Standing for memorial siren
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Living The Halachic Process
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Part 1
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Rabbi Daniel Mann
I am disturbed by the refusal of some religious Jews to stand for the siren on Yom HaZikaron (Israel Memorial Day). Someone told me that it is forbidden to do so. If true, why doesn’t the rabbinate come out against it? If not, shouldn’t all religious Jews stand?
Those who say that it is forbidden to stand for the minute of silence on Yom HaZikaron claim that it is a problem of chukot hagoyim (following practices of gentile nations), a prohibition that is derived from Vayikra 18:3. Indeed, the practice of standing for the siren was learned from non-Jews. However, we have not found a published, scholarly p’sak that rules that it is forbidden (it is possible that one exists). Furthermore, based on the classical sources on the subject, it is difficult to forbid the practice on halachic grounds, as we will see.
There is an apparent contradiction between two gemarot regarding the parameters of chukot hagoyim. It was once customary for both Jews and non-Jews to burn objects after their king’s death. The gemarot agree that the practice is permitted but give different justifications. Avoda Zara 11a says that the activity does not fall under the category of chuka (singular of chukot) but is an act of chashivuta (showing importance). Sanhedrin 52b says that it is a chuka and is permitted only because there is a pasuk[1] that mentions the practice in a Jewsh context, which allows us to view it as a practice that was learned from Jews, not gentiles.
Tosafot[2] explains that these gemarot are complementary. The chuka discussed in Avoda Zara refers to a practice connected to actual idol worship. In such a case, a preceding Jewish source for the custom is insufficient grounds for leniency. However, says the gemara, the burning after a king’s death was not an idolatrous act and is permitted if there is Jewish precedent. Chuka in Sanhedrin, though, speaks about a non-idolatrous gentile practice, which is permitted if there is a Jewish precedent.
We need to define what constitutes the latter category of chuka, because, if we go to an extreme, many things, such as wearing a suit and tie,[3] would be forbidden. The Maharik[4] explains that practices that are initiated by non-Jews for logical reasons and are not negative in nature are not considered chukot at all. The Rama[5] paskens like the Maharik, as do a predominant majority of poskim,[6] despite the Gra’s[7] protestations.[8]
It is not always simple to apply the rules to contemporary situations. For example, in three responsa, Rav Moshe Feinstein wrestles from different perspectives with the issue of whether elements of the American holiday of Thanksgiving are chukot hagoyim.[9] In our case, however, the Maharik’s requirements are clearly met. Anyone who has experienced standing at the sound of the siren as the whole country together stops everything, silently contemplating the sacrifices and contributions of the fallen kedoshim, knows how effective a remembrance it is. It is, therefore, fully logical and permitted.
So why can’t we all agree? Some within the religious community frown upon almost anything that symbolizes the Israeli government or general society. Although we share many of their complaints, our approach is to be thankful to HaShem and to the people who have sacrificed to enable all the good that comes with our Jewish state. Although it is a chillul HaShem not to stand (especially in public), publicizing the fact that people don’t stand, which applies only to a minority of the religious community, causes even more chillul HaShem. We feel that one most effectively deals with conflicts among our people with love, and not, for example, by yelling, “Shabbos!” For the sake of consistency and a desire to make things better, not worse, we urge that this disagreement be handled with love and understanding, not with mud-slinging.
[1]
Yirmiya 34:5.
[2]
Avoda Zara 11a.
[3]
See Igrot Moshe, Yoreh Deah I, 81, which explains why this is not so.
[4]
#88.
[5]
Yoreh Deah 178:1.
[6]
See Maharam Shick, Yoreh Deah 165, Yabia Omer III, Yoreh Deah 24, and many others.
[7]
Yoreh Deah 178:7.
[8]
See Rav Yehuda Henkin’s article in Techumin IV, in which he tries to prove that the Gra would agree in our case.
[9]
Igrot Moshe, Yoreh Deah IV, 12 deals with the contradiction.