ASK THE RABBI

It is good to have a set order of practices, which helps avoid the doubt, but these things happen. Regarding one with a doubt whether he recited BKHT, poskim assume that whether or not one has to recite it now depends if BKHT is a Torah-level obligation or a Rabbinic one (see Mishna Berura 47:1). The gemara (Berachot 21a) identifies this as the measuring stick regarding doubt about having recited Kri’at Shema and mentioning yetzi’at Mitzrayim. The same gemara cites p’sukim as sources for the obligations of Birkat Hamazon and BKHT, which many identify as the two berachot of Torah origin (Ramban, Shich’chat Aseh 15). Therefore, the Sha’agat Aryeh (24) and many others rule that one who is in doubt whether he needs to recite BKHT, should do so. He just says (ibid. 25) that since the mitzva from the Torah is fulfilled with one beracha, in a case of doubt we recite only “… asher bachar banu …” Some (Birkei Yosef, OC 47:8- see other opinions in the Mishna Berura ibid.) posit that BKHT is only Rabbinic and that we do not recite in a case of doubt (as we generally say, safek berachot l’hakel).

Although the stronger opinion is to recite BKHT when in doubt, the Mishna Berura (ibid.) suggests the alternative you mentioned – to fulfill the obligation with the beracha before Kri’at Shema – Ahava Raba. While this seems to follow the general halachic “sentiment” to keep things safe, it is not a foregone conclusion that this is fully safe. First, there is a major machloket whether it is permitted to recite P’sukei D’zimra, which consists of Torah texts that are recited as praise in tefilla, before BKHT (see opinions in the Shulchan Aruch, OC 46:9). Indeed, if one realizes in the midst of P’sukei D’zimra that he definitely did not recite BKHT, most rule that he should interrupt P’sukei D’zimra to recite it (Mishna Berura 51:10; Yabia Omer IV, OC 7; Tefilla K’hilchata 9:31).

Another drawback of using Ahava Raba is that it is unclear that it is always done correctly. The gemara (Berachot 11b) does say that after having said Ahava Raba, one no longer needs BKHT, but the Yerushalmi limits it to a case where one learned right afterward. Considering that Kri’at Shema, which comes from the Torah, follows Ahava Raba, wouldn’t this condition be trivial? One of the Beit Yosef’s (OC 47) answers posits that Kri’at Shema does not count, as it is not done for the purpose of learning and/or it is not clearly for that purpose. In the Shulchan Aruch (OC 47:7-8), he cites two opinions on whether one needs to learn something else right after davening and recommends stringency. Although one can wait until the end of Shacharit as long as he does not talk about matters not related to Torah or tefilla in the meantime (Be’ur Halacha ad loc.), the Shulchan Aruch considers it risky to rely on this system to fulfill BKHT.

Your plan to have in mind to fulfill the obligation with Ahava Raba during recitation, while worthwhile to strive for (Mishna Berura 47:1; see Be’ur Halacha to 47:8) is most likely not a requirement (Mishna Berura 47:14; see Be’ur Halacha ibid.). In a case like this of multiple sefeikot (maybe you said BKHT, maybe you had sufficient intent for Ahava Raba, maybe intent is not needed), it is easier to be lenient (see Ishei Yisrael 6:(33)).

The halachically simplest way to get out of doubt (but is not always practical or pleasant) is to find someone who has not yet made the beracha and have him do it for you with intention to include you (Mishna Berura 47:1). While women recite BKHT (Shulchan Aruch, OC 47:14), it is not agreed that she is obligated to do so or at least obligated in the same way as a man. Therefore, while it is plausible that a woman can be motzi a man (Be’ur Halacha ad loc.), one should not rely upon this (see Tzitz Eliezer XV:24).   

There are too many permutations to cover, but we will concentrate on the principles and the main cases and give you a few references to sources dealing with related complexities.

One of the major rules of berachot on food is that regarding foods with different berachot eaten “together” (which is hard to define in a phrase) we make the beracha of the “main” food (ikar) and are exempt from making the beracha on that which is subservient (tafel) to it (Berachot 41a). This is certainly true when the two foods are ingredients of one combined food, e.g., soups (ibid. 36a). It is far from trivial to determine what the main ingredient is in vegetable soups that have a majority of water, cooked vegetables (in a variety of forms), and sometimes, some chicken or meat (see Living the Halachic Process, vol. VI, B-2,3). We will assume for the purpose of this question that the beracha on the soup without the soup nuts is Borei Pri Ha’adama (=Ha’adama). We will also assume that the soup nuts are made from one the five main grains and that the way it is prepared, its individual beracha is Borei Minei Mezonot (=Mezonot) (V’zot Haberacha p. 397).

One of the major determining factors of what the ikar is that we follow the majority of the mixture (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 208:7). However, a sub-rule of the laws of ikar and tafel is that if one of the ingredients is from the five grains in the form that its beracha is Mezonot, then even if it is significantly less than a majority of the mixture, the berachot are Mezonot with an after-beracha of Al Hamichya (Berachot 36b; Shulchan Aruch, ibid. 2). An exception to this sub-rule is when the purpose of the grain food is of an unimportant, technical nature, such as to make the other food stick together (ibid.; Mishna Berura 212:13) or to “stretch” the more expensive ingredients (e.g., bread crumbs in hamburgers). Therefore, the simple answer is that no matter what the nature of the soup is, if there are Mezonot soup nuts, then it apparently has some taste significance to the person who put them in, and the beracha on the soup is only Mezonot. This is true even if there may be spoonfuls of soup that happen not to have soup nuts in them, although one should be careful that the first spoonful, after making the beracha of the ikar, contain some of the ikar (Rama, OC 212:1 and Mishna Berura ad loc. 10).

The situation is different when the soup nuts play a very minor role in the eating, which would most commonly occur when there are only a small number of them, so that one would make Ha’adama on the soup, as it is not subservient to the soup nuts. This is all the more so regarding soup nuts (as opposed to kneidlach that are cooked in the soup, which is a more complicated question), which are put into the soup in the bowl, after the soup was cooked independently (see Dirshu 205:18). On the other hand, because the soup nuts are from the main grains, they cannot be ignored, and therefore Mezonot is also called for (Mishna Berura 205:11). In such a case, it is better to make the beracha first on the soup without eating any soup nuts right away (even though usually Mezonot has precedence) because if we were to make Mezonot first, we would have a doubt whether the Ha’adama is required for the soup (Mishna Berura 208:23). One can also get out of doubt and/or keep the regular order of berachot if he takes out each element from the bowl and eats them separately (ibid. 205:11). This is easier and more logical to do with kneidlach than with soup nuts or noodles. Regarding the beracha acharona, in a case in which neither is batel to the other, we would also make each beracha separately, if one ate a k’zayit of each within the requisite time (Mishna Berura ibid.).

It is agreed that if one had no interest in the soup nuts and some just happened to have fallen in, then they would be totally ignored (V’zot Haberacha, p. 117) and one would make just Ha’adama and Borei Nefashot on the soup.

We have to present as full a picture as possible to appreciate the nuances here.

What we call the week of “Sheva Berachot” (=SB) the gemara (Ketubot 4a) calls “the seven days of mishteh (feasting).” This period focuses on a state of simcha and of giving thanks to Hashem (see Ketubot 7a). The most basic part of the simcha is the chatan and kalla spending quality time together (Shulchan Aruch, Even Haezer 64:1). However, the involvement of others in festive meals is also important. For one, a minyan and panim chadashot are required to recite the sheva berachot (=sb) at Birkat Hamazon (Ketubot 7b). More fundamentally, we see from the halacha that a chatan and his entourage are exempt from eating in a sukka throughout SB that having a nice amount of appropriate co-celebrants is a significant consideration, especially at the time of eating (Sukka 25b and Meiri ad loc.).

Poskim broadly assume that there is no full obligation to have sb every day of SB. Many quote Rav Pe’alim (IV, EH 6), and his main source is Ketubot 7b. The baraita states that the sb are recited with a minyan “all seven days,” but Rav Yehuda makes this conditional on the presence of panim chadashot. The Rav Pe’alim infers from the gemara that one is not responsible to bring panim chadashot to have a complete sb.

It is possible to argue that the existence of a nicely attended party (which provides the simcha) is a given, and the variable is whether the party needs the possibility of reciting the berachot. However, Acharonim generally understand that although when sb is held, it is a seudat mitzva, there is no halachic requirement to have sb every day of SB (Aruch Hashulchan, OC 640:14; Nitei Gavriel, Nisuin 83;3; Bemareh Habazak VII:96). The Aruch Hashulchan (late 19^th century, Eastern Europe) reports that it was standard to have only a few sb. He admits that this was not as Chazal’s envisioned SB but explains that the difficult national climate in a difficult exile has worn us out to the point that it is hard to celebrate too much. The Yam Shel Shlomo (Ketubot 1:12) provides similar comments hundreds of years earlier. He justifies halachically that since these meals are in the kalla’s honor, she may waive her right to them. The Nitei Gavriel (contemporary) says that in our times there is a minhag to try to have sheva berachot every day, except when this proves too difficult. Hanisuim K’hilchatam (15:7) relates to the matter similarly but slightly less forcefully. In Bemareh Habazak, we wrote similarly that there is no obligation but that we encourage doing a nice amount of sb.

We will demonstrate a nuanced difference with the help of Sukkot. The mitzva of sukka applies continually during the 168 hours of Sukkot. The more time in the sukka the better, and this applies more or less equally throughout the chag. Regarding lulav, it must be taken each day but Shabbat, but each day, once one finishes doing what needs to be done, there is thereafter little value in taking it more. Nitei Gavriel understands the present-day minhag/preference in terms of one each day, like lulav. In Bemareh Habazak, we talk of a nice amount of celebrating, without stressing if it covers each day. The minhag seems to be to try to align the sb by halachic day, but this is just a preference. Logically, having the most meaningful experience is more important, and one should not get carried away trying to conform to the each-day minhag.

There is an additional element besides our general belief in following minhag. While older sources discuss the chatan’s obligation to arrange his SB, now family and friends do it. Once an act to honor others becomes standard, one who receives sub-standard is likely to be insulted or disappointed. Therefore, while on the one hand, many couples appear to benefit from extra rest and privacy, it is still generally an expected chesed for their loved ones to make the standard amount of sb.

The gemara (Pesachim 107a) prescribes wine to make Kiddush upon, and this generally applies across the board, for the two Kiddushes of the day, as well as Havdala. (We will not discuss other ceremonial occasions (e.g., brit mila, cup for bentching).) However, we see in a story in the gemara that in a case in which shechar (date liquor) is chamar medina (we will translate it as the major replacement for wine as a central drink), it may be used for Havdala. The gemara then continues to bring the opinion of Rav Huna that shechar should not be used for Kiddush. The Rosh (Pesachim 10:17) views the matter as a machloket Rishonim if the gemara posits that even chamar medina is invalid for Kiddush or whether we could be lenient as we are regarding Havdala.

The Shulchan Aruch (OC 272:9) cites different opinions on whether one can use shechar for Kiddush, but he and the Rama prefer the opinion (attributed to the Rosh) that at night one should not use other drinks as a substitute for wine, but should rather should use challa for Kiddush, whereas in the daytime, shechar is preferable to bread. The Rosh explains the distinction as follows. Bread is the main part of the meal, and Kiddush is closely dependent on the meal, which makes challa the best alternative to wine. However, in the daytime, the essential Kiddush is just the beracha with which one starts the meal (the p’sukim recited are just a preference – Mishna Berura 289:2), whereas at night there is a whole separate beracha of Kiddush. If, then, making Kiddush on challa would consist of saying Hamotzi, it would be the same as if he had a meal without Kiddush.

Regarding the night, then, it is very difficult to use any drink as an alternative to wine. One reason is that it is the main Kiddush of the day can be a mitzva from the Torah (although the element of the wine itself is only Rabbinic). Another is that the Kiddush at night is connected to the pasuk of “Zachor (remember) et yom …” and in various places in Tanach we find a connection between zechira and wine (Eliya Rabba 272:14). This is in contrast to Kiddush in the day, which is not connected to zechira. Also, the minhag has developed to be much more lenient on this matter in the day (including in the regular practices of great rabbis – see Bach, OC 272:10) than at night.

One of the problems with chamar medina is that determining what counts as such is very elusive. The simplest reading of the gemara and the opinion of most Rishonim (see Beit Yosef, OC 272) is that it only applies when there is a lack of available wine. The Rambam (Shabbat 29:17) is somewhat more expansive about what is chamar medina (the main drink drunk as wine in that place), although on the other hand he rules that chamar medina may be used only for Havdala and not for Kiddush, apparently even during the day. The Taz (OC 272:6) posits that when wine is expensive (presumably, expensive is relative to the abilities of society and perhaps the person), it is permitted to make Kiddush on chamar medina.

There are few drinks in contemporary society (which likely differ from place to place) that are considered chamar medina according to a consensus of poskim. Whiskey (there is much discussion about how much one must drink) and beer have been on the “short list” for generations (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 53:9-10), and some have added natural fruit juices and coffee, with milk and soft drinks/soda being “lower on the totem pole” (see ibid.).

In our generation, with a wide variety of wine/grape juice available at cheap prices, the pendulum has rightly turned toward making Kiddush only on them. The best reasons to still use other drinks are when one ran out of them, dislikes them, or has a physical sensitivity to them. Another case is if one is very attached to a family minhag to use a different drink that is indeed still a notable, important drink.  

There are two problems with extracting hot water from the faucet when the water is heated by an electric boiler. One is that it will cause the thermostat to heat water sooner than it would have had you not used it. This is a problem in terms of connecting an electric circuit, and, more importantly, that a glowing filament or a gas flame will go on, as well as cold water being heated in the process. All of the latter involve Torah-level Shabbat melachot. It is a complicated question whether there is a Torah-level violation for the person who takes out the water, as the normally delayed reaction makes it likely that it is a form of gerama (indirect causation). We will not go further into this interesting question because you describe your system as off when you want to use it, until the end of Shabbat.

The other problem that occurs when you extract hot water from the tank is that cold water rushes into the tank to take its place and mixes in with the remaining hot water. The systems are designed in such a manner that the cold water enters on the bottom, whereas the hot water (due to the physical properties of heat rising and hot water being less dense than cold water) for the most part stays on top and does not fully heat the cold water below. However, it can be assumed that if the hot water is hot enough, at least a small amount of the cold water will reach the forbidden level of yad soledet bo (113°F, 45°C). Even in this case, there is some amount of leniency in that you do not place the cold water in the hot water tank but it goes in based on properties of physics after you open up your tap (see Yabia Omer IV, Orach Chayim 35). However, at least under normal circumstances, it is forbidden to remove water from a hot-water tank (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 1:39). If you were referring to a tank that had only solar-heated hot water in it, then this would very likely be permitted (see the famous leniency and its partial withdrawal in Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (ed. I, 1:31, and ed. II 1:45), as water heated by the sun is not fundamentally deemed to cook other things (Shabbat 39a). But, here too, we will be brief because this is not your case.

There are several practical ways to obtain lukewarm water. One is to not have the heating system go on on Shabbat and prepare things before Shabbat so that the water left in the tank does not heat the incoming cold water to yad soledet bo. Based on the physics discussed above, if you remove a nice amount of hot water before Shabbat after shutting off the heating system, the incoming water will not come in contact with hot water (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata ed. I, ibid.).

Another way to have warm water is to use a different source of hot water. If you remove hot water from a Shabbat urn, you can use it to create warm water in a container in two different ways. Many are used to using an extra cup in order to have a kli shlishi in which they put their tea, as many poskim (see Igrot Moshe, OC IV:74.15; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 1:57 is slightly more stringent) posit that kli shilishi does not cook even kalei habishul (easily cooked food). However, regarding water, all agree that it is permitted to put it into a kli sheini (Shabbat 40b; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 318:13), so that the extra cup is unnecessary. (Just as when making tea, one should make sure that there is not a small amount of (never heated) water in the cup before pouring into the kli sheini (Igrot Moshe ibid. 19).

If there is a nice amount of cold water in a cup one can pour in a small amount of hot water if the resulting mixture will clearly be less hot than yad soledet bo (Rama, OC 318:12; Mishna Berura ad loc. 84). This is a good idea only if one is confident he will remember to be careful about the amount.

Indeed Shehecheyanu is for important acquisitions; Hatov V’hameitiv is for those that also benefit others (Berachot 59b; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 223:5). The question is how direct the others’ benefit must be.

The gemara (Berachot 59b) says that Hatov V’hameitiv applies to cases where the recipient has a partner, or that it is for him and a friend. The Yerushalmi (Berachot 9:3) says that an individual who receives a nice present recites Hatov V’hameitiv, and the Rosh (Berachot 9:16) explains that the gift giver also benefits, as it is nice to be able to give and to have it accepted. Tosafot (Berachot 59b) sees the two Talmudic sources as contradictory, as the Bavli requires joint ownership to make Hatov V’hameitiv, and the Yerushalmi views side benefit as sufficient. If that is the case, the rule is that we follow the Bavli, that Shehecheyanu would be said, not Hatov V’hameitiv. The Rosh (ibid.) and the Beit Yosef (OC 223:5), though, believe the two sources are compatible, explaining that the Bavli does not mean to require a literal partner but one who joins in the benefit. The Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) therefore rules that a gift recipient recites Hatov V’hameitiv, whereas many poskim say that Shehecheyanu is said (see Mishna Berura 223:21).

The Mishna Berura (ibid.) recommends resolving the issue in practice by doing Shehecheyanu. The Be’ur Halacha (ad loc.) explains that this is the safer choice. First, even if the higher-level beracha of Hatov V’hameitiv is called for, one still fulfills the requirement with Shehecheyanu (similarly to Shehakol being a valid beracha after the fact for all foods). Additionally, there is a respected opinion that when Hatov V’hameitiv is called for, it means Hatov V’hameitiv in addition to Shehecheyanu. According to this opinion, Shehecheyanu is anyway warranted, and we would omit the second beracha of Hatov V’hameitiv due to doubt.

At first glance, your question depends on this machloket. After all, you are the one clear owner/user of the hearing aid who is benefitting directly. It is even possible that the Yerushalmi did not mean that Hatov V’hameitiv is said on all cases of indirect benefit.

Your excellent outlook causes you to assume that at least Shehecheyanu is called for. Those people who dread hearing aids certainly would not make a beracha even if they are very helpful (see Magen Avraham 223:10). It is less certain that people who value that which most people do not make a beracha (see Mishna Berura 223:24).

There is a machloket whether to recite Shehecheyanu on things which serve to rectify or alleviate an unfortunate problem. Avnei Yashfeh (V:41) says to do so for a wheel chair or glasses if they bring him joy. Be’er Moshe (VIII:67) says the same about dentures. He claims that there is a proof from the halacha that when one’s parent dies and he inherits, he makes a beracha on the inheritance despite the tragedy (Berachot 59b). One can deflect that proof, as inheritance is positive and not just rectifying a problem; therefore, it gets a beracha even if accompanies tragedy. This is different from a hearing aid, which just overcomes the ear’s malfunctioning. I have seen accounts of Rav SZ Auerbach (Berachos of Praise, p. 201) and Rav Mazouz (online) saying that one does not make a beracha on medical appliances. There is also an old, although dubious, minhag to make Shehecheyanu only on clothes and not other articles (see Magen Avraham 223:5)  

Your happiness/thankfulness should find expression with a beracha. It is safer to do it by making a Shehecheyanu on something that definitely warrants it and having the hearing aid in mind. However, there is a strong enough case to make Shehecheyanu (not Hatov V’hameitiv) independently if you like, all the more so regarding the latest hearing aids that have uses that go beyond fixing.   

We will not discuss the pharmaceutical questions this question raises, which are not within our expertise.

Let us expand the question. Is it permitted to receive and return new medicine? The mishna (Bava Metzia 75a) forbids (Rabbinically) lending commodities in a way that obligates the borrower to return the same type and amount he received (se’ah b’se’ah). This is out of concern that the article’s price will increase and the borrower will have to return more value than he received, and it applies even if the article’s price remained unchanged.

We will take a cursory look at relevant leniencies (see more in Living the Halachic Process, II-F-5), which can apply in many cases of gemachs. One reason for leniency is yatza hasha’ar (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 162:3). It permits the loan of a readily available commodity with a stable price.

Another heter applies to cases of warm relationships. The gemara (Bava Metzia 75a) rules that one may lend loaves of bread to a friend without stipulations. The Rama (YD 162:1; the Shulchan Aruch is somewhat stricter) rules like those who explain that small changes in the value of small quantities are not considered purposeful interest. It is difficult to know what he would say about a case like this. On the one hand, we are talking about kind people who run gemachs and their chesed “clients,” but on the other hand, gemachs often have clear rules.

Both of these heterim are problematic when the borrower returns a clearly larger quantity than he borrowed (Torat Ribbit 7:(7); Brit Yehuda 17:(6).), and a clearly more valuable version of the same commodity is equivalent. It is hard to know what to say about this case. On the one hand, many people would not be willing to accept expired medicine. On the other hand, it is unclear that it has a lower price, as people who would buy it anyway, might be willing at the regular price. Furthermore, the service one gets along with the product affects its price (Pitchei Choshen, Ona’ah 10:(1)). If a business would sell under the conditions of a gemach (e.g., late at night, Shabbat), they likely could sell old medicine for at least the regular price.

The fact that you are not required to return with money may be helpful. The Shulchan Aruch (YD 162:1) rules that if one lent a commodity but set a price above which the borrower does not have to pay if the price goes up, then he may give back the commodity. Applying this concept to our case is too complicated to do justice in this context, both in regard to halachic complexity and the likelihood that it is impacted by nuances regarding the rules of the gemach (see Chavot Da’at (161:1), Netivot Shalom (p. 193-4) Divrei Sofrim, p. 71).

Regarding most gemachs, there is a strong leniency to rely upon. Rabbinic ribbit is waived when the lender is a charitable entity (Shulchan Aruch, YD 160:18). Poskim generally apply this rule broadly to gemachs (Torat Ribbit 20:26; The Laws of Ribbis 19:5; Brit Yehuda 17:(45) distinguishes between different types of gemachs). This likely applies to your case, whose potential violations are Rabbinic – se’ah b’se’ah and/or voluntary ribbit. This explains how many gemachs can encourage (not, require) donations from borrowers (Torat Ribbit 20:27).

Finally, many pasken that a borrower does not violate Rabbinic ribbit other than for causing the lender to sin (Rama, YD 160:1). Therefore, if a lender has what to rely upon, the borrower does not have to worry (see Netivot Shalom, p. 83). Considering all the above and the likelihood that what the gemach did was standard and that many gemachs have halachic guidance, you may follow their instructions.  

It is difficult to speak definitely about “fulfilling” bikur cholim, as it is regarding many mitzvot bein adam lachaveiro. There is a consensus among poskim (many of whom we will cite, discussing phone calls) that there is moral and mitzva value to “visit” not in person. On the other hand, they all say that if one can come in person, he should. In order to appreciate both the value of a visit by telecommunication and the preference of in-person, we need to see the goals of bikur cholim and some sources on them.

One of the main of many reasons for visiting the sick (featured in the Ramban’s Torat Ha’adam and the Tur, Yoreh Deah 335), is to be moved by his condition and inspired to daven powerfully for him (Nedarim 40a). This is important enough to give cause for a halacha that one should visit at times of the day when his situation looks more severe, thereby increasing the prayer’s likely intensity (ibid.; Shulchan Aruch, YD 335:4). The Rama (ibid.) says that one who visited but did not pray for the choleh did not fulfill the mitzva. Considering the importance of the tefilla’s quality, being there in person helps in two ways: 1. It helps one feel the choleh’s condition more acutely (B’er Moshe II:105). 2. The Divine Presence is found around the choleh’s bed (Nedarim 40a). For that reason, one who davens away from the choleh should daven in Hebrew, as the angels do not bring before Hashem tefillot from other languages (at least, Aramaic), whereas before the choleh, Hashem Himself accepts the tefilla in any language (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 5). Therefore, while we value tefilla for cholim at all times and places, when we aim for the best tefillot (i.e., while visiting), it is best in person (Igrot Moshe, YD I, 223; Yechaveh Da’at III:83).

Another major reason for visiting is seeing to his practical needs, including advice (Nedarim 40a). The Minchat Yitzchak (II:84) presumes that one can get a fuller assessment when being there. On the other hand, he posits that if one has visited in person once, he can subsequently fulfill this element of the mitzva by phone. Tzitz Eliezer (V, Ramat Rachel 3) suggests that this element is rarely necessary in our days when the choleh is getting good care and medical advice in a hospital. The Minchat Yitzchak (died, 1989) also foresaw that when “television technology” would develop to the point that one could speak and see the choleh, that would suffice.

There is a concept that someone born at the same time of year (Bava Metzia 30b) or perhaps anyone (see Rambam, Avel 14:4) may relieve some of the illness. If this is mystically based, it would presumably work only in person. Another element is psychological encouragement, which Igrot Moshe (ibid.) posits works better in person than by phone. It would seem that while audio-visual contact is stronger than telephone, it still does not compare to being in person, especially because part of the encouragement comes from knowing that the visitor made a real effort to come visit, which is obviously harder than reaching out by telecommunication.

The gemara discusses cases where there is more to lose than to gain from one coming in person to visit, and the Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 8) says that one can stay outside in such cases. So one who is unable to come should not use that as an excuse to do nothing. Rather, the consensus of poskim is that in addition to davening for the choleh, one should “visit” electronically when appreciated. On the other hand, while we can use modern technology to help significantly in many mitzvot, it should not turn into a replacement for the full-fledged personal fulfillment. The following is a scenario upon which I have not seen discussion and am unable to say anything conclusive: one (especially a rabbi) has only enough time to either visit many electronically or a few in person. Which is preferable? About such cases, Kohelet says: “The eyes of the wise are in his head” (2:14). 

Although mature children generally recite berachot, the consensus of opinions is that a child does not recite Birkat Hagomel (Mishna Berura 219:3; Yalkut Yosef, Orach Chayim 219:3). The reason is not related to Hagomel’s minyan requirement, as a woman can recite Hagomel (see Mishna Berura ibid.; Living the Halachic Process ((=LTHP); V, B-8).  

The source of this halacha is the Maharam Mintz (Shut, 14), who says that since the language of the beracha is that one thanks Hashem for doing kindness (saving his life from danger) for those who deserve punishment (chayavim), it does not apply to children who cannot deserve punishment. Although it is possible that a potential harsh decree could come from his parents demerits, to call them chayavim would be a disgrace of the parents. He is also not in favor of the father making the beracha on the child’s account (see more in LTHP III, B-10).

Mahari Basan (Lachmei Todah 5), cited by many as a minority opinion (the Birkei Yosef 219:1 says that his local minhag did follow him), disagreed. He argues that if the capability of deserving death as divine punishment were a requirement, then adolescents until 20 would also not be able to recite Hagomel. He also points out that we are not supposed to say harsh things about our religious state (Berachot 19a). He claims that chayavim does not mean deserving of death but being in debt, i.e., we have received more from Hashem than we deserve. This can apply to children as well. As mentioned, we do not pasken like the Mahari Basan.

If the reason for children not making the beracha is that we cannot attribute the danger to them, then if one’s danger was over when he was a child, the beracha should not apply, and therefore your son, who will iy”H land safely before his bar mitzva should not make the beracha. It is true that R. Akiva Eiger (to OC 186:2) considers it plausible that one who ate a meal right before he turned bar mitzva and remains satiated after he became bar mitzva might become obligated in Birkat Hamazon on the level of Torah law. We might argue then that since the time of your son’s aliya would be the correct time to recite Hagomel and he should still be thankful, Hagomel should become an obligation. However, this is incorrect for two reasons. For one, R. Akiva Eiger is predicated on the possibility that Birkat Hamazon is fundamentally on the state of satiation, which remains in adulthood. In contrast, here the extrication from danger was over during childhood (Be’er Sarim V:2). Also, since the word chayavim relates to childhood, it is still problematic.

It is likely that the inability to say chayavim is not a mere technical impediment to the beracha. Consider that one can fulfill the mitzva without saying the word chayavim (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 219:4) which is not even in our text of the gemara (Berachot 60a). Rather, the Pri Megadim (Eshel Avraham, intro. to 219) implies that considering the language usually used, Chazal decided not to institute it regarding children, unlike other berachot, and therefore it cannot be created after the event that generates the beracha passes.

Rav S.Z. Auerbach (Minchat Shlomo II, 60) goes further, leaning toward saying that even if the child’s recovery was completed after bar mitzva, he would not recite Hagomel if the time of danger was earlier. (Be’er Sarim (ibid.) goes even further, regarding sickness, but not regarding travel.

In conclusion, since there is solid logic for those who think children should recite Hagomel, plus the fact that he will be bar mitzva at the time one would normally make the beracha, if your son wants, the two of you can have in mind during your recitation of Hagomel that, if appropriate, it relate to him also (see LTHP, II, B-7).

It is not only forbidden to eat orla fruit but even to benefit from them. The main non-eating benefits discussed regarding issurei hana’ah are physical (e.g., using orla for paint or fuel – Pesachim 22b), feeding animals (ibid. 22a) and selling.

The Rambam (Ma’achalot Assurot 8:16) forbids giving issurei hana’ah to non-Jews as a present. The Kolbo (92) points out that this prohibition is implicit, according to some, in the Torah’s formulation of the prohibition of neveila (meat of an animal that was not shechted properly) – one must not eat it but give it to a non-Jew who enjoys special standing (ger toshav) or sell it to another non-Jew (Devarim 14:21). Rav Avahu (Pesachim 21b) learns, according to R. Meir, that had it been forbidden to benefit from neveila, it would have been forbidden to give it to a non-Jew.

The logic is that giving presents causes reciprocity in some way/time, making the present a cause of benefit to the giver, and this is expanded to less direct cases. The Rama (Yoreh Deah 294:8) forbids helping a non-Jew pick his orla fruit, even for free, because the owner will be grateful. There is more room for leniency when the benefit is indirect. For one, the Avnei Nezer (Orach Chayim 489) posits that if one did not intend to enjoy the recipient’s gratefulness, it is permitted to provide him the orla. However, it is difficult for one who gives a present to determine he has no intention for beneficial good will, and such a situation can also create other halachic problems (ibid.), which it is unclear how easy it is to overcome (see Beit She’arim, OC 61; Chatam Sofer, Avoda Zara 64b).

The way to do things is not to present the orla as a gift, but to make your worker aware of the situation. Explain that you must not benefit from the fruit, that if no one takes them you will throw them out, and therefore you have nothing to lose (and even a little toil to gain) if someone, including him, takes them.

The following is the main source that allowing people to take issurei hana’ah, as opposed to giving a gift, is permitted. The mishna (Bava Kama 108b-109a) rules on one whose father used a neder to preclude his son from benefit from his property, and then the father died, and the son inherited the property. The son may indeed not benefit from the property, but he can direct it to his relative who may benefit from it. The Ran (Nedarim 47a) asks why this transfer of the property to the person of the son’s choice is not forbidden benefit. The Ran answers that the son is not allowed to give it to them regularly. Rather, he is to explain to them that he cannot use it himself, and therefore, from his perspective, they may as well take it. The Shach (YD 223:4) accepts this Ran, including that the son must mention that he has no use for the property. If you do so regarding the orla, it should work for you as well.

There are times that one may not give to a non-Jew, an object that is forbidden for Jews out of a concern that it will end up in the hands of Jews who will not realize the object’s status (see Avoda Zara 65b). However, this is not a broad concern, at least regarding things that people know need a kashrut check. Regarding orla, the gemara (Avoda Zara 21a)) and Shulchan Aruch (YD 294:14) allow people, in preparation of their trees producing orla, to sell or have a partnership with a non-Jew so that the non-Jew gets the fruit during the years of orla and the Jew gets them afterward. Rav Kook (Mishpat Kohen 6) says that such actions are permitted because they were done before the prohibited fruit existed, which would imply that at the stage you refer to, it would be a problem to make such fruit available. However, he discussed transferring an orchard of orla, which is meant for commercial use, which may go to Jews, as opposed to your small amount of fruit meant for personal consumption. The fact that you will mention that Jews may not eat it is also helpful.