ASK THE RABBI

While these agreeable people, who have gone beyond halachic requirements (see below), can do whatever they agree on, it is an honor to discuss relevant general halachot.

A katan, who is not expected to be proficient at watching objects, and his parents, are exempt from payment for his deficiencies as a shomer (see Bava Kama 87a). However, our communities seem happier when children are encouraged to be careful and when their parents often pay for their failings.

It is common that when one damages or loses another’s item, he buys or pays for a new replacement. This is not always required, as the obligation is to pay the value of the lost object. Used items, including basketballs, are often worth less than their new replacement. (Paying more than one is required is not a problem of ribbit, as ribbit is forbidden when it is for delaying paying a loan or sometimes other obligations, not for paying more than obligated.)

Now, we get to your question about what to do with the balls. The mishna (Bava Metzia 33b) says that if a shomer pays for the theft of the object he was watching and later the thief was caught and has to pay double (kefel), the shomer gets the kefel. The gemara posits that since the shomer is nice enough to agree to pay, the owner transfers him rights to the kefel. In response to technical problems about the ability to transfer such a potential, amorphous asset, the gemara answers that an implied, earlier, conditional (should he pay) transfer of the object makes it possible for the shomer to get the kefel. The gemara continues that this transfer applies to a variety of external gains from the object (not just kefel), but notto an animal’s physical products, e.g., wool and offspring.

Tosafot (ad loc.) understands that the gemara refers to a literal transfer of the lost/stolen object, so that the shomer owns the object he paid for. According to this approach, once the Levis paid, the Cohens ceded ownership rights to the old basketball. If Reuven Cohen wants his old ball back, he would have to request a favor of the Levis (the reciprocation should be return of the money the Levis paid).

The Rambam (Sh’eila 8:1) describes how when an animal stolen from a shomer is found, it returns to the original owner with its wool and offspring. According to the standard explanation of the Rambam (see Maggid Mishneh, ad loc.; K’tzot Hachoshen 295:4) wool and offspring are not exceptions to the rule but are indicative of the fact that all stolen and lost objects remain owned by the original owner even after the shomer pays for their loss. According to this approach, Reuven Cohen keeps his basketball, and the payment is returned when it turns out there is no loss.

We generally assume like Tosafot’s approach (Pitchei Choshen, Pikadon 8:13). The Shach (CM 295:11) suggests that the Rambam agrees that the shomer keeps the object if he wants it, just that the Rambam discussed a case that he did not want it.

It appears that since the whole idea of getting rights in the animal is in appreciation for the shomer’s cooperation, Tosafot agrees that he can turn down receiving the object when it is found and can thereby be eligible to receive the money he gave. (See also Shulchan Aruch, CM 103:11 for a precedent of undoing a forced payment after the lost object was found.) In our case, that would seem to mean the Cohens would have two basketballs. However, it is very possible here that since, conceptually, the Levis gave a basketball (just that for technical reasons, the Cohens ordered it), the Cohens would give the Levis the new basketball.

We cannot address every permutation, but trust the friendly parties to “have a ball” continuing to cooperate. 

It is an honor to learn Torah with people, all the more so with a soldier for whom Halacha is front and center. We will discuss principles and address some scenarios.

The gemara (Shabbat 19a) says that one may embark on a sea journey that will continue into Shabbat only if: A. He sails before the last three days of the week; OR B. His trip is for a mitzva. Rishonim (see Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 248) present different possibilities about the relevant problem of being on the ship. These include: 1. Seasickness harms oneg Shabbat; 2. The violation of techum Shabbat. 3. The Rabbinic prohibition of sailing. 4. The Ba’al Hama’or (ad loc.) says that we presume that the danger will make it necessary to do melacha on Shabbat, and that it is forbidden to enter such a situation without a legitimate need at the time of the week that Shabbat should be on his mind. The Rivash (Shut 101), accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (OC 248:4), reasons that even those who explain the gemara differently, agree that there needs to be sufficient justification to put oneself into a situation that requires violation of Shabbat for pikuach nefesh.

Logically, making Shabbat early when the need to do melacha is expected during tosefet Shabbat is like setting up the need by entering the ship. It is unclear how high the chance of doing melacha needs to be for this to apply. In most cases, it depends if one has a shift or an operation at that time.

One pertinent question is why you are considering accepting Shabbat early. On a weekly basis, few men actively accept Shabbat early, in the way that [Ashkenazi] women do with candle lighting (see Shulchan Aruch and Rama, OC 263:10). Men do not accept Shabbat at that time (and must not if they need to daven Mincha). Some make a declaration of accepting Shabbat after Mincha, but this is not mainstream practice or required according to most poskim (see Yabia Omer VII, OC 34; Living the Halachic Process III, C-4). Rather, tosefet Shabbat is fulfilled by refraining from melacha at least a few minutes before bein hashemashot. It is detrimental to actively accept Shabbat when there is a good chance one would need to do melachot in those minutes.

The question is if soldiers want to accept Shabbat early to enable davening Ma’ariv (with a minyan), Kiddush, and/or a seuda before a shift? Based on the above, entering the situation requires that it includes facilitating a mitzva. What counts as a mitzva? The Tur (OC 248) cites Rabbeinu Tam that a business trip counts as a mitzva, whereas a pleasure trip is a non-mitzva. Many require a real mitzva, such as traveling to making aliya. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 248:4) rules like the stringent approach, but the Rama says that some follow Rabbeinu Tam, and they should not be criticized.

According to the approach that one needs a real mitzva, it is unclear whether doing the mitzvot of Shabbat during tosefet in a case that he can do the mitzvot in a non-optimal way (e.g., later, without a minyan, with cold food, while tired) counts. The policy of the IDF Rabbinate is that one should not accept Shabbat early if he can fulfill the mitzvot of the night after the shift. If not, one should eat his meal before the shift as a weekday meal and have a minor meal after returning from the shift. This reflects the correct general approach that one being exacting in avoiding melacha on Shabbat, even under extenuating circumstances, is more crucial than ideal fulfillment of the positive mitzvot of the day under such circumstances.

Such a general policy is for standard cases. Circumstances vary, both concerning halachic distinctions and practical concerns of the “army-on-Shabbat experience.” We would expect an expert army chaplain (as a high-ranking one told me) to weigh the specifics of a given case to determine if it fits the general guidelines or whether accepting Shabbat early might be worthwhile.

Your question shows halachic acuity. We will start with a case where the fruit is orla.

Orla is forbidden in benefit (Orla 3:1; Pesachim 24b), and this is likely a full-fledged Torah-level prohibition in Eretz Yisrael even in our times, when many land-based prohibitions are Rabbinic (implication of Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 294:9; Mishneh Lamelech, Maachalot Assurot 10:11 argues). On the other hand, if a usage is abnormal for this species (likely true for fragrance for many fruit), some say it is only Rabbinically forbidden or even permitted (see discussion in Yalkut Yosef, Orla 2:10). Although orla applies only to edible fruit (Vayikra 19:23), the soap’s being unfit for a dog’s consumption (which is important regarding chametz) does not help regarding non-eating benefit, if the fruit became forbidden as orla when it grew (Yalkut Yosef ibid. 19).

The soap’s percentage of orla fruit can be important. While bitul of orla requires 200 to 1 of permitted substance (Orla 1:6), that is only for mixtures within the same species, but if fruit is mixed in with something else (e.g., soap), the normal rate of bitul of 60 applies (Pri Megadim, intro. to Hilchot Ta’arovot). If the fruit’s fragrance is clearly discernable (possibly, the main fragrance is chemical, and they put in a tiny amount of fruit as a marketing ploy), we have an interesting question. There is a machloket (see Acharonim on Rama, YD 102:1) whether there is bitul when the mixture’s forbidden part is small enough for bitul, but it is noticeable due to its color.  Arguably, the same bitul impediment could apply to the fruit’s noticeable fragrance (likely, only Rabbinically – see Badei Hashulchan 102:16).

The doubt about whether the fruit used in the soap are orla at all provides significant, possible grounds for leniency. Orla fruit are almost always a small percentage of the fruit market. The rule is that when there is an actual or virtual “market” of food, where the majority of the sources are kosher, if one encounters food of unknown origin away from the “market” (parish), we may assume is from the permitted majority. If one took the food from the market without noticing whether it was from a permitted or forbidden source (kavu’a), we treat the food’s status as a safek (Ketubot 15a). Since the consumer encounters the fruit in the soap away from its “market” ((sections of) orchards throughout the country), the majority chance is that the fruit was not orla. (We are describing a case in which the fruit in the package of soap comes from a limited number of trees. If the fruit element in each comes from a huge mixture coming from a wide amount and variety of locations, we must use different tools of analysis, relating to bitul. That is beyond our present scope, but likely brings a leniency-leaning outcome.)

However, there is a problem. According to the simple reading of the Shulchan Aruch (YD 110:3), if a Jew took or had the food taken, without taking note of its halachic status, from the origin to the place of the person asking the question, we treat the food as kavu’a and thereby as a safek whether it is kosher. Just as it was forbidden for the one who took it, so is it for the ones (e.g., stores, consumers) who got it from him. See Yabia Omer VI, YD 24 who brings many opinions on whether this stringency is correct regarding fruit at the grocer. His conclusion is that there are enough reasons for doubt (including those we have not mentioned) why a given fruit is not orla that we can permit fruit without an orla hashgacha. He praises the many who do seek certification, although it is accepted that for the majority of fruit species with a tiny percentage of orla, we can assume each fruit is kosher.

Considering all the above, we posit that you may freely use the soap in question without concern about orla.

BB, which most batei knesset in Israel recite at the end of Shacharit and Ma’ariv (a minority of Ashkenazim do so abroad) grew out of the concept of poress al Shema (=paS), which is found already in a mishna (Megilla 24a). Barchu was instituted as an introduction to the berachot of Kri’at Shema, which leads into Shemoneh Esrei (see Rivash 334). PaS allows those who missed this process to join the tzibbur and salvage what they can. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 69:1) presents, as the classic case, those who davened without a minyan; paS enables them to take part in Kaddish, Barchu, and a repeat of the first beracha of Kri’at Shema, which, in the morning, includes a Kedusha. In contrast, the Rama points out that the mode of paS practiced in his time/place did not include the first beracha of Kri’at Shema. The Mishna Berura (69:1) cites important poskim who say that paS, even for just doing Barchu, is only for those who did not yet daven.    

BB is a few steps removed from the above. BB is done at the end of tefilla, whereas paS is not necessarily done then (see Mishna Berura, intro. to siman 69). A more major difference is what need triggers saying Barchu. Classic paS is when someone missed something, either by not hearing Barchu at all, or hearing it not before Birchot Kri’at Shema (which he is now up to). In contrast, BB is done even if no one is known to have missed, because it is possible that such a person is present (Rama, OC 131:1).

The origins of this minhag are not fully clear. Massechet Sofrim (10:6) speaks of saying Barchu right before or after Shemoneh Esrei because of concern for “those who come and those who leave.” The Rivash (Shut 334) sees this as a source for BB, while pointing out that the Rambam and Tur do not cite it and that there is opposition to it on the grounds that Barchu needs to be an introduction to a beracha. (The likely answer is that the response of “Baruch Hashem Hamevorach …” itself can be that beracha.) There are indications that various Rishonim had differing texts and/or understandings of Massechet Sofrim. The Rivash does not like doing BB when it is known that no one missed Barchu.

The Shulchan Aruch (OC 133:1) is sensitive to the idea that one cannot say BB anytime, but only when it fits the need. He rules that one does not say BB after Shabbat morning davening because people are not expected to be late enough to justify it. This is either because they will not be up to Birchot Kri’at Shema when Mussaf is over (see Rivash) or because we expect that they heard Barchu in Kri’at Hatorah. The difference between the approaches is the minhag of Nusach Ashkenaz of Israel to omit it on Mondays/Thursdays because of Barchu in Kri’at Hatorah. The Kaf Hachayim (OC 133:1) explains the Sephardi minhag to do BB at every Shacharit and Ma’ariv based on Kabbala – the second Barchu supplements spiritual elements not covered by the first one.

We have not found discussion of your interesting case, but an answer apparently emerges by analyzing the underlying principles and “listening to the silence.”

The topic begins with mishnayot (Chulin 103b & 104b) that rule that one must not eat meat at a table that has cheese on it, but may have these foods side-by-side on a table at which food is being prepared. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 88:1, based on Rambam, Ma’achalot Assurot 9:20) explains that the concern is that one might end up eating the two foods together. (Rashi ad loc. speaks about eating one after it is soiled by the other.) Another mishna (ibid. 107b, according to the gemara ibid.) says that two people who do not know each other may eat milchig and fleishig at the same table (implying that if they know each other, it is forbidden – Shulchan Aruch ibid. 2). The logic is that we do not suspect that one will eat the other’s food.

Your case falls between those of the mishnayot, as follows. 1. On the one hand, you are eating and not merely working with food, but on the other hand, the second food is not being eaten. 2. While in your case, there is no one else eating who may interest you in the other type of food, there is also no one eating the other food who may stop you from eating it.

According to the Shulchan Aruch’s reasoning (he may eat the other food), if he is eating and there is available food, the fact that the second food is not being eaten now (#1) does not seem to take away the temptation of eating it. Regarding the absence of a second person (#2), we find in poskim, including the Chochmat Adam (40:11), that the problem is at least as bad when one is eating alone.

Does intention take away the concern that he might eat anyway? Lack of explicit sources for such a distinction is a strong indicator that we cannot create one. Furthermore, in the regular forbidden case, a kashrut-observant person who is eating meat is not planning to eat milchig food for hours, and still Halacha forbids it to be on his table. The argument to reject this leniency is also strengthened by the gemara (ibid. 107b), which explicitly applies to this prohibition the concept of lo plug (we apply the Halacha broadly even to specific cases where the logic does not fully apply).

There are, though, acceptable leniencies found in the gemara and poskim regarding this halacha. The gemara (Chulin 107b) says that the prohibition is only when the two people are eating in one “tefisa.” Most Rishonim (see Tosafot ad loc.; Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 173) say that this means that if there is a noticeable separator (heker) between the two foods, it is permitted (we assume it applies even when a person is eating alone (see Chochmat Adam ibid.). This includes having one eating on a different surface (e.g., via a tablecloth or place mat) than the other (Rama, YD 88:2). Placing objects with some height that are not usually on the table also helps (see ibid., Taz ad loc. 4). Also, the Pitchei Teshuva (ad loc. 3) rules that it is permitted when the other food is far enough away that one cannot reach it without getting up.

There may be further leniency in a case where the other food is still packaged, as Rashi’s reason about food getting soiled would not apply. While Badei Hashulchan (88:6) is stringent, there is an opinion (Rashash, Chulin 103b) that it is permitted to eat one type of food when the other one is in a utensil (i.e., it is unlikely the foods will touch). If the food is on the table in a way that it is clear to all that it is not to be eaten now (e.g., it is in a supermarket bag along with other foods), then arguably the situation serves as a heker. However, since these are conjectures and the accepted solutions are easily accomplished, one should avail himself of the standard solutions.

It is indeed worthwhile for people with hundreds of Kaddeishim in front of them to learn more about different facets of Kaddish, but we will actually start with Shemoneh Esrei.

The gemara (Yoma 53b) says that the correct way to show respect to Hashem before Whom one was praying is to take three steps back at the end of Shemoneh Esrei, give Shalom while turning to the sides, and not return to one’s place right away. While it is unclear what text was used in the gemara’s time to “give Shalom,” by the time of the Rishonim (see Mordechai, Berachot 111), it was clear that we employ some version of “Oseh shalom bimromav hu …” This is a request that Hashem bring peace to Israel as He brings peace between the different components of His heavenly abode. (The opening words come from the description of Hashem in Iyov 25:2).

We recite Oseh shalom bimromav … at or near the end of three important texts we recite: Shemoneh Esrei, Kaddish, and Birkat Hamazon. Peace is such an important value that we want to acknowledge Hashem’s part in it and request more of it at the end of these “interactions” with Him (see Tzitz Eliezer XIV:14). This is done at Shemoneh Esrei after taking three steps back. At Birkat Hamazon, we do not take any steps at any point, including when saying Oseh shalom bimromav. There is a major machloket among poskim and in Sephardi practice whether we take steps back after all Kaddeishim that end with Oseh shalom bimromav or only in Kaddish Titkabel (see opinions in Yabia Omer V, Orach Chayim 9).

The reason that Kaddish Titkabel may be different is that this Kaddish has a special kinship to Shemoneh Esrei. First, in content, the line that is unique to this Kaddish is the request that Hashem accept our prayers, and this usually refers to the Shemoneh Esrei and/or chazarat hashatz that the tzibbur recently recited. The connection finds expression in various halachot. For one, if Shemoneh Esrei/ chazarat hashatz began with a minyan that later dissipated, since they can finish up the units they began, they can recite the Kaddish Titkabel because it is the conclusion of chazarat hashatz (Rama, OC 55:3). Also, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 123:5, based on Terumat Hadeshen I:13) rules that a chazan does not need to take three steps back at the end of chazarat hashatz, because the steps at the end of Kaddish Titkabel count as the steps after chazarat hashatz (see Mishna Berura 123:18).

Now to your question. Rav Chaim Naeh (Sh’not Chaim 9:(47)) says that since Kaddish Titkabel is connected to chazarat hashatz, one should wait the amount of time it takes to walk four amot (2-3 seconds) before returning to his place (based on the model of the Rama, OC 123:2). Since there is apparently no one who explicitly disagrees, it is not surprising that contemporary sources, such as Ishei Yisrael (24:(152)) and Dirshu (124:21), cite and seem to accept him. However, he limits this requirement to Kaddish Titkabel (as opposed to Kaddish Yatom and D’Rabbanan, despite ending with Oseh shalom bimromav and even for those who take steps back). He also excludes Kaddish Titkabel of Ma’ariv (Mekor Chayim (Bachrach) to Rama, OC 123:2) disagrees) apparently because there is no chazarat hashatz to connect to and everyone took steps back after Shemoneh Esrei.

My strong impression is that few chazanim think about how long to wait before moving forward. (Kaddish reciters who are not chazanim may not even return to the place they started Kaddish). Possibly, many naturally wait close to the “required” time, but we still contend that the minhag is not to wait after any Kaddish. On the other hand, if you want to be machmir, this is not a problem, because presumably the tefilla would not be delayed by it. (We would not find it appropriate to follow the opinion (cited in Ishei Yisrael ibid.) that a Kaddish sayer should not say the ending Barchu until returning).

The minhag of a Shalom Zachar is mentioned by a couple of Rishonim and may have a source in the gemara. The gemara (Bava Kama 80a) mentions an Amora going to a shavua haben or yeshua haben. While Rashi relates this to a pidyon haben, Tosafot cites an opinion that it was to celebrate the birth of the baby, who was safely extricated from his mother’s womb. The Terumat Hadeshen (I:269) connects it to the minhag that existed in his time and ours, to have a celebration with food on the night of the baby’s first full Shabbat. (The Orchot Chayim (Mila) says something similar.) The Rama (Yoreh Deah 265:12) cites this minhag as standard, and it is so for Ashkenazim to this day. (Sephardim have a similar observance the night before the brit called a Brit Yitzchak, and some Ashkenazim also do a practice called “vach nacht” that night). The question of whether it is better for the nuclear family to do it alone or for grandparents to have one with greater participation is a good one.

Several explanations are given for Shalom Zachar, and, at first glance, they influence the answer to your question. The Terumat Hadeshen (ibid.) relates it to celebration of the birth, which should include thanks to Hashem, which makes it a seudat mitzva. Anyone who feels connected can thank Hashem for that, but parents most so.

A midrash (Vayikra Rabba 27:10) tells that the timing of a brit mila significantly ensures that babies “experience” Shabbat before undergoing a brit mila. This makes the day significant in the baby’s life, but his presence should not be necessary. Teshuvot V’hanhagot (II:202) similarly says that we find in a few contexts that the Shabbat before a major event captures some of its glory, which makes it fit for looking forward and, in this case, thanking Hashem. The parents are most connected to the baby and the father alone is obligated in the brit (Kiddushin 29a), but, again, anyone who cares about the baby can be connected. Certainly, grandparents, who are expected to have a special connection to the child’s spiritual future (see Shemot 10:2; Devarim 4:9; Rambam, Talmud Torah 1:2) are also significant.

The Derisha (YD 264:2) says that at the Shalom Zachar, we console the baby for the loss of the Torah he studied in his mother’s womb (based on Nida 30b). This could lead to the conclusion that the baby must be at the Shalom Zachar to be consoled (Teshuvot V’hanhagot II:202). The fact that it is often done even without the baby can be attributed to the other reasons (ibid.). Furthermore, even the consoling does not have practical impact (not meaning to insult the baby’s intellect), but is spiritual or perhaps symbolic. So it is possible that “consolation” can be gained when people gather in the baby’s honor and bless him in abstentia.

 Is the participation of people outside the nuclear family important? Many sources (including the early ones) refer to people coming. Considering there is no ceremony and the food served is minor (see Aruch Hashulchan, OC 265:37), the visitation is apparently central to the event (see explanations in Osin B’simcha, Ma’amar 4).

Considering the above, it is fully appropriate for you to make a Shalom Zachar. This does not exclude the parents doing something low-key at the hospital, and they can “turn it into” a Shalom Zachar by eating traditional Shalom Zachar foods (e.g., chickpeas, almonds), thanking Hashem for the birth, and discussing the upcoming brit’s significance.

There are two possible reasons to forbid using steel wool to wash dishes on Shabbat.

The gemara (Shabbat 50a) says that one may generally scrub utensils thoroughly on Shabbat, except that one may not scrub silver with an abrasive material called gartekun because that will definitely smooth out the surface. (Cleaning well is permitted, whereas smoothing a surface is included in the melacha of memachek). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 323:9) paskens this gemara and highlights the fact that silver is a relatively soft metal. While the Mishna Berura (323:39) says that for other, harder materials even a gartekun can be used, some say that steel wool is worse, as it is meant to smooth out even the surface of steel (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 12:10; Dirshu 323:41). Some Acharonim (see K’tzot Hashulchan 146:(126)) claim that there are also problems of uvdin d’chol (weekday-like activity) in this scrubbing.

On the other hand, this logic for stringency applies primarily for a more common use of steel wool – scrubbing pots with this quite abrasive substance to remove baked-on residue. (It is rarely permitted to clean pots, and certainly not scrub them, on Shabbat, with any material, as this is rarely needed for Shabbat, but should be done on motzaei Shabbat. Development of that topic is beyond our present scope.) You, though, asked about washing dishes, which are usually glazed flatware, and glasses, which do not need smoothing of their surfaces. This process is not similar to the gemara’s description of the use of gartekan, even if the same steel wool could be used in that way. Therefore, using steel wool like a dish sponge is unlikely forbidden on the grounds of abrasive scrubbing (Shalmei Yehuda 9:(7) in the name of Rav Elyashiv and Rav B. Zilber).

The bigger problem is the similarity to a sponge, which may not be used on Shabbat because of sechita (squeezing out) of absorbent objects. (There is a machloket as to the melacha to which this belongs – see Orchot Shabbat, I, p. 399). One can argue cogently that steel wool, made up of thin metal strands, is not an absorbent object, and just as the gemara (Shabbat 128b) says there is no sechita of hair, so too there should be no sechita of steel wool. However, we generally assume that there is a Rabbinic prohibition to squeeze hair (Mishna Berura 326:25). This may also apply to other non-absorbent materials (see Orchot Shabbat 13:56).

The question is where to draw the line. The following is probably the basic guideline that most people knowledgeable about the halachot of Shabbat keep. If the non-absorbent elements of the material lie together in very close proximity, it is prohibited to squeeze the liquid between them, as this is in many ways equivalent to classic sechita (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 12:15). For this reason, specially made “Shabbat sponges” are not only made out of hard, nonabsorbent materials such as plastic, but the strands are somewhat spread out. Steel wool does not meet these standards, and this is particularly a problem when it is desired that the liquid in between the strands (soapy water) come out to use for the washing (see Mishna Berura 320:55).

Therefore, poskim generally do not allow washing dishes with steel wool (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 12:10; Orchot Shabbat 13:58). Nowadays, there are effective alternatives, broadly accepted for Shabbat use. However, since the idea that there is sechita on non-absorbent materials and its exact parameters are not trivial (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 12:(46)), the woman you refer to might have received a legitimate rabbinic leniency.

Even if one is going to use steel wool, he should be careful not to cut a piece off a roll or mass, on Shabbat (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 340:13), and if he is particular about the piece’s size, it violates the melacha of mechatech (see Rambam, Shabbat 11:7; Mishna Berura 340:41).

You imply that you do not usually make Kiddush another time before your main meal. That common minhag is fine, as the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 273:5; see Mishna Berura ad loc. 24) accepts the opinion to count this snack as “Kiddush in the place of a meal.” On the other hand, some people are careful to make daytime Kiddush again. One reason is to want an unquestionably valid Kiddush, i.e., one followed by a bread meal (see Ma’aseh Rav 122). Another is that we want the main meal to be elevated by wine (Teshuvot V’hanhagot I:264). (Igrot Moshe (OC IV:63) has another reason regarding after a shul Kiddush, in that the Kiddush was not in the same place as the main meal.) The many with your practice should not be concerned about an unwarranted, repeat daytime Kiddush, as we only recite Borei Pri Hagafen. This after all is needed when drinking wine before or even during the Shabbat meal (which is part of oneg Shabbat ­– see Rambam, Shabbat 29:10) as the berachot acharonot after your first “Kiddush” ended the wine drinking (see Living the Halachic Process, III, C-8). Therefore, Halacha has nothing against another Kiddush, as your guest may prefer.

But does your Kiddush work for her if you already fulfilled that mitzva? The gemara (Rosh Hashana 29a) posits that one who has recited and finished with a beracha can make the beracha to be motzi someone else, except for berachot on foods. Rashi (ad loc.) explains that the ability to be motzi others is based on arvut (responsibility for a fellow Jew’s religious observance), which only applies to cases where the other is obligated, and he is not obligated to eat. The gemara continues that one can make the beracha on the wine of Kiddush on another’s behalf because that is an obligation.

However, whether this applies to daytime Kiddush may depend on its nature. The Ran (Pesachim 22a of the Rif’s pages) says that the day Kiddush is a truncated, less prominent redoing of the night Kiddush. Rabbeinu David finds this difficult, considering that Shabbat is not mentioned (the p’sukim people recite are a post-Talmudic minhag); rather, the wine is used to elevate the meal. R. David introduces nafka minot between approaches, including that the gemara’s permission for one who has made Kiddush to be motzi a friend is only at night. During the day, the beracha is just to allow him to drink the wine, so the beracha is not a direct, classic mitzva.

This only a slight problem for you. First, regarding all of R. David’s nafka minot (including whether one needs wine at seuda shlishit), we rule against him (see Yabia Omer, IX, OC 3). Furthermore, since he treats the beracha on the wine as a regular food beracha, assuming you will drink some wine after making Kiddush, your beracha will be justified and work for your guest (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 213:1; Dirshu 273:26). There are actually another two possible reasons you should drink from the Kiddush wine. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 273:4) says that one should not make Kiddush for someone without taking part in it for himself unless the person he is doing it for is not capable of doing it himself. While this is a chumra that not all agree with, it is difficult to ignore it when there is an option (Mishna Berura ad loc. 20). Also, there is a minority opinion (cited and preferred l’chatchila by the Shulchan Aruch, OC 271:14) that the required amount of wine to drink after Kiddush (m’lo lugmav) should always be drunk by the person making Kiddush. This also is a chumra, but one that is hard to ignore (see Be’ur Halacha ad loc.).

The first question, whether the mirpeset requires a mezuza in its own right, has two parts. The gemara (Yoma 11b) derives that only “houses made for living” require a mezuza. There are different indications as to whether what Chazal called mirpeset requires (see ibid. and Menachot 33b), and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 286:7) rules that it depends if there is an entrance from a house to the mirpeset. However, that is not talking about a balcony. Most poskim posit that our mirpesot require mezuzot (see Chovat Hadar 2:5) because stepping out for air etc. is a normal way of using one’s house. Although a house needs a roof to require a mezuza (Shulchan Aruch ibid. 14), it is normal for a balcony to not have a (full) roof, and lack of one does not necessarily exempt (see Sha’arei Hamezuza 2:(11)). According to some opinions, and possibly depending on certain parameters, one would affix the mezuza to a mirpeset without a beracha (see ibid. (12)).

The balcony’s size is an important factor. The minimum size for a house is 4 amot (around 2 meters or a little more) by 4 amot, regarding several halachot including mezuza (Sukka 3a). The Rosh (ibid. 16) posits that both its length and width must be 4 amot. Most early sources understand the Rambam (ibid. 2) as saying that it suffices that the room’s area be 16 sq. amot, even if one of its dimensions is less than 4 amot, and the Shach (286:23) treats the matter as a doubt. According to these rules, it is a doubt whether your mirpeset (around 20 sq. amot, but not 4 amot wide) is big enough to require a mezuza. The Pitchei Teshuva (YD 286:11) cites an opinion that a room whose size is viable for its living purposes requires a mezuza even if it is “undersized.” While this is a respected opinion (see Minchat Yitzchak I:8), it is unclear to what extent we accept it (see Chovat Hadar 4:(16)).

The indications are, then, that it is a doubt whether your balcony deserves, from “its sake,” a mezuza, and in which case, affixing it on the right going out without a beracha on it could make sense. However, even according to the possibility that the mirpeset does not have its own mezuza obligation, its connection to the living room may affect matters.

We put the mezuza on the right side going into a house, but when going from room A to room B within it, we must decide which room we are considered entering from which, to determine which side is “the right.” The major factors are: 1) which room is used more significantly; 2) into which room does the door open; 3) most importantly, when one can only enter room B by means of room A, we view it that we are going into the “dead end” (Taz, YD 289:4; Pitchei Shearim 289:67). Your mirpeset is such a dead end, ostensibly indicating to affix the mezuza on the right side going out to the balcony. (A minority opinion holds that since the mirpeset is subservient to the house, one always puts it in the direction of entering the main house (Chazon Ish, YD 168:5).)

However, if the mirpeset does not deserve a mezuza, it may enable the following possibility. Just like an entrance from a non-mezuza-entity into a house requires a mezuza, so does a non-mezuza-entity mirpeset need one going into the house. Then, you would need a mezuza going into the house, on the right side (see R. Akiva Eiger to YD 186:13).

In summation, there are many indications in different directions. We would be tempted to suggest a mezuza on each side, but we must not do that (see our column, Kedoshim 5774). We recommend affixing it on the right coming into the living room, doing so along with a mezuza for a definitely required location, so one can “share” the berachot.