ASK THE RABBI

Presumably the tzedaka part is the difference between what she pays and what she would pay (if tzedaka was not an issue) for this worker under these circumstances.

There are many opinions on many of these type of questions, and one has the right to be lenient as the practice is not fully binding and is intended for those who can afford it. However, since you do not differentiate, we will give you the standard rulings (according to our understanding).

Whatever gift is liquid and can be used for whatever the recipient wants is titheable. Cars and a (grand)parents cash payment to help cover their grandchild's college tuition are exempt.

Investements - when one realizes the investment, try to figure out if their are real gains (after adjusting for inflation) and try to approximate the tithe at that time.

Retirement accounts - take out the tithe when receiving the money (assuming one can afford it at that time).

You should try to estimate how much a ticket like that would go for if it were not for a charity. Whatever you pay beyond that, can be taken from maaser.

For sure, the full amount counts. It is rare to give donations where there are not costs in some form and usually there is no way to avoid or to calculate how much. In general, it is how much you spend on it. For example, you can count toward maaser the stamp and envelope (if you still send that way), even if I don't know I would suggest being that exacting.

Yes, it can, assuming that the assistance is provided to allow the son to subsist according to his needs and not above them. Supporting poor people occupied in Torah study is one of the classic uses of maaser kesafim, and one's mitzva towards close relatives has priority of that which exists toward others. 

If the salary was a certain and expected thing for someone in his job, and he cannot make up the hours at another time, then we would say yes, it does count. We would not want to say that anyone who does chesed can count the time as one that he could have been working on X, Y, and Z. In other words, a loss counts; not gaining does not. Sometimes it is difficult to determine which case fits into which category. 

This is a case where halachic intuition screams from the outset that it must be permitted to use ma’aser money, as the money is being given with the intention to help Reuven. We now aim to provide specific reasons why the intuition is indeed correct.

We begin with a simple halacha. After a guarantor has, based on the agreed terms, paid the loan back instead of the borrower, the borrower is required to reimburse him (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 130:1). This halacha impacts on our question in two ways. First, on the practical level, the donors are extricating Reuven from debt, whether you view it as the present debt to the gemach, or the future one to the arev.

Perhaps more significantly, the above and other halachot are instructive in understanding the nature of the mutual obligations when a borrower is unable to pay and an arev is called on to do so. It is not that the arev turns into the borrower, as the borrower remains obligated. Therefore, if the donors pay, they will be paying and relieving Reuven’s debt. The fact that practically this will benefit Shimon greatly does not cancel the tzedaka toward Reuven.

Under certain circumstances, there are additional reasons. Let’s assume Shimon took the responsibility as a chesed (not for some personal gain) and planned that if Reuven would be unable to pay, he would count his payment of the loan as tzedaka/ma’aser, as he may (see Tzedaka U’mishpat 5:(50)). If so, if the new donors relieve Shimon of paying, they are saving money for Shimon’s ma’aser fund, which is in effect a donation to it. While we usually thinking of giving our ma’aser kesafim to poor individuals or official NPOs, one can give (or, as in the case, give, in effect) his ma’aser money to someone else’s ma’aser fund. Thus, even if one views it (incorrectly, in our opinion, as above) as giving money on behalf of Shimon, it could still be considered giving it to his ma’aser fund.

Another way of looking at the donation as a valid use of ma’aser is to simply look at the donors’ actions as replacing the existing guarantor. While one could claim that this was an unnecessary gesture, as Shimon does not need to be replaced, in the final analysis, the donors are paying for Reuven, as Shimon had been prepared to do. So if, as we posited, Shimon could consider his payment as a legitimate tzedaka outlay (even though he originally hoped not to), certainly the new donors, who are acting in at least as altruistic a manner as Shimon, can consider it such.

Finally, it may be possible to give the money as a donation to the shul’s gemach, as they are actually giving it, just doing so on condition that the gemach will let their friend “off the hook.” This is not far-fetched. After all, the gemach is not interested, despite the requirement of an arev, in forcing payment from one with extreme difficulty paying. Rather, they are concerned that if they let people off too lightly, they will lose the ability to continue lending to others in the future. The new donors are assuring the gemach that they can forgive Reuven because the donors are replenishing their resources commensurately.

You could look at it as income. You can also look at it as it turning out that you paid less taxes than was expected during withholding, and therefore that retroactively you had more net income in the previous year than you thought and thus did not give enough maaser (which is fine).

Either way of analyzing it, it is proper to give 10% of the refund in the next "maaser period." If you have difficulty giving a full maaser, there is room to look for various leniencies and you can be back in touch with us.

Refuah shleima! It is important to realize the nature of the practice of ma’aser kesafim. Tzedaka is a mitzva from the Torah, but its practical parameters are hard to define and quantify. Maa’ser kesafim gives a moderately ambitious (depending on a person’s circumstances) tzedaka formula (compare Rambam, Matanot Ani’im 7:1 and ibid. 5). In general, there are three opinions as to whether the practice of ma’aser kesafim is a mitzva from the Torah (Tosafot, Taanit 9a), a Rabbinic obligation (Maharil 54; Taz, Yoreh Deah 331:32), or a proper practice for one to accept (Bach, cited Taz ibid.; Shut Chatam Sofer, Yoreh Deah 231). The latter is the stronger possibility.

Most poskim rule that if one receives money as a gift and has freedom to use it as he likes, he is obligated in ma’aser kesafim (see Chikrei Lev, Yoreh Deah III:102). If the money is earmarked for a certain purpose, it is as if he received that matter as a present, and, according to many, he is exempt (see Tzedaka U’mishpat 5:(26)), especially if giving ma’aser kesafim will effectively preclude his obtaining that matter.

In your case, on the one hand, you can use the money for whatever you wish. However, medical expenses are primarily necessities one cannot reasonably ignore. One can suggest a proof that ma’aser kesafim does not apply to damage payment’s that relate to medical expenses (=ripuy). Ripuy is intended and calculated so that medical expenses should not harm the victim’s financial situation. It is conceptually optimal for the damager to directly arrange medical services for the victim rather than give an estimated lump sum of money for past and future expenses (Bava Kama 85a). Lump sum payments, when done, are a matter of practicality and convenience. If one had to give ma’aser on those payments, he would sustain a net 10% loss, and we do not find halachot of adding 10% to ripuy to cover the ma’aser. (One can deflect the proof on technical grounds, arguing that the obligation to pay damages is a Torah law, which does not take the victim’s worthy tzedaka practices into account, especially assuming they are Rabbinically-mandated or less. We would counter that the practice of ma’aser kesafim/tzedaka does consider the fact that ripuy is not general profits but necessarily earmarked payment, which it would be wrong to “tax.”

In most cases, it is possible to at least approximate the breakup of the elements of large lump sum payments based on an itemized insurance claim or a court or arbitrator’s ruling). Major injuries can include loss of income, which should (halachically and legally) be compensated for, and here, the halachic logic is different. Since such payments are in place of earnings that that are presumed to be lost, this element should be treated as income, which is subject to ma’aser kesafim.

We explained in Living the Halachic Process, vol. I, F-5 that people who cannot afford to give significant amounts of tzedaka should not do so, as their obligations to their families come first. While some injured people have no financial worries, many in this situation should consider their present and future financial outlook. Considering we do not know your situation, we will share our suggestion to the average person receiving large lump-sum damage payments. Since the payments are planned for long-term use, it is logical to set up a fund to be invested, with a certain amount being freed periodically. If you take that approach (we are not giving financial advice), it is fine to give any appropriate ma’aser only from the periodic payments (minus the portion that relates to medical or other injury related expenses. Do not give from the lump sum in the beginning. Thereby, as time goes by, you can see whether you will be able to give full ma’aser kesafim or the extent to which you will be able to fulfill the wonderful mitzva of tzedaka.

There are two major channels for use of ma’aser funds. The classic one is to help provide essentials for the poor (Ahavat Chesed II:19). Another is to enable the fulfillment of mitzvot. There appears to be a machloket if ma’aser money can be used for mitzvot (see Rama, Yoreh Deah 249:1; Shach ad loc. 3). In practice, only if the donor is not required to finance the mitzva is he allowed to use ma’aser funds (see Beitza 19b).

It is a complicated question whether the parents are able to count their children’s tuition toward ma’aser since it is their obligation to educate their children (see Igrot Moshe, YD II 113). Regarding Torah education, it is likely permitted after bar mitzva (Tzedaka U’mishpat 6:14). Without getting into a discussion about what the Torah considers the ideal secular education, schooling is generally included in the positive matter of teaching a child a profession, and the obligation is on the father alone (see Kiddushin 29a). It is unclear to what extent this would be considered like a classic mitzva, like teaching Torah, which would justify one using his ma’aser money on it. However, if due to lack of funds, the child would be forced to go to public school unless someone pays his day school tuition, then the secular tuition, of boys or girls, can be taken from tzedaka funds, whether from the community or from grandparents’ ma’aser, as this is a critical mitzva. This could apply to a college education in the framework of a makom Torah as well.

Grandfathers have a mitzva to teach Torah to their son’s sons (see Rambam, Talmud Torah 1:2). It is unclear whether this includes paying for yeshiva (see Kesef Mishneh, Talmud Torah 1:2; Igrot Moshe YD II, 110), but the Shach (YD 245:1) and Shulchan Aruch Harav (Talmud Torah 1:8) assume that he is obligated. Thus, a son’s son’s Torah education before bar mitzva might not be able to be taken from ma’aser.

The way to justify using ma’aser funds for a grandchild’s college education is to focus on his parents’ needs. If from one’s child’s perspective, he needs to provide a college education that he cannot afford, then that middle generation could be considered poor for such matters (poor is whoever cannot afford that which is subjectively considered a necessity in his healthy milieu – Ketubot 67b). The needs of a close relative are a tzedaka precedence compared to people with less connection (Shulchan Aruch, YD 251:3). While it is possible that one who can afford to support his poor parents cannot use ma’aser for that purpose (see Shulchan Aruch and Rama, YD 240:5), one may give ma’aser money to a son who should normally be financially independent (Tzedaka U’mishpat 6:4).

Now we present crucial questions you need to answer yourself. Is your child unable to afford his children’s education? To what extent is the planned education a necessity (e.g., they want their son to go an expensive university, which might not improve his future significantly compared to a cheaper alternative)? Setting up a 529 fund might complicate the answers to these questions, as one may not know when putting the money aside what the situation will be when it will be time to use it (it is difficult to reassign the funds later).

Your question is general, as will be the focus of our answer. Realize that details can make a big difference. 

Pledges of a gift can obligate on various tracks. One follows rules of monetary laws: Only after a kinyan (act of finalization) to obligate himself or transfer an item can the gift be enforced. However, if one asserts that he will give his friend a modest present, he has a halachically recognized moral obligation to do so (Bava Metzia 49a). When the intended recipient is poor, the moral obligation exists even for a significant present (Rama, Choshen Mishpat 243:2). In that case, the basis of the moral obligation is “religious,” under the laws of oaths (nedarim) (Yerushalmi, Bava Metzia 4:2; Shut Harama 47). Indeed the idea of nidrei tzedaka is derived (Nedarim 7a) from a pasuk on oaths (Devarim 23:24). Jewish schools that promote Torah values and observance are considered a proper recipient of tzedaka funds (see our article of Va’eira 80).   

Each element has rules as to when it applies and why a pledge might not be binding. When one becomes obligated based on neder, he can often (see one of the exceptions in Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 228:21) remove the neder with hatarat nedarim – he professes regret about having made the oath, and the assembled “court” can uproot it. The neder part of a pledge to tzedaka can similarly be undone (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 258:6); the process is called sh’eila. However, the fact that this neder is for the direct benefit of the worthy recipient, and thus backing out erases his rights, impacts in a few ways. For one, once the donation reaches the gabbai, the pledge cannot be undone (ibid. see Arachin 6a). This largely parallels the rules of kinyan, as the gabbai is considered “the hands of the poor” (see Tosafot ad loc.; Bava Kama 36b). Also, while she’ila can work if done, poskim warn not to agree to nullify the pledge (Shut Haradbaz IV:134; Pitchei Teshuva, YD 258:8). However, this idea does not totally shut the door to undoing the vow. In the parallel discussion of nidrei hekdesh, the Shulchan Aruch and Rama (YD 203:4) say that one should do hatarat nedarim only in the case of dochak (roughly, pressure or difficulty). Therefore, for example, if a rich person pledged a large donation and before giving it, he lost his wealth to the point that it is not feasible to follow through, there are grounds for sh’eila.

Another scenario in which a pledge does not have to be fulfilled is when it was based on a mistake (ta’ut or shegaga). The concept that ta’ut nullifies obligations/agreements applies both to monetary matters and to nedarim (see Shulchan Aruch, YD 232:6). In such cases, hatara is not even necessary. It is not always clear when the mistake is definite or significant enough to void the obligations. One of the cases in the Rama (ibid.) is a slip of the tongue regarding currency (e.g., stated $1,000 when he meant 1,000 NIS). The Chatam Sofer (Shut YD 237) talks about a more subtle case – the donor thought the recipient’s needs were well beyond their true level. The Shvut Yaakov (I:72) discusses one who promised to support a group of ostensibly righteous Torah learners, and it turned out that that many of them were far from righteous. He demonstrates that in principle this is a ta’ut, but in practice one should be cautious before reneging. The two latter sources both suggested being on the safe side by doing hatara even in cases in which they should not need it. Tzedaka U’mishpat 4:76 discusses at length cases of ongoing commitments in which over time things changed for the recipient (e.g., became rich, died) that change the rationale for the donation.

In summary, a pledge to a Jewish school is generally binding, but practically there may be reasons why it is not. In an actual case, one should carefully discuss the specific merits with a rabbi who can help put the facts and the halacha in proper perspective.

Indeed, the standard ruling is that in most cases, cash gifts are subject to giving mk (see Tzedaka U’mishpat 5:5).

 The basic question, whether one maintains a responsibility to take mk on “income” from which he did not take at the appropriate time, arises in different ways. For one who never gave ma’aser, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 249:1, based on Yerushalmi Peah 1:1) prescribes: “The first year, from the principle, subsequently … from what he earned every year.” (The Shulchan Aruch discusses a fifth, the maximum rate of giving tzedaka, but the same is true for those who give the “average rate” of mk (Shach ad loc. 2).) Thus, whatever remains in liquid accounts, no matter how he received the funds, would be tithed with the principle, and what was spent is “water under the bridge.”

This is not a full proof that we do not look back to the past, especially if we consider the likely origin of mk. While some view it as a Torah-level law (see Tosafot, Ta’anit 9a), most hold that it is only a Rabbinic requirement and, more likely, non-binding advice on how to properly fulfill the mitzva of giving tzedaka (see Pitchei Teshuva, YD 331:12). When one accepts the practice, it becomes an obligation (ibid.), and it makes sense that it starts with the aforementioned clean-the-slate system.

What happens if one who was already practicing mk failed to tithe some income? The Tashbetz (II:131), focusing on money that had been spent, compares this to one who ate food slated to be given to a kohen or the poor. The gemara (Chulin 130b) says that in such a case, he is not required to pay because there is no specific recipient with rights, and it is only an act of the righteous to do so. Here too, once the money is spent, one need not donate money in its place.

The K’tzot Hachoshen (212:6) views mk differently. He argues that unlike produce to be donated, which applies to specific objects, mk is a matter of accounting how much to give, from any asset. The obligation cannot be “eaten,” and there seems no reason for it to disappear over time.

Tzedaka U’mishpat (5:14) cites both opinions without a clear preference. It is difficult to understand the Tashbetz’s logic, as indeed: why should the obligation disappear? Also, when would this occur? Perhaps, one question answers the other.

Poskim discuss making mk calculations at given intervals, which is important according to our ruling that expenses and losses are deducted from profits (Chavot Yair 224). So one needs a cutoff point to know which losses can be deducted from which profits (ibid.). The Noda B’yehuda (II, YD 198) demonstrates that the relevant pasuk and the halacha we cited from the Shulchan Aruch (YD 249:1) hint at a year as a likely mk-calculation period, and the Chavot Yair (ibid.) posits that erev Rosh Hashana is a logical time to do so. Once there is an idea of a periodic accounting, the Tashbetz can view whatever was passed over at that time as relegated to history.

Still, there are several reasons for you to give mk on the past: The K’tzot Hachoshen is likely correct. The Tashbetz says it is praiseworthy to give and you seem interested to do so. If you have not yet spent the money, the Tashbetz might not apply.

As far as estimating amounts, halachic logic would have it that it suffices to give only that which you know you “owe” (Shevet Halevi V:133 disagrees). After all, mk is likely Rabbinic or less and when you accepted upon yourself, you may/should have considered (which is impactful - see Shut Chatam Sofer, YD 231) that you would sometimes forget income and do not want to be liable for what you do not remember. (Many are also more stringent in the system of calculating than may be necessary.) On the other hand, those who can afford to give tzedaka generously are promised reward (see Ta’anit 9a).

Many factors impact this question, so it is difficult to rule on all sets of circumstances. After mapping out the factors, your friend may be able to see if his question is already answered or whether he needs to provide additional details.

Our initial focus is on the impact of the commitment’s charitable context. (A hora’at keva (=hokv) to give a gift to a not needy person would not normally be binding – discussion is beyond our scope.) Oral commitments to donate to the Beit Hamikdash (Kiddushin 28b) or to tzedaka (Rosh Hashana 6a) are binding, and Rishonim disagree whether this is only for verbalizations or even for a clear intention to give tzedaka. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 212:8) apparently says it is not binding, and the Rama (Yoreh Deah 258:13) rules that it is. Some say there must be a basic oral commitment, in which case intent can determine its extent (Pitchei Teshuva ad loc. 15). While there is a machloket whether, according to the lenient opinion, writing is as effective as speech (Kol Nidrei 61:22), writing a check or a hokv may lack the right formulation to count (ibid.). On the other hand, perhaps besides writing the hokv, your friend also made an oral commitment. Therefore, there may or may not have been the building block of a binding commitment.

The above applies to a hokv for a set number of charges. However, for an open-ended one, since few people would commit to a totally open-ended period of payment, the intent is usually to give until he stops it, which he can then do. The rule that one cannot take back that which he gave to a gabbai tzedaka (Arachin 6a) does not apply to a hokv for future payment.

The reason for a change of heart can make a difference. If one feels the organization deceived him (it might be difficult to ascertain), that at times could nullify the tzedaka commitment. If your friend’s ability to donate deteriorated over time, this could be grounds for undoing the commitment with sh’eila (a form of hatarat nedarim) (see Kol Nidrei 9:7).

Another important question is what will happen with the “saved” money. There is a machloket whether one is allowed to switch the recipient from one ani to another; the matter is more lenient regarding an undefined group of recipients (Tzedaka U’mishpat 9:1). It is not clear how to view many contemporary tzedaka organizations (ibid. (4)).

A fine NPO which is not dedicated to tzedaka (i.e., the poor) but for other mitzvot purposes, likely lacks certain privileges of tzedaka. There is a machloket whether the latter can be taken from ma’aser kesafim (see Rama, YD 249:1 and Shach ad loc.), although the minhag is clearly to allow it. In our context, it is possible that, for a mitzva organization, the level of obligation based on an oral commitment and certainly based on a thought, as well as the ability to change the recipient from one organization to another parallel one, is not as it is for one of tzedaka.

If hokv draws from a tzedaka account rather than your friend’s regular account, then your friend was not acting as a donor but as the gabbai of a tzedaka fund, who has latitude in the matter without concern for neder (Tzedaka U’mishpat 9:(3))). As a step to combine with other reasons for leniency, while we do not usually allow people to get out of the promise of tzedaka with sh’eila, it may be okay in some of the discussed borderline cases.

Even with room for leniency about binding commitment, regarding proper behavior, there are often moral expectations to keep one’s word even in non-tzedaka contexts and in the absence of a binding kinyan (see Bava Metzia 49a). Therefore, in many of these cases, even when one is not fully obligated, he should still try to keep his word, including by not ending a hokv before its time, without very good reason (see Pri Yitzchak I:51).

If you give more details, we can give a more precise answer.