ASK THE RABBI

There are several points of machloket/safek that impact this topic.

The concept of mentioning me’ein hameora (=mehm – about the special day) in a beracha acharona (classically, in Birkat Hamazon) after the day is over because one started the meal during the day is the subject of a machloket Rishonim (see Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 188). The Shulchan Aruch has an apparent contradiction on the matter (see OC 188:10; OC 271:6), and the strongest explanation is that out of doubt, it is appropriate to say mehm based on either the beginning of the meal or the time of the bentching (Magen Avraham 271:14). How bad it is to mention something from a wrong day is complicated (see Ginat V’radim OC, I:28, Mishna Berura 108:38).

There are two explanations of why to follow the beginning of the eating on Shabbat. One is that when one ate on Shabbat, he became obligated in mehm, and that obligation does not cease (see Mishna Berura 188:32). Another is that even though Shabbat is over, it is still a time that could be Shabbat if he had laudably extended it further (Magen Avraham 188:18 in the name of the Shelah). The second idea, related to extending the day, does not apply to Rosh Chodesh. The first idea does apply, but the comparison is imperfect because the obligation of mehm on Rosh Chodesh is weaker, as there is no obligation to eat and therefore one who skips Ya’a’leh V’yavo, does not have to repeat Birkat Hamazon (Shulchan Aruch, OC 188:7). Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch (ibid. 10) rules that one who started a meal during Rosh Chodesh mentions mehm when bentching at night.

Does this concept also apply to Al Hamichya? Mehm is less important in Al Hamichya, as we rule that if one forgot it, even on Shabbat and Yom Tov, he need not repeat Al Hamichya (Mishna Berura 208:58). There are few reasons why not. For one, it is not unanimous that one ever has to do mehm in Al Hamichya (Sha’ar Hatziyun 208:60). Also, this type of non-bread eating does not typically fulfill required eating (ibid.). Finally, mehm might have been instituted only as a preferable recitation (ibid.). Therefore, the case for there being a need to say it after the day is weaker. Shevet Hakehati (V:42) argues that only important eating on a special day enables mehm to extend to the night and therefore eating that gets only Al Hamichya does not warrant it. There is room to disagree, as one way or the other, there was an obligation or expectation to recite mehm in this beracha acharona. As mentioned above, erring on the side of saying is not a major problem, as we say mehm when there is a safek, and in Al Hamichya it contains only a few “innocuous words,” which are not a beracha (see Ginat Veradim ibid.) and do not even include Hashem’s Name.

In your specific case, there was a reason to specifically not have added mehm (even if it had been a bread meal) – the fact that you already davened Ma’ariv, officially ushering in the new day. The Magen Avraham (188:17) says that fundamentally after eating makes one obligated in Birkat Hamazon with mehm, whenever you bentch, the special day should be mentioned. But once ushering in the new day with Ma’ariv, it looks like a contradiction if one makes a recitation that is a throwback to the previous day. Contradictions are problematic, not just unnecessary. There is significant logic to say that this only applies to day changes that have significant halachic consequence, like when Shabbat enters or ends, and not to the end of the day of Rosh Chodesh (see Machatzit Hashekel to 188:17). On the other hand, davening Ma’ariv any day has some halachic significance regarding ending halachot of the previous day (see Rama, Yoreh Deah 196:1). In any case, the Mishna Berura (188:34) clearly states that Ma’ariv of the evening after Rosh Chodesh precludes saying mehm of Rosh Chodesh.

The main halachic issue here is that one is not supposed to look at the kohanim during Birkat Kohanim. The sources begin with the mishna (Megilla 24b) that a kohen with blemishes on his hands must not do Birkat Kohanim because it can cause people to stare at the kohen’s hands. The Yerushalmi (Megilla 4:8) says that this shows that it is forbidden for the congregation to look, irrespective of whether the kohanim have blemishes, because it can cause them to not properly concentrate on the berachot. This is codified by the Rambam (Tefilla 14:7) and the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 128:23). (This concern is best understood according to the opinion that the tzibbur has a mitzva to accept the kohanim’s beracha; see Be’ur Halacha to 128:1; Dvar Avraham I:31.) The Mishna Berura (128:89) says, that since concentration is the problem, one should not be looking anywhere, and that the halacha only precludes extended looking, as only this would impair one’s concentration.

The explanation that most people think of is that it is disrespectful and potentially dangerous to look at a kohen’s hands during Birkat Kohanim because of a special Divine Presence (Shechina) that exists there. Indeed, the gemara (Chagiga 16a) says that doing so could damage one’s vision. The Beit Yosef (OC 128) points out that the Shechina is on the hands only in the Beit Hamikdash, where they would use the Shem Hameforash during Birkat Kohanim, and so our present-day practice of not looking relates only to concentration. (Some kabbalistically oriented sources say that the danger effect still exists – see Da’at Torah to the Shulchan Aruch ibid.) Although we have seen that it should thus be permitted to look casually, the Mishna Berura (ibid.) comments that the minhag is to not look at all as a remembrance of the care taken in the Beit Hamikdash.

In fact, some take further precautions. The Beit Yosef (ibid.) reports a minhag, which is indeed followed broadly today, for each kohen to pull their tallit over his head and even his hands. This prevents the kohanim from being distracted by the people, and the people from being distracted by the kohanim. By the same token, it also prevents seeing the hands, with the Shechina implications.

If this is not enough, there is the minhag you ask about, which is mentioned and encouraged by the Kaf Hachayim (OC 128:142), that members of the tzibbur also cover their heads with a tallit. He says that if one does not cover his eyes with a tallit, he at least should shut his eyes. Some mention (see Piskei Teshuvot 128:55) covering children with a tallit. This is probably more logical if the problem is the Shechina issue as opposed to concentration, as the latter is unlikely to be important for a child. At some point, apparently quite recently and as a grass roots idea, some fathers started putting their hands on their child’s head, as some sort of conduit for the beracha of the kohanim to land well on the children. It could be that this was borrowed from the practice of fathers to put their hands on their children’s heads when blessing them (including with Birkat Kohanim) on Friday night.

We have seen how the minhag you experienced in chutz la’aretz, was an extension of an extension of an extension. It could be that it just did not spread to Israeli communities here as much as abroad. The explanation could be that when Birkat Kohanim is a rare, highly anticipated event, people are more inclined to seek every possible enhancement, but not in Israel, where its frequency fosters a more basic approach.

Now that you live in Eretz Yisrael, we suggest to follow the local practice. However, especially since people do not look around at this time, you may, if you prefer, cover your head during Birkat Kohanim, as this is not divisive.

While the best option (someone else lighting) is unavailable, both of your options are supported by significant but minority opinions.

The gemara (Shabbat 23b) says that one should not light Shabbat candles too early, because it is not clear that it is being done for Shabbat (Rashi ad loc.). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 263:4) rules that this is problematic even after plhm if she does not accept Shabbat at that time and that it cannot be before plhm, which is too early to accept Shabbat (Magen Avraham 261:10). Therefore, the standard assumption of poskim is that it is impossible to fulfill the mitzva of candle lighting before plhm (see Be’ur Halacha to 263:4; Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 43:12: Orchot Shabbat 33:35).

However, it is possible to question this assumption. Firstly, on a certain level, avoiding lighting “too early” may be only l’chatchila (Mishna Berura 263:20 regarding after plhm but well before sunset without accepting Shabbat). While many apply this only after plhm, others say that plhm is a strict cutoff only for ushering in a new day early, not for candle lighting done for Shabbat use (Eretz Tzvi I:103, based on R. Akiva Eiger on Rama, OC 263:4). Second, some Rishonim and poskim allow lighting two hours before nightfall (see Be’ur Halacha ibid.). On the other hand, Orchot Shabbat (35:(83)) says that this is said only within Rabbeinu Tam’s opinion that nightfall is very late.

We can logically add that if the problem before plhm is that it is too early to connect a lighting to Shabbat the situation is different in the summer in places where it is common to accept Shabbat soon after plhm. Would anyone watching you light candles and run to Mincha, followed by Kabbalat Shabbat, think that you did not light for Shabbat?! This is strengthened by the fact that you, as a man, do not accept Shabbat for around a half hour after lighting candles, all year. Furthermore, nowadays virtually the only reason to light candles is for Shabbat. Despite these arguments, I cannot recommend relying on and certainly not making a beracha on a lighting that the consensus of poskim says is ineffective for the formal mitzva.

Your idea of making a beracha later touches on how we view the mitzva of lighting candles. The main purpose of the mitzva is apparently to make a nicer Shabbat atmosphere (see Shabbat 23b; Living the Halachic Process VI, C-17). It is less clear if its halachic nature is the act of lighting the candles with the purpose in mind (see ibid.; compare to Chanuka, based on Shabbat 23a), or the mitzva fulfillment is in receiving the benefit on Shabbat, with technical grounds dictating that one lights earlier. If the latter is correct, then making the beracha at the time one is experiencing the benefit can work (see Divrei Malkiel IV:5; Rambam, Berachot 11:5).

Indeed, a venerable opinion says that one who will be out of the house at the time of lighting can light before leaving and make the beracha upon returning. Most poskim reject the idea (Magen Avraham 263:11; Mishna Berura 263:21) of making a beracha on a light that was already lit, but the opinion is not fully rejected (see Be’ur Halacha to 263:5).

In short, each of your ideas is reasonable from a halachic perspective. On the other hand, as practical Halacha, neither is recommended. My recommendation is to daven Mincha earlier, light candles at plhm, and proceed immediately to Kabbalat Shabbat, where you need not be more than a couple of minutes late. However, if a rav with whom you confer recommends one of your approaches, I have no qualms.

There are two questions – about returning and about protecting the objects. They are, though, quite related.

In the past (Living the Halachic Process, V, I-6), we have brought the question that Acharonim have discussed – whether it is enough for one to inform the owner that his item is available by you, or whether you must actively return it. Regarding the mitzva to return that which he stole, it suffices to tell the victim that he can come get his object (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 367:1). It is unclear whether this is the standard halacha regarding mitzvot of returning or a special dispensation to promote teshuva (see Shach ad loc. 2). There are different possible ways to read the p’sukim (Devarim 22:1-3) in this regard. The more accepted approach is that informing suffices (Pitchei Choshen, Aveida 7:(2)).

Along with the obligation to return, there is an obligation to protect the object until you have succeeded to return it (see Devarim 22:2 and Shulchan Aruch, CM 267:17). If informing him counts as returning, it should also remove the requirement to guard them (see Torat Ha’aveida (Tzabari) 12:11). The main point is that at this point, the item is no longer lost, and therefore its welfare is the owner’s responsibility.

This is in line with the Rama’s opinion (CM 261:4) on aveida mida’at (one who knowingly leaves his object in a precarious situation). Even though he holds that this does not make the object hefker (ownerless), the finder does not have to care for it. Also, one could argue that your yard is not considered a precarious place, as you would not take someone’s property. However, it is still likely in a precarious position regarding protection from the elements.

Nevertheless, in this case, it does not appear clear that all of the items’ owners are aware where their object is. Sometimes the owner did not know the object “flew” over a fence. Especially if we can assume that for example, parents own the family’s balls, if a child kicks the ball over the fence and does not tell them, from the owners’ perspective, it is an aveida. Another scenario is that they originally knew where the item is but procrastinated about getting it until they forgot its whereabouts. Once they forget, it is an aveida (see Bava Metzia 25b).

The gemara (ibid. 26b) says that the positive mitzva begins from the time the finder takes the object. Could it be that if the things are where they fell, you have no obligation? Halachically, in many ways, things that are in one’s property are as if they are in his hand (ibid. 10b). The Ra’avad (Aveida 7:14) says that the fact that the lost item is in the finder’s property creates an obligation of hashavat aveida (in his context, it prevents the finder from claiming it after the owner’s subsequent yeiush). Even Haezel (ad loc.) clarifies that this obligation without moving the object begins only from the time the property owner knows it is in his domain. But from that point, which you are already at, the obligation exists until the loser receives it or finds out about it and can get it.

Therefore, we suggest the following. Be in touch with the neighbors who could own things in your yard. Come to an agreement about their expectations of you. If they all agree, you can leave them where they are, or set them aside in a convenient place for them to claim. Only if (common these days) the people trust each other not to take that which is not theirs (Bava Metzia 27b), we have modern arrangements to more easily share with a group of people what is missing so they can come and claim their lost items.

Each of you has a reasonable claim. We will explore different factors, approaches and gray areas.

Classical libun involves using an agent (usually, water) to remove a substance that is embedded in a fabric. Cleaning that lacks either water or absorbed substance is apt to either only violate a Rabbinic prohibition or, often, be permitted.

One of the test cases is found in Shabbat 147a. The gemara says that one who shakes out his garment on Shabbat violates a Torah prohibition. Rashi explains that this refers to shaking out dirt, and Tosafot says that this could not be libun (due to lack of water – Ritva) but rather it must be talking about shaking out dew. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 302:1) rules like Tosafot, but the Rama cites Rashi’s position, which includes dirt in the prohibition. Sephardi poskim disagree about which opinion to follow (Ohr L’Tzion II:24:1 – stringent; Yalkut Yosef (OC 302:9) – lenient), but the consensus among Ashkenazi poskim is that libun could apply to shaking off dirt (Mishna Berura 302:6).

However, the gemara sets conditions for violating libun in this case: the clothes are black and new, and one is makpid on their cleanliness. This is because a non-classic cleaning is forbidden only when these factors make the cleaning significant enough. The Be’ur Halacha (to 302:1) posits that there are not fully three separate conditions. Rather, when it is black and new, particularness is assumed until it is clearly missing, whereas without those objective factors, only when one is particularly makpid is it forbidden.

Each of the factors needs clarification. Poskim say that black includes other dark colors (see Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 15:28-29). New also likely includes something that “looks new” (ibid.). These qualities are hard to quantify, but note that, generally, most people save their best-looking clothing for Shabbat. The degree of hakpada is also elusive. Orchot Shabbat (13:25) describes it as whether one will go out with it without cleaning (what level of alternative existing is unclear.) Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (ibid.) differs slightly – he would not put it on dirty. Perhaps there is a machloket if he would not choose to wear it but he would not remove it once on. He adds that if one is makpid only because of Shabbat’s honor, that is not called makpid.

Another factor relates to the modes of cleaning. Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata (ibid.) says that even when it is permitted based on the above parameters, that is to bang it softly, not to shake vigorously or hit hard with a hand. In the context of removing a clump of mud (Shulchan Aruch, OC 302:7), the Be’ur Halacha (ibid.) says that it is permitted when a mark of dirt remains. He similarly argues (to 302:1) that the prohibition of shaking off dirt when one is makpid is only when it becomes totally clean. Some argue that in the standard case, a mark from dirt/dust will remain and yet it is still forbidden (see Dovev Meisharim I:61; Halichot Shabbat (Lintzer) VIII:11).

A factor that is difficult to decide is whether the threshold of hakdpada is different for the clothes’ owner and the person who is cleaning (i.e., your case). The Be’ur Halacha (ibid.) leaves it as an unanswered question whether that is considered makpid. It is also unclear if your husband is not personally makpid but defers to you – does that turn him into makpid?

In summary, there are many opinions and factors with gray areas, and so both your claim and your husband’s claim each have a reasonable basis. If you do this often, it is even possible that sometimes it is permitted and sometimes not. What your policy should be in the future is a good question that we cannot solve unequivocally.

Rav Yehuda (Bava Metzia 75b) forbids lending money without witnesses, as a violation of lifnei iver, causing the borrower to sin if he denies owing the money. Reish Lakish says that the lender brings curse upon himself, as people may suspect him of fabricating the loan. The Rambam (Malveh 2:7) and Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 70:1) cite the prohibition and curse and apply them (based on a story in the gemara) even to a borrower who is a talmid chacham. They permit a loan only with witnesses, collateral, or, preferably, a contract. So, your understanding appears correct.

Your observation, that few good Jews are careful about this prohibition, is also documented for hundreds of years by Acharonim, some of whom offer explanations, which they admit do not fit well with the Rambam/Shulchan Aruch. Following are some unlikely reasons for leniency compiled in Tzitz Eliezer (VII:47) and Yabia Omer (VII, CM 7): 1. Nowadays we know whom we can trust; 2. The gemara discusses frequent lenders. 3. The gemara discusses a rich person, regarding whom borrowers may rationalize not paying. 4. It is permitted when the restriction impacts one’s business; 5. The oath instituted after Rav Yehuda’s time for one who denies a loan, prevents lying.

However, what I believe is the most important reason for leniency is that it is rare for classical problem of lifnei iver to exist here. A basic rule of lifnei iver is that it does not apply if there a good chance one’s counterpart will not sin as feared (Avoda Zara 15b). The gemara also says that people rarely simply deny borrowing money (Bava Metzia 3a; see Erech Shay to Shulchan Aruch ibid.). This helps explain the following opinions: 1. Lifnei iver applies here only on the level of midat chasidut (Ritva, Megilla 28a); 2. Reish Lakish holds there is only a curse (if the lender persists to claim after denial) and no lifnei iver (Pilpula Charifta to Bava Metzia 75b); 3. The lifnei iver element does not apply to people who are clearly honest (Bach, CM 70).

Even within the strict opinions, we find practical ideas to allow permission. The Rambam and Shulchan Aruch, without a known Talmudic source, allow lending based on collateral alone. The Maggid Mishneh says this solves the problem of not having witnesses. Since they do not state that the collateral must cover the entire loan principal, it follows that classical poskim suffice with a partial solution.

The case for leniency is bolstered by a factor that is probably more prevalent in recent times than in ancient ones. It is likely insulting to a borrower to require a loan contract for a moderate amount of money. If everyone followed the gemara, borrowers could hardly be insulted by the lender’s requiring contracts or witnesses. However, since in practice, borrowers rarely ask for them and given the mitzva to lend money while maintaining the borrower’s dignity (see Shemot 22:24), the mandates impinge on each other. (See Minchat Shlomo, I:35 regarding “collateral damage” from stringency on lifnei iver). On the other hand, it is difficult to allow one to ignore a codified halacha. We therefore suggest plans to keep the halacha while maintaining dignity.

If one lends a small amount of money, have in mind that if the borrower forgets about it, to turn the money into a present or tzedaka (see Ketubot 67b regarding about loans becoming presents). If the loan is too large to be willing to waive, in our times, it is standard to naturally have documentation, i.e., checks and bank transfers. According to most approaches (see Yabia Omer ibid.), witnesses did not fully prevent the borrower from refusing to pay, but were used to jog his memory or make it difficult not to pay. Checks and bank transfers should suffice for this end, especially if one writes “loan” on the memo line, which is not insulting.

We start with the possibility you ended off with “Baruch ata … al hamichya v’al hapeirot (peiroteha in Israel).” As a rule, the determinant of a beracha’s efficacy is how it is completed (Berachot 12a). Therefore, presumably with such an ending, you would have been yotzei. However, some poskim say that in this case, it is unclear if fixing this long beracha only at its end will remedy the lacking opening (see Ot Hi L’olam vol. I, p. 35a; Petach Had’vir 208:20). Almost all poskim rule (see ibid.; V’zot Haberacha, p. 47) that after the fact, one should assume he was yotzei due to the proper ending, and not make another beracha on what he left out from the first beracha’s opening, as it would be l’vatala if he was previously yotzei.

Because of the doubt involved, some poskim recommend your second option – obviate the question by sticking to a simple Al Hamichya, and do Al Ha’etz afterward (ibid.). It is true that one is required to incorporate both elements that require a beracha in one beracha acharona (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 208:12). Presumably, splitting them into two berachot acharonot without justification makes the second one a beracha she’eina tzricha. However, a major rule in beracha she’eina tzricha is that if the ostensibly extra beracha is needed to avoid a halachic doubt, it is no longer unnecessary (see Kaf Hachayim, OC 208:82). Still, though, if there is an easy alternative to obviate the need for an extra beracha, we should use it.

The Maharshag (I:53, cited and accepted by Piskei Teshuvot 208:19) indeed has the following simple solution, if caught in time. Go back to the place of the omission, fix it, and continue from there. Admittedly, after “… rachem na Hashem Elokeinu,” backing up means repeating Hashem’s Name. However, even unnecessarily saying Hashem’s Name in the midst of a long beracha is not nearly as problematic as saying Hashem’s Name in what turns out to be a beracha l’vatala. For example, even though it is not critical to say Al Hanisim, if one remembered before he finishes the beracha, he goes back to say it (Shulchan Aruch, OC 682:1), even though this means that he repeats part of the beracha, including Hashem’s Name.  (See also Ginot Veradim (I:28) regarding R’tzei in bentching at seuda shlishit after nightfall.) According to the Maharshag, it is too late to go back only if he has said Hashem’s Name at the beracha’s conclusion.

The Petach Had’vir (208:15, inspired by his understanding of the Magen Avraham 59:1) has a complicated explanation why it is too late to attach one’s addition of that which he left out to the opening of the beracha with Hashem’s Name. Therefore, he reasons that the best remaining option is to keep the me’ein shalosh focused on the cake and make later on the dates. While the Sdei Chemed (vol. VI, p. 319) and V’zot Haberacha (ibid.) endorse his basic approach, they discuss cases where he did not fix the beracha until close to the end of the beracha (confirmed by a phone call I had with the author of V’zot Haberacha), which might be what makes it improper to go back to the beginning. However, the Petach Had’vir’s opposition is even from the “middle” of the beracha.

While it is difficult for me to decide between the opinions in this machloket Acharonim, the Maharshag’s approach seems in line with more mainstream halachic rules. Therefore, I would recommend going back to the place of the omission unless he has said Hashem’s Name at the end of the beracha. Apparently, the Petach Had’vir does not consider this a hefsek, and he agrees that one can assume he was yotzei even if we only count the inclusion of al hapeirot at the end.             

You have a sharp grandchild, and it is a pleasure to see how well he did regarding the laws of Shabbat.

One can violate Shabbat by an animal performance of “chillul Shabbat” in two ways. If one causes an animal to do any melacha (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 27:2), he violates the prohibition of mechamer, as one of the p’sukim (Shemot 20:10) that forbids doing melacha mentions “and your animal” (Shabbat 153b). While your grandson’s (=gs) plan was close, it appears that this line was not crossed because gs only set up a situation in which the dog “decided” to lunge for something, and gs did not physically lead him or command him to do the melacha (see Orchot Shabbat 31:(8)).

The other violation is when one allows his own animal to do melacha even if he was not involved or even around when it happened (shevitat beheima = sb). This is likely derived from Shemot 23:12 – “in order that [your animal] will rest” (see Mechilta ad loc.). While most of the halachic sources deal with the common use of animals, carrying a load (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 305), it applies to all melachot. So, we need to identify grounds for leniency.

If a person reached for something and accidentally switched off a light, it would be a case of “mitasek” in the melacha (he did not intend to do the physical action that came out), and is exempt from a korban (Kritot 19b). There is a broad discussion over the extent there was an act of violation of Shabbat with reduced consequences, or no act of melacha at all (see Shut R. Akiva Eiger, I:8), and so perhaps the dog did not do melacha. However, paradoxically, an animal is worse than a human here. Because an animal never acts with da’at (halachically recognized intent), there is no exemption of mitasek (see Yalkut Yosef XIV, p. 51; Na’ot Mordechai XIII, p. 63). The only consideration is when the human side of a shevitat beheima situation was mitasek (see ibid.), but here gs was aiming for the “melacha outcome.”

The possible grounds for leniency in gs’s trick relate to the rule that when an action is forbidden only Rabbinically, sb does not apply to it (Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 27:4). Here, it may be Rabbinic for a few reasons. First, our orientation is that turning on and off all but incandescent lights is only a Rabbinic prohibition (analysis is beyond our scope). Second, shutting off a light is not positive benefit from the melacha (which exists when we extinguish to use the charcoal produced – see discussion in Yabia Omer, I, OC 31). Therefore, the situation is a melacha she’eina tzricha l’gufa (=mshetlg), which is forbidden only Rabbinically. On the other hand, some Rabbinic prohibitions are foirbidden in sb (see Mishna Berura 305:43). It is particularly likely that mshetlg, which is subjective and related to context more than the action itself, might not weaken the melacha enough to eliminate the prohibition of sb.

We mentioned that sb applies only to one’s own animal. It is possible that the dog is owned by gs’s father, not gs, even if the dog is for gs’ enjoyment (we will not get into the monetary law or the sociology behind this). If so, it would not be gs’ violation if the dog did forbidden melacha. On the other hand, if the father owns it, it is his responsibility to ensure that the dog does not do melacha. Therefore, if the kulot above do not work, the father is required to stop his son, whether immediately if he was there, or when he finds out about it, he must tell gs not to create an ongoing phenomenon

In short, there is a fair chance that gs did nothing wrong when he “choreographed” his dog shutting off a light, particularly if the light was not incandescent. We would not, though, recommend making a practice of using what we could call a “Shabbos dog.” At the least, it could lead to mistakes.

Your concern has some basis, but we will see that it is misplaced.

The general rule is that mitzvot of recitation, even those that can be done in any language (see list in mishna, Sota 32a), require the reciter to understand the language (Mishna Berura 62:3). However, if he is reciting in lashon hakodesh (biblical/rabbinic Hebrew), then one does not need to understand it (ibid.). Although one might thus think that your concern lacks merit, the Magen Avraham (489:2) says: “If he does not understand lashon hakodesh and counted in lashon hakodesh, he did not fulfill his mitzva, as he did not know what he counted, and this is not counting; so it seems to me.” The Mishna Berura (489:5) accepts this ruling.

Rav Yaakov Emden (Mor U’ketzia to Magen Avraham ibid.) disagrees, and his opinion is cited, with different levels of acceptance, by the Birkei Yosef (489:7), Sha’arei Teshuva (489:3), and Kaf Hachayim (489:20). He bases himself on Tosafot (Sota 32a), who implies that in the list of recitations in that mishna, they can be done in languages other than lashon hakodesh only if one understands them, implying that comprehension is not needed in lashon hakodesh. But the Mishna Berura (Sha’ar Hatziyun 489:6) argues that this misses the point, as sefirat ha’omer is not on the list, and the Magen Avraham was positing that it is a unique mitzva, as I will explain in my words. Sefirat ha’omer is not fundamentally a mitzva of recitation, but of cognitive counting, just with an additional condition of vocalization. If one parrots the words of the sefira, he has not fulfilled the spirit or the letter of the law. This dovetails with the opinions that one who is unsure of the day of omer cannot count multiple times to cover his bases (see Living the Halachic Process II, D-18); guessing is not counting.

If our explanation of the Magen Avraham is correct, it is unlikely there should be concern in your case. It is safe to assume that the chazan knows what day of the omer it is and that he is expressing that with the words he is saying, just that he might not know how the words correspond to the content. In that case, he is cognitively counting and regarding the recitation requirement, it is valid in lashon hakodesh even without specific understanding of the words. The Maharil Diskin (Kuntras Acharon 55) indeed assumes that the Magen Avraham agrees in such a case. Admittedly, apparently not all Acharonim make this distinction within the Magen Avraham (see Kaf Hachayim 489:20), and it is unclear what level of coordination between words and content is required. The Maharil Diskin also says that the matter is more complicated during the period of counting weeks also, as, if there are two countings, one might need to know with which words he is accomplishing each counting.

On a practical basis, your concern is based on the assumption that people are being yotzei their sefira through the chazan, which is actually not advisable. There is a machloket Acharonim whether one can fulfill sefirat ha’omer by listening to someone else’s count, and the minhag is not to rely on others (Mishna Berura 489:5). Even if one missed a day of counting and needs to rely on the “leader” due to the beracha, he should count himself, and is yotzei only with the other’s beracha preceding his counting. Regarding the beracha, the rule that it is valid in lashon hakodesh without understanding applies. Even if one does rely on the chazan for the whole thing, halachic logic dictates that if the listener understands the words, it should not matter that the reciter does not (beyond our scope).

So, while it is wonderful if a rabbi is able to help anyone whose lack of understanding endangers his fulfillment of sefirat ha’omer, it is not a specific issue if that person “leads the tzibbur.”

The gemara (Sanhedrin 47b) discusses the permissibility of using a grave and/or the material it was made of, for other purposes. In that context, the gemara distinguishes between a “grave that was built,” which becomes forbidden, and a “grave of earth itself,” which remains permitted, because one cannot make the ground forbidden. The Tur cites a machloket on the parameters of a built grave. R. Yeshaya reasons that since, generally, material that was detached from the ground and then becomes attached keeps the status of a detached object, the earth that was dug up and then placed back to form the grave is forbidden. The Rosh points out that the gemara implies that a standard grave, which is dug up from the ground, does not become forbidden, and he therefore reasons that the problem is only for mausoleum-type burial. One could understand that according to R. Yeshaya, it would be forbidden to reuse the gravesite, since much of it is soil was removed and returned, whereas the Rosh would permit it. It is not fully clear which opinion is primary as practical halacha (see Shulchan Aruch and Rama, Yoreh Deah 364:1; ibid. 363:3, 5; Da’at Kohen 207).

However, there are other grounds for leniency. The Rashba (Shut I:537) says that the prohibition on grave-related matters is on the benefit of those who are living, who are obligated in mitzvot, and that live people do not halachically benefit from the burial of the deceased.  While the burial itself is not benefit for live people, as the fulfillment of mitzvot (i.e., to bury a deceased) is not halachically considered forbidden benefit, Acharonim wrestle with the fact that money is usually involved in the process. Some see it as a problem for the cemetery owners to sell the used grave, and thereby receive money for it (see Gesher Hachayim II, 4:3). Rav Kook (Da’at Kohen 202) recommends having the sellers stipulate that they are selling the part of the land that was not dug up and returned, but it is not unanimous that this works (see Gesher Hachayim ibid.). Shevet Sofer (YD 104) says that in a situation in which the inheritors would have had to pay for a burial spot, if they would receive the already used grave for free, this saving of money would be forbidden benefit.

The above complications apply only to things that were brought from elsewhere (like bricks and boards), and perhaps even the earth that was taken off and returned (see Rama ibid.). Therefore, it is best not to reuse these materials when using the plot (i.e., that which is beneath and to the sides of the coffin) (Bemareh Habazak III:71).

The matter is arguably more lenient when those who were exhumed were buried there with the intention that this would occur, as then the burial might not cause permanent prohibitions after the deceased is removed (see Pitchei Teshuva, YD 363:6). However, the gemara (Sanhedrin 48a) implies that if preparations were made for the use of the deceased [after his death – Bemareh Habazak ibid.] then even if the burial itself was done with the intention for him to remain temporarily, the prohibition continues after the exhumation (see Shulchan Aruch, YD 364:1). Since it appears that you do know about the history of the burials, we will not get into further details on the matter.

There is also a monetary or quasi-monetary matter of making sure that the first “owner” of the grave has no outstanding issues with the cemetery. Gesher Hachayim (ibid.) demonstrates why the inheritors of the deceased have halachic authority to agree to end any claims to the ground that could cause a problem.