Ethical and Procedural Questions for Litigants
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Living The Halachic Process
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part 6
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Rabbi Daniel Mann
Must a potential defendant agree to come to beit din if he knows he is right? Must a defendant be open about parts of the story that might work to his detriment if the plaintiff has no proof of what transpired, or do we say hamotzi meichaveiro alav ha’re’aya (the plaintiff shoulders the burden to prove his case)?
Ostensibly, one who is sure (and is in a position to genuinely know) that he does not owe money is not required to volunteer to go to beit din to prove it to the other side. In certain cases,[1] one may even actively “take the law into his own hand” without resorting to the hassle of adjudication to obtain his rights. Likewise, if one knows he does not owe money, he may make things difficult for the plaintiff with the hope that he will give up and/or agree to a compromise.[2]
However, this makes more sense if the other side is aware of the truth, not if he is sincere but is making a legal or factual mistake. Furthermore, the halacha is different in regard to a response to a beit din that summons the person while operating within its authority. Its instructions must be followed, as we see from the fact that if one does not do so, the halacha is[3] that he is to be put in cherem.[4] Beit din is justified to take this step even though it is possible that the refusing side is actually correct in his merits regarding the case. Although in our days many batei din (including ours) do not resort to charamim, this does not mean that it is acceptable to fail to conform to the instructions of a neutral, authorized (by Halacha) beit din.
A litigant may certainly raise legitimate objections to a summons (e.g., wanting to go to a different beit din;[5] asking for an itemized claim;[6] requesting time to work out a compromise), but he should do so appropriately and follow the beit din’s instructions. A defendant’s claim that he need not come because the plaintiff has no proof is invalid. First of all, only time will tell if the plaintiff actually has sufficient proof. Second, a litigant has the right to make the other side deflect his claims and arguments when interrogated before and by beit din; often, the greatest proof is explicit[7] or even implicit[8] admission, and this may come out when the sides hammer out the claims and accounts. Third, logical claims may convince beit din to employ compromise, including in cases in which one of the sides is halachically required to take an oath, which we no longer administer.[9]
We now move on to proceedings within beit din. If a litigant possesses information that is valuable to the other side, beit din is required to prevail upon him to produce it.[10] He cannot simply say: “You did not prove your case, so you lose.” On the other hand, a litigant should realize that providing self-damaging information or an admission regarding an element of the litigation does not always mean that he will lose the case. In fact, he will sometimes be able to use a migo – i.e., “since I was honest enough to give up a false but potentially winning claim, believe me regarding a different claim without further proof.”[11]
In limited cases, there are opinions that it is permitted to make claims that are not true but are equivalent to the truth.[12] However, the general rule is that litigants must tell everything as it is and let the dayanim decide.[13] It is not valid to rationalize that “since the other side is lying or exaggerating about certain things, I should do the same.” This is all the more so considering that often (based on my experience) litigants who are convinced they are right are really not. (Mistakes can be attributed to a lack of halachic knowledge in often complicated matters and on the natural tendency to see things in a way that advances one’s personal interests.) Thus, one rarely knows when there are righteous ends that might justify certain means. Finally, a warning: Dayanim often uncover or sense a litigant’s attempt to “improve” his claims, which weakens his case rather than strengthens it.
We pray that litigants will cooperatively and truthfully join dayanim in searching for a correct ruling based on an honest process – which is HaShem’s will.
[1]
See complicated halachot in Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 4.
[2]
Tumim 12:5, cited by Pitchei Teshuva, Choshen Mishpat 12:8.
[3]
Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 11:1.
[4]
A "ban," which includes elements of a curse on one who violates it.
[5]
Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 14.
[6]
Shach, Choshen Mishpat 11:1.
[7]
Gittin 40b.
[8]
Including when making mutually exclusive arguments (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 79:1).
[9]
Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 12:2.
[10]
Ibid. 16:3.
[11]
The complicated parameters of this rule are discussed in many places, including Choshen Mishpat 82.
[12]
See Mishpat Aruch 75:1:30-34.
[13]
See Shach, Choshen Mishpat 75:1.