ASK THE RABBI

1.         Kohanim should not enter [cemeteries], even the burial places of our Sages, as in brought in the Pitchei Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah 372, sif katan 20.

2.         Regarding Kever Rachel, there is a tradition ascribed to Rabbi Yitzchak Alafia that the monument was built in such a way that it would be permissible for Kohanim to enter. Cf. Tzitz Eliezer, volume 15, siman 68; volume 16, siman 18. Likewise, many rule this way.

3.         Regarding Maarat HaMachpelah, there is a debate both from a technical point of view and from a halachic viewpoint. Since visiting the burial places of our tradition is not obligatory, but rather a fine custom, a Kohein should not be lenient and cause himself to possibly violate a Torah prohibition. This is also the ruling of Rav Dov Leor, the rabbi of Kiryat Arba and Chevron.

The gemara (Berachot 54b, based on Tehillim 107) lists one who recuperates from illness as one of four types of people who must thank Hashem. The manner in which he does this is by reciting Birkat Hagomel before ten people.

Regarding the illness’ extent, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 219:8) says it applies to any reasonable illness, whereas the Rama (ad loc.) says it is only for illnesses where there appears to be real danger (parallel to the parameters for violating Shabbat to treat). Some Ashkenazi poskim accept the former approach, at least when the illness confines one to bed for three days (see Mishna Berura 219:28).

One might suggest that your question depends on these two opinions. Do you need a true life-threatening situation or only one which warrants thanking Hashem when He brings a recovery? However, the sources indicate that even the expansive opinion requires some threat to life, just that it reasons that any significant illness could become life-threatening. If it becomes evident that there was nothing remotely dangerous, no one would require Hagomel. (If one was confined to bed for three days, Sephardim would require a beracha, presumably even if doctors say there was no danger at all- see Yalkut Yosef, OC 219: 22, 27).

This being said, there is great logic to distinguish between the formal beracha of Hagomel, which must meet certain parameters, and the more general inyan (positive element) of making a seudat hoda’ah. The Shulchan Aruch does not mention anywhere a requirement to make such a seuda. Yet, we know that such a practice exists, although apparently on a voluntary basis (as opposed to Hagomel). Some cite the following gemara (Berachot 46a) as evidence. Rav Avahu, upon visiting Rav Zeira when he was sick, stated that if the latter would recover, he would make a feast for the rabbis. Some cite this source as not only a worthwhile thing to do afterward but as a segula (a spiritual facilitator) to help bring about the recovery (see Imrei Shamai, p. 85 in the name of the Ba’al Shem Tov’s disciples). If one, under these circumstances, felt the need to promise such a party, it does not seem right to claim afterward that the self-obligation was not binding because it was based on misinformation.

Even if one did not accept such an obligation prior to recovery, a seudat hoda’ah would still seem appropriate. Even if it turns out that there was no serious illness from which recovery was necessary, there still was good news that a perceived problem disappeared. We shall illustrate with Talmudic precedent. The gemara (Bava Kama 87a) tells of Rav Yosef (who was blind) who said that he would make a feast for the rabbis if he found out that the opinion that a blind man is exempt from mitzvot is incorrect because one who is obligated in mitzvot receives more reward. Here, nothing changed but a happy realization, and yet a celebration was appropriate. Another such source is the historical background behind an early-winter pagan holiday. The gemara (Avoda Zara 8a) says that one was instituted properly by Adam who feared that daylight was disappearing due to his sin until the solstice passed and he saw that the days were naturally getting longer. Despite Adam’s mistake, the celebration was appropriate (until it turned pagan).

The logic behind such thanks appears to be as follows. We are always in danger (see text of Asher Yatzar), just that it is natural not to feel it. However, when we understandably come face to face with the prospect of our mortality, it is a good time to thank Hashem for our continued existence. So, if one wants to make a seudat hoda’ah upon receiving, for example, a negative biopsy result on a suspected malignant growth, he should be encouraged.

It is indeed correct that only the wool from a male or female sheep is forbidden to be woven with flax.

(Rambam, Hilchot Kileim, 10:1; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 298:1)

As we would expect for a debate between learned rabbis, each side has significant basis. Our approach incorporates virtues of each side, hopefully in a balanced manner.

The classical sources on this topic discuss haircutting before davening, which, in many areas of halacha, is equivalent to cutting a beard. Haircutting is a serious issue, actually, especially before Mincha, because one who gets occupied in it may end up not davening (see Shabbat 9b). The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 89:7) says that there was no formal prohibition on haircutting before Shacharit because it is an uncommon occurrence. However, the Eliyah Rabba (ad loc.:12) says that the Shulchan Aruch refers to the time before alot hashachar (some 72 minutes before sunrise). After that time, when davening is nominally viable, it is forbidden because all work is improper before davening. Only regarding the added stringency of not starting haircutting a half hour before the time of davening is Shacharit more lenient than Mincha, not regarding the regular regulations of activities before Shacharit. [See this week’s and last week’s Ein Ayah for Rav Kook’s view of the philosophical side of these halachot.] Although the Eliyah Rabba cites the Kolbo as saying that it is not the type of activity that is forbidden work, he and the Mishna Berura (89:36) accept the strict opinion. Thus, the first opinion you cited certainly has validity.

We must consider, though, that the classical sources dealt with a situation where religious Jewish men were, at least predominantly, bearded. For such people, shaving is a periodic activity, which is seen as a matter of choice at any given time. For many clean-shaven people, daily shaving is a matter of simple hygiene that cannot be pushed off for long. These differences find expression in several areas of halacha, including shaving on Chol Ham’oed, sefira, and the three weeks. Those who are lenient on Chol Hamo’ed, for example, to a great part, based on the halachic approach of Rav Soloveitchik and Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe, OC I, 163), reason that shaving before Yom Tov does not suffice for an entire week as it once did. There are even (disputed or contrary) accounts that Rav Feinstein said that not only may the clean-shaven shave on Chol Hamo’ed  but that it is preferable to do so in honor of the holiday.

Some apply the same logic to shaving in the morning. The halachic concept of hikon likrat Elokecha mandates preparing oneself with a clean body and appropriate clothes for davening (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 91-92). One posek who has written that shaving may be a fulfillment of hikon… is Rav Yosef (Yalkut Yosef 89:32), although he brings it as a legitimate but less preferable stance. Many oral accounts and the practice, especially in segments of society where “needing a shave” has a social stigma and is a physical nuisance, make shaving even a preference.

This being said, it is wrong to make a sweeping rule. Those with beards should normally not shave before Shacharit. Those with slow growing or light beards would do better to shave before going to sleep or after davening and if they need to do so in the morning, should do so after saying Shema and some berachot (see referenced article). Those who need a morning shave to make themselves presentable to daven should feel free to do so before davening. However, if they are running late, it’s hard to justify missing P’sukei D’zimra for it.

The gemara (Yevamot 43b) says that from the beginning of Av until Tisha B’Av, one should lessen his business dealings and his building activities. The gemara does not say specify the type of transaction and building it refers to, nor does it explain what it means to lessen. However, in the context of similar restrictions on fast days called to deal with drought, the gemara (Ta’anit 14b) refers to “building of joy” and gives the example of the house where one’s son will be getting married and living in. The Yerushalmi gives a counter example of a type of building that is permitted: when one’s wall needs support so that it does not cave in. What happens in between these two extremes?

The poskim come to the following basic consensus. If there is fear of collapse, one can do what is needed even for the needs of a joyous building (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 551:2). In general, though, any type of building whose purpose is to enhance and not for necessity should not be done during this time (Mishna Berura 551:12). This would apply to most cases of kitchen renovations, which usually take a functional kitchen and make it more attractive or more convenient. There are opinions (against the simple reading of the classical sources) that this is forbidden even from the beginning of the Three Weeks (which start this year on July 9^th) (Biur Halacha, ad loc.) but one has the right to be lenient on the matter, especially if he already made an agreement with workers.

This brings us to what may be a major point of leniency in this case. Several poskim (including Eliya Rabba 551:3; Mishna Berura 551:12 – based on the Maharil) say that if one hired a non-Jew before the Nine Days to do the work in a manner that he is paid by the job (and not by the hour), the work relates to the non-Jew and may be done during the Nine Days. However, they say that if the worker will accept a small fee to delay the work, the owner should prefer that option. Another case where it is not be required to push off the work during this time is when the delay will cause a significant loss (Mishna Berura 551:13). Some examples include: the work or materials will be more expensive later; given that the work has begun, the interim setup is a difficult one to maintain.

In general, there are three ideas behind refraining from certain types of acquisitions and building during the Nine Days. One is that it is a time when the mazal of Bnei Yisrael is low (which is something you may want to consider). The other is that it is a time when it is inappropriate to do things that are in a category that is considered too happy. There is a third idea, that the entire period of the Three Weeks is a time that is historically tragic and we are, therefore, not supposed to say Shehechiyanu about “hazeman hazeh” (this time) (Shulchan Aruch, OC 551:17). If you plan to make Shehechiyanu on the renovations (which is a good question that is beyond our present scope- see Mishna Berura 223:12), it should not be during this time. This would make it problematic to have the job finished until the middle of the 10^th of Av (see Igrot Moshe, OC III 80). Even if you will not make the beracha, it still is better that the finished product not be ready during the Nine Days, as this is a greater joy than the interim progress on the work. So even if you have little choice but to have the workers do the bulk of the work during the Nine Days, still try to have the entire overall job finished afterward. Work should also not be done on Tisha B’Av itself.

We need to first see if you had a right to break the chain and move the bike, as it impacts on your question also. In general, one may “take the law into his own hands” to remove/prevent damages in a manner that causes the least necessary loss to the damager (Bava Kama 28a; Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 4:1). One may break things that prevent him from getting out (ibid. 412:2). It seems that the accumulated inconvenience and potential danger the bike caused justified doing something. If you exhausted reasonable efforts to find the owner and have him remove the bike, it was proper to break the chain and remove it.

At this point, why should you not have the normal responsibilities of hashavat aveida (which includes preserving the object until the owner is found- see Tosafot, Sukka 25a)? Perhaps you could claim to be exempt because there is no aveida, as the owner presumably knows where the bike is. Indeed, when one leaves his object purposely in a certain place, no one should take it to return it (see Bava Metzia 26b). However, this is not relevant because when the owner left it, the bike was chained up and now it is not. This resembles the case of one who hid an object in a garbage dump that was not slated to be vacated and now it is slated for removal, in which case there is an obligation of hashavat aveida when feasible (ibid. 24a).

However, a different exemption from hashavat aveida seems to apply. The gemara mentions in a few places (including Bava Batra 87b, Bava Metzia 25b) the situation of aveida mida’at (literally, an intentional losing). The common denominator of the cases is that an owner purposely left his object in a situation where its chances of remaining intact and in his possession are poor. In that case, one is not required to do hashavat aveida. The Rambam (Aveida 11:11) derives this from a pasuk (apparently based on a Talmudic source- see Shut Habach 97) that one does hashavat aveida when the object was “lost from him” (Devarim 22:3), as opposed to an intentional loss. The Rambam says that while there is no mitzva of hashavat aveida in this case, the finder may not claim the object. The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 261) says that the finder may take it because we consider the owner to have been mafkir (relinquish rights to) the object. According to the Rambam, there appears to be a rule that one does not have to go to greater efforts to protect someone else’s possession than the owner did (see Netivot Hamishpat 261:1; Even Haezel, Aveida 11:11). Similarly, in our case, when one left his bike in a manner that he should have expected people to eventually exercise their right to cut the chain, he knowingly exposed it to the prospect of being unprotected. Thus, you are not required to take steps to remove the danger he should have anticipated. The Tur probably agrees to this concept, in cases of aveida mida’at where hefker does not apply (see Bava Batra 87b; Netivot Hamishpat 261:1).

In summary, you are probably not required to obtain a chain for the bike you moved, especially if the bike is in a situation where he still has good chances of getting it back. On the other hand, you do not know what caused the owner to leave the bike as he did, and it would be a responsible move and nice gesture to protect it.

We will focus on the limitations on speech only regarding the special factors that relate to kri’at hatorah. Many topics and modes of discussion are forbidden at any time of the tefilla and in fact, in a shul at any time.

The gemara (Sota 39a) says: “Once the sefer Torah is opened, it is forbidden to speak even in matters of halacha.” Two sources from the nevi’im are cited: one focuses on being quiet and one mentions the need to listen. Bglg is not explicitly discussed, and according to several authorities (apparently the Rambam, Tefilla 12:9; Bach, Orach Chayim 146, cited by Magen Avraham 146:3 and others; B’er Sheva, Sota ad loc.) it is permitted to talk then. In fact, in regard to another matter of disgrace to the Torah, walking out in the middle, the gemara (Berachot 8a) says that it is permissible to go out bglg. It is Rabbeinu Yona (Berachot 4a of the Rif’s pages) who says that once the Torah is opened, it is forbidden to talk until the end, including bglg. The Beit Yosef (OC 146:2) explains that the prohibition must be based on our concern that the person will continue talking after the reading continues.

Poskim discuss how broadly to extend this concern. Most permit learning quietly by oneself bglg, where it may be easier to stop and he at least does not disturb others (see Ateret Paz I,3, EH 13). If there is an organized break, such as when someone says divrei Torah to the whole congregation at that time, the problem likely does not exist (Yecheveh Da’at V, 17). Distinctions are also raised regarding the length of the bglg break (Magen Avraham ibid.: Aruch Hashulchan OC 146:3).

Interestingly, the Shulchan Aruch (OC 146:2), while accepting Rabbeinu Yona’s stringency, adopts the Rambam’s timeline for the matter. The gemara and Rabbeinu Yona speak about from the time the Torah is opened; the Shulchan Aruch and Rambam posit that this is only from the time the reading actually begins. (The Ateret Paz tries to explain why it is easier to stop talking before the initial reading than bglg.) One could have explained Rabbeinu Yona's opinion to mean that it is disrespectful to speak during the entire unit of kri’at hatorah, including its breaks, but the Shulchan Aruch explains his ruling on more pragmatic grounds.

This point is important for the following reason. Other than the length of the break for Kaddish (during which one is anyway forbidden to speak) and hagba, there seems to be no difference regarding the chance of continuing talking from the beginning straight through the haftara (the Shulchan Aruch ibid.:3 forbids talking during the haftara). On the other hand, regarding the matter of a unit, there is a big difference. The original takana of leining on Shabbat did not include the haftara or maftir. Along with the institution of the haftara, it was instituted that he who gets the aliya to read from the Navi should read also from the Torah, so as not to equate an aliya for reading Navi alone to that of reading the Torah (Megilla 23a). We even separate between the two sections of Torah reading with Kaddish. Therefore, it makes sense that after the seven aliyot, it is no longer considered bglg. In fact, Rabbeinu Yona himself says that the prohibition is in place until he “finishes the parasha,” which implies after the seventh aliya. (We did not find Acharonim who discuss the matter.)

As hinted, there is logic to say that the Shulchan Aruch might argue. However, since he is trying to comply with Rabbeinu Yona, it makes sense to not extend the stringency to the less stringent section of kri’at hatorah. Considering that we did not find someone who forbids the matter (albeit, we did not find one who permitted it either), we do not feel that one can forbid appropriate speaking before the readings of maftir and the haftara.

 Washing one’s skin is forbidden on Tisha B’Av, including even putting one’s finger in water without justification (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 554:7). When there is justification, such as for the need of a mitzva, it is permissible to wash as much as is necessary (ibid.:8). There are other justifications besides mitzvot, as the gemara (Yoma 77b) says that one whose hands are dirty may wash his hands normally on Yom Kippur (and thus certainly on Tisha B’Av). In explaining this halacha, the Tur (Orach Chayim 554) says that only washing for enjoyment is forbidden.

Thus, there is logic to say that since few people intend to have washing enjoyment from doing dishes, it should be permitted to wash dishes normally. However, there are strong indications that we permit non-enjoyment washing only under circumstances that justify it. For example, the gemara (ibid.), when allowing one to wade through water on Yom Kippur to visit his rabbi (a mitzva), leaves it as an open question whether the rabbi may go to visit his student. We are stringent on the matter (Shulchan Aruch, OC 613:7). One can claim that this is perhaps a more objectively enjoyable form of real bathing, which thus requires a more serious justification. However, even when allowing one to wash the hands for a mitzva need, he is required to wash the minimum area of the hand, not the whole hand as we normally prefer (Shulchan Aruch, OC 554:11). This does not seem to be such a clear objective enjoyment, and thus it seems that there must always be a clear need.

We do find that preparing a meal is a legitimate justification to get one’s hand wet. The gemara (Shabbat 114b) allowed doing keniva of vegetables toward the end of Yom Kippur, so that one will have the presence of mind that he will be ready to eat when the fast ends. The Rashba and Ramban explain that keniva is washing and thus the fact that one’s hands will undoubtedly get wet in the process does not prohibit it. (We do not practice this leniency, but for an unrelated side reason (ibid.; Shulchan Aruch, OC 611:2)). Also, the Magen Avraham (554:11, cited by the Mishna Berura 554:19) says that women who are cooking on Tisha B’Av may wash meat even though their hands will get wet.

On the other hand, getting the hands wet in that context is somewhat of an issue. The Pri Megadim (ad loc.) makes two comments on this Magen Avraham. One is that it is talking about one who needs meat. The Machazeh Eliayhu (87) understands that he was bothered by the fact that it is forbidden to eat meat until the next afternoon. The fact that he must point out that he needs the meat earlier is a sign that it would be forbidden to wash one’s hands while cooking on Tisha B’Av for the next day’s meal. The second point is that one should not use warm water, which is a higher level of enjoyment. The Kaf Hachayim (OC 554:46) takes issue on the second point, at least in cases where warm water is necessary, and it seems logical to be lenient in that case.

The position of avoiding touching water when possible is the topic of the following disagreement. The Beit Yosef (OC 615) and Taz (615:1) say that when a child needs to be washed, a non-Jew should do it, so the Jew can avoid the pleasure of the water. The Magen Avraham (ad loc.:1) and most authorities say it is permitted for a Jew to wash him.

In the final analysis it is proper to wash only those dishes that need to be washed on Tisha B’Av. This can be to avoid flies and odors or to make sure there are as many dishes as are needed for those who need to eat on Tisha B’Av or to break the fast right afterward. In other cases, one should either use rubber gloves or wait until after Tisha B’Av. Also, unless one cannot wait, housekeeping type activities should be done after chatzot (midday), even when issues of washing do not apply (Rama, OC 554:22).

The Talmud (Nidah 17a) states that one should not eat pealed onions which were left overnight even if they were covered because a "ruach ra'ah" (literally: evil spirit) resides upon them.

There are several exceptions to this:

1.       If a little bit of the peel or the where they are connected to the roots was left on (Talmud ibid).

2.       When they are mixed in a salad or a dish (Smak 171).

3.       When salt or oil where placed on them (Kaf Hachaim Yoreh Deah 116, 93).

The Mishna Berura (554, 7) rules that after noon one may say tehillim, as one is saying it more as a prayer then a form of learning. The Chazon Ish is quoted (Orchot Rabeinu vol. 2 page 142) as saying that if one is saying tehillim as prayer for a sick person then one may do so even before noon.

No, tevilla is not necessary for melamine.

Firstly, let us confirm that your assumption is not only correct but is unanimously agreed upon. Indeed the mishna (Rosh Hashana 29a) says that one who is not obligated in the mitzva of shofar is unable to blow on behalf of one who is obligated to fulfill their mitzva, and all agree that women are exempt from the mitzva of shofar because it is a time-linked mitzva (see Kiddushin 29a and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 589:3).

Your question is an excellent one, according to an understanding that many but not all authorities have. You seem to assume that the mitzva is to hear shofar blowing, not to blow the shofar. The Rambam writes in this vein in several places (see Shofar 1:1). The Tur (OC 585) provides two indications that the mitzva is to hear: 1) the language of the beracha is: “… He commanded us to hear the sound of the shofar.” The halacha is that if one blew the shofar into a pit in a manner that he was not able to hear his own blowing, he does not fulfill the mitzva (see Rosh Hashana 28a). According to this approach, your question is logical: if one heard an authentic shofar sound, what difference does it make who produced it?

On the other hand, there are dissenters to this approach to different degrees. The Rosh (Rosh Hashana 4:10) cites Rabbeinu Tam as saying that the mitzva is to blow. He is not bothered by the language of the beracha, as Rabbeinu Tam’s version of the beracha was indeed “… on the blowing of the shofar.” One can explain the need to hear the blowing by saying that while the essence of the mitzva is to blow the shofar, there is also a condition in the mitzva’s fulfillment that one hears it. Another simple question Rabbeinu Tam has to deal with is: if the mitzva is to blow, why don’t we all have to blow? One cannot answer that the ba’al tokeiah is our shaliach (agent) for the fulfillment of the mitzva because if agency was effective, then one could have someone blow for him without even being present to hear the blowing. In fact, the mitzva of shofar is a mitzva shebegufo, a mitzva that one must perform personally, just that we can apply the rule of shomeiah k’oneh (he who hears is like one who recites), which we find in contexts such as the reading of the Megilla. In other words, one who hears the sound of the shofar being blown is like one who produces the sound. Shomeiah k’oneh requires the reciter to be obligated in the mitzva, and thus according to Rabbeinu Tam we understand why a woman cannot blow shofar for a man. In contrast, the Rambam does not need to employ shomeiah k’oneh, as the hearing each person does himself suffices.

Yet your question does not disprove the Rambam’s approach. The mitzva can be to hear the sound, but not any shofer sound, but specifically a ‘mitzva- connected’ sound, which can be produced only by someone who is obligated in the mitzva. It is similar to tefillin. While the mitzva is to wear tefillin, not write them, only one who has the mitzva to wear tefillin can write them. What is very difficult for the Rambam is why the person blowing must have in mind that his blowing can be used by others in order for them fulfill the mitzva (Rosh Hashana 29a). After all, the sound is mitzva-connected because he is using it for his own mitzva or that of his friends, so why doesn’t everyone who hears that mitzva sound with his own correct intentions fulfill the mitzva by hearing it? (The Chazon Ish’s (OC 29:4) answer is beyond our scope).

According to a third approach, the essential mitzva is both blowing and hearing (see Minchat Chinuch #405). Therefore a man who hears from a woman is missing at least one element of the mitzva, being connected to the blowing of one who is obligated in shofar.                                                                                                                                                                                                                         

Once she gets them to the maximum level of cleanliness that she gets them, they can be tovelled. That which one does not bother to ever remove is not a problem of a chatzitza.

For Ashkenazim, that is an accepted leniency. For Sephardim, it is not. Main source - Shulchan Aruch and Rama, Yoreh Deah 113:7.

We presume that you are referring to playing poker in a manner that money is lost and gained and not returned at the end of the game. See the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 370, 1-3) where the Mechaber prohibits gambling completely, while the Remma permits occasional gambling. We should point out that in certain circles, the problem of gambling turning into more than an occasional phenomenon but an increasingly common one within the society of observant Jews. Not only can regular gambling be forbidden when it is a way of life, but it can be a major part in a person losing his sensitivity to respectable behavior in many areas that are important to us as Torah observant Jews. Because it is hard to know when occasional and casual will turn into more, we can only discourage one from playing poker in any forum. When one needs a recreational outlet, modern society provides so many that one should be wise in learning to choose those that are least likely to lead to regrettable modes of behavior down the line.

The laws of orlah, not benefitting from the fruits of a tree during its first three years apply also outside of Israel. However, in cases where there is doubt whether three years have passed, one may be more lenient outside of Israel.

Regarding replanting, if the tree was removed with enough ground attached to it to live for another two weeks without being replanted, one does not need to restart the counting of the three years. If there is doubt regarding this, in Israel one should be stringent while outside of Israel one may be lenient.

The Torah forbids cutting down fruit trees (Devarim 20:19), which is the strictest application of the concept not to be destructive (see Rambam, Melachim 6:8). It is thus not surprising that the gemara and poskim identify “non-destructive” cases where it is permitted to cut down fruit trees.

The gemara grants permission in the following cases: 1. The tree no longer produces a kav (a relatively small amount) of fruit (Bava Kama 91b-92a). 2. It is worth more for wood than for fruit (see Rashi, ad loc.). 3. It is significantly damaging a more valuable tree (see Tosafot). 4. It is damaging someone else’s property (Bava Batra 26a).   

The Rosh (Bava Kama 8:15) learns from the above that one may cut down a tree if needed to use its location, which the Taz (Yoreh Deah 116:6) applies to building a home. Most poskim say this includes expanding a home, at least when the addition is objectively more valuable than the tree (see Chayim Sha’al I:22; Yabia Omer V:12). On the other hand, the gemara tells of an Amora’s son who died because he cut down a fruit tree prematurely, and R. Yehuda Hachasid also warned about it. Therefore, even when it is apparently permitted, some prefer that the work be done by a non-Jew (ibid.) and/or that the tree be transplanted (Chatam Sofer, YD 102).

To what extent can we rely on the Rosh’s thesis that making room for something else is an excuse for cutting down a fruit tree? The Beit Yaakov (140) claims that Tosafot and others disagree with the Rosh. The Meishiv Davar (II:56) adds that it is hard to be certain that after cutting down the tree, the building project will actualize. However, many Acharonim (see Chayim Sha’al I:22; Yabia Omer V, Yoreh Deah 12) strongly reject the Beit Yaakov and adopt the Rosh/Taz leniency.  

How important must the need for the spot be? Although the gemara’s cases (e.g., wood worth more, affecting another tree) are not huge benefits, they relate to situations where the tree’s existence is more directly wasteful. In contrast, in the Rosh’s (and your) case, the tree is fully viable, just that it precludes another future use. It is therefore not surprising that some who accept the Rosh say that the need must be substantial. The She’eilat Yaavetz (I:176) relates to a case where a shul is too small and needs to be extended to an area occupied by fruit trees. The Chavot Yair (195), while allowing cutting down a tree that darkens one’s house, forbids doing so to allow for a place for walking around or increasing space and light. Several Acharonim, including important poskim such as the Aruch Hashulchan (YD 116:13) and Yabia Omer (ibid.) adopt this middle-of-the-road approach.

Appraising the cases you raised is tricky. On one hand, building a swimming pool or a basketball court is expensive, so that one erects one only if it is important to him (see Minchat Asher, Devarim 33), in which case the tree should not prevent it. On the other hand, some poskim (see Yabia Omer ibid.) indicate that the value of the change should be an objective one that applies to the average person. Swimming pools and basketball courts are not likely to qualify in that regard (even if we focus on the positive and permitted uses of those facilities). It is hard to ignore the possibility that one who uses honest but faulty judgment could be punished with death (aforementioned gemara; see also Chatam Sofer YD 102; She’eilat Yaavetz ibid. is more extreme). Another factor is that it might be possible, even if less convenient, to build what is desired without cutting down a fruit tree.

Therefore, we suggest the following. If you are willing to professionally, preferably by a non-Jew, transplant the tree, you may do so. Otherwise, we would have difficulty permitting removing the fruit tree unless we were convinced that the need and the lack of alternative were clear.