We will focus only on the limitations on speech that relate to kri’at haTorah. Many topics and modes of discussion are forbidden throughout the entire tefilla and, in fact, some of them are off-limits in a shul at any time.
The gemara[1] says: “Once the sefer Torah is opened, it is forbidden to speak even in matters of Halacha.” Two sources from the Navi are cited. One focuses on being quiet,[2] and the other mentions the need to listen.[3] The case of bein gavra l’gavra is not discussed in this gemara explicitly, and, according to several authorities,[4] it is permitted to talk at that time. Indeed, when discussing the situation of someone disgracing the Torah by walking out in the middle of the reading, the gemara[5] says that it is permissible to go out bein gavra l’gavra. It is Rabbeinu Yona[6] who stipulates that once the Torah is opened, it is forbidden to talk until the end of the reading, including bein gavra l’gavra. The Beit Yosef[7] explains that the prohibition is apparently based on our concern that the person will continue talking after the reading resumes.[8]
Poskim discuss how broadly to apply this concern. Most permit learning quietly by oneself bein gavra l’gavra,[9] as it may be easier to stop and because learning does not disturb others.[10] Similarly, if there is an organized break, such as when someone presents divrei Torah to the whole congregation between aliyot, this problem likely does not exist.[11] Some also permit very short statements bein gavra l’gavra.[12]
Interestingly, the Shulchan Aruch,[13] while accepting Rabbeinu Yona’s stringency that one must be silent even when the Torah is not being read, adopts the Rambam’s[14] ruling that the prohibition on talking applies only once the reading begins. The aforementioned gemara and Rabbeinu Yona speak about silence from the time the Torah is opened.[15]
Our analysis of the question of when the prohibition of talking begins and why it was implemented may also impact on the question of whether it extends the entire time until the haftara, during which talking is similarly forbidden.[16] From the perspective of the possibility that one who talks will continue doing so, the prohibition seems to apply from the beginning of the laining straight through the haftara.[17] On the other hand, even if we regard the laining and the haftara as a single unit, there is a big difference between the two with respect to the prohibition. The original takana[18] of laining on Shabbat did not include the haftara or maftir. Along with the institution of the haftara, the Rabbis instituted the requirement that the one who gets the aliya to read from the Navi should read from the Torah first, so as not to equate an aliya for reading from the Navi to that for reading from the Torah.[19] We even separate between the two Torah readings (the parasha and maftir) with Kaddish. Therefore, it makes sense to argue that after the seven aliyot, bein gavra l’gavra is no longer a consideration. In fact, Rabbeinu Yona himself says that the prohibition is in place until he “finishes the parasha,” which implies until after the seventh aliya is concluded.[20]
As alluded to above, there is logic to argue that the Shulchan Aruch might disagree. However, since the extension of the prohibition to bein gavra l’gavra was made in order to comply with Rabbeinu Yona’s stringency, it makes sense to limit the stringency to the main laining, to which he referred. Furthermore, based on halachic logic,[21] one might distinguish between the period before maftir, when the reading from the sefer Torah is still not completed and where the aliya can even count toward the requirement of seven aliyot,[22] and the period after maftir and before the haftara.