We will begin with a few halachic sources in order to put this serious issue into halachic perspective, and we will then conclude with an important moral message.
The gemara in Bava Metzia[2] sets down the general rule regarding a work agreement that became unfeasible to carry out. If one side is assumed to have been aware of the possibility that the work might be stopped in the middle, whereas the other was not, the side that knew loses (and therefore must pay or does not receive payment, depending on the case) because of his failure to stipulate regarding extenuating circumstances. If the degree of awareness of the two sides was comparable at the time of the agreement, however, the worker cannot demand to be paid. There are different opinions as to whether the worker loses because he has the more difficult legal task of extracting money or because in order for a worker to receive pay even if he will not end up doing the work, he must make such a stipulation in advance.[3] One practical difference between these two explanations is in a case in which the worker was pre-paid.
Another pertinent source[4] discusses a case in which Reuven rented a boat from Shimon to transport wine, and the boat and wine sank midway. Does Reuven have to pay Shimon the boat’s rental fee? There are four different halachic conclusions (Reuven is obligated, he is exempt, they split the money, it depends if Reuven already paid), in four different permutations of the case. The crucial factor is what exactly the legal nature of the agreement was – whether Reuven is entitled to provide other wine for transport and whether Shimon is entitled to provide a different boat.
Finally, we must consider the concept of makat medina (an impediment that affects a broad population). The mishna and gemara[5] state that a field’s sharecropper is entitled to partial relief from his payment obligation if crops are destroyed by a regional infestation. The Maharam Padua[6] explains that in such a case, we cannot say that one of the two sides simply had “bad fortune,” as everyone is suffering. The Maharam Padua and the Rama[7] both apply this concept also to a worker who was prevented from working due to a makat medina, although there are differences between their applications of the concepts.[8] The Mordechai[9] cites the Maharam as ruling that if the government suspends schools, parents must still pay the teachers.
There is great debate[10] regarding if and under what circumstances we accept the Rama’s ruling on this matter. In reference to a situation in which teaching was suspended for weeks due to war, the Chatam Sofer wrote[11] that he found it nearly impossible to determine whether the teachers must be paid according to strict halachic principles, and he urged the various sides to reach compromises.
If a specific case were to come to our doorstep (which would require that both sides present their claims in front of the beit din), we would likely find it difficult to be more certain than the Chatam Sofer was. If the question is general, as yours appears to be, it is even harder to answer, because many fluid factors are not addressed. Among other questions, we would have to explore the following: Is the camp in question in a region in which some such activities are continuing, or are all such activities suspended? Is it possible for the camp to make other arrangements? Was the problem known at the time of payment, and if so, by whom?
One of the great national assets going into and up until the current stage of Operation Tzuk Eitan is a palpable feeling of solidarity. Especially around Tisha B’Av time, we should recall the gemara[12] that says that Jerusalem was destroyed because people were unwilling to go beyond the strict law and give of themselves beyond the letter of the law. In most cases, both parents and camp directors will have legitimate claims. It is our hope that all people involved in such disputes will be willing to offer their fellow Jews a compromise, if not the benefit of the doubt. One of our dayanim likes to tell of an ancestor of his who was sued in beit din for refusing to receive more payment than he thought he deserved for his job. While our beit din has not yet adjudicated such a case, we will happily do so.
In the merit of mutual understanding and concern, may we defeat our enemies and see a geula shleima.