har Tzvi, ibid; Igrot Moshe, Choshen Mishpat I, 39; Yaskil Avdi VIII, OC 20.34) indicate that R. Akiva Eiger’s thesis is not widely accepted.

Yom Kippur has a complex character in regard to crying. It is the most important day of teshuva, which includes crying (see Rambam, Teshuva 2:4 & 5:2), but it is also a wonderful day, in that we receive much kapara (atonement) (Vayikra 16:30). In fact, if fasting were not needed as part of the teshuva/kapara process, it would likely be a mitzva to have a feast on Yom Kippur to celebrate the positive (see Ritva, Rosh Hashana 9a).

Rosh Hashana is more complex. The Torah tells us little about the nature of the day, but it is presented as equivalent to the three regalim and Yom Kippur. Chazal tell us that mankind is judged on Rosh Hashana (Rosh Hashana 16a), and due to the real possibility of an unfavorable judgment, we do not recite Hallel on the Yamim Noraim (Arachin 10b). On the other hand, there are powerful, happy things going on, e.g., “coronating” Hashem, hopefully good judgment. The themes associated with the various shofar sounds also conjure up hopeful and foreboding thoughts.

How do these mixed indications of the day’s nature and mood factor into halachic practice? A pasuk in Nechemia (8:10), speaking about a powerful event that occurred on Rosh Hashana, instructs the people not to cry or be sad but to feast on that special day. We indeed pasken along these lines: “We eat and drink and are happy, and we do not fast on Rosh Hashana” (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 597:1). The Shulchan Aruch does conclude that we should not to eat in a manner that causes lightheadedness, but we should maintain fear of Hashem.

The Gra (see Ma’aseh Rav 207) posits that the above pasuk is a precedent that one should not cry on Rosh Hashana, apparently even during davening. Rav Ovadia Yosef cites others who rule this way and concurs, although he justifies those whose emotions during tefilla bring them to tears (see Yabia Omer IX:51). It is not clear from Nechemia that at no point in Rosh Hashana, including some heart wrenching moments, is one allowed to cry. We note that while the Gra (ibid.) says not to say the powerful tefilla of Avinu Malkeinu, our minhag is to recite it on Rosh Hashana, except when it falls on Shabbat (Rama, OC 584:1).

Indeed, many Acharonim, including the Ba’er Heitev 584:3 and Mateh Ephrayim 582:28, cite the Arizal that one should cry on Rosh Hashana and that there is something wrong with the neshama of one who does not. Elef Hamagen (582:45) even cites those who say that one who has difficulty crying should at least make crying-like sounds. Some understand the Gra to oppose crying only out of fear and not of emotion due to the magnitude of the day and Hashem’s greatness (see citations in Dirshu 582:30).

Multiple sources confirm that the accepted practice is not like the Gra, and most seem to understand that the crying is out of fear of what could happen during the year. Granted, plenty of people do not cry, but realistically, few of those are holding themselves back due to the discipline the Gra promoted (the Gra was famously a highly demanding spiritual person). Rather, some people are not emotionally demonstrative, and some are apathetic to or skeptical about the idea of being judged for the year and how this is critical for their life, an approach that no poskim promote.

Therefore, we assume that those who cry at appropriate junctures enhance their Rosh Hashana and set a good tone for their environs. We strongly discourage faking or artificially amplifying his crying, which in our time and places, is likely and understandably to be scoffed at. Last Rosh Hashana, I was thinking how young people enjoying “smooth” lives have trouble feeling “fear of judgment.” Tragically, we have lost many dear people of all ages since then, and it should be easier to feel and demonstrate emotion this Rosh Hashana.