We cannot address every pertinent factor or provide full guidelines, but we will use halachic sources and logic to present certain general recommendations. As always, a psychologist must be very careful in his treatments, and in many cases should also consult a well-versed rabbi about the relevant halachic restrictions. In this piece, we will specifically discuss cases of normal parents with shortcomings, not of criminals or sadists.
In addition to honoring one’s parent through performing positive actions (kavod), one is obligated to revere him or her by avoiding certain actions that would be considered appropriate in relationships with others (mora).[1] The gemara[2] states that a son should not disgrace his parent even in a scenario in which the latter throws a significant amount of money into the sea. The gemara seems to assume that according to the opinion (which is accepted as halacha[3]) that honoring parents may be done with the use of the parent’s money, the child’s restraint is required only when the father throws away his own money. However, the Rambam[4] extends the obligation even to a case in which the father discards the son’s money. The Beit Yosef[5] explains that although a son does not have to spend his own money to honor his parent, he must give up all his money before disgracing him.
On the other hand, the Ri[6] maintains that a son is not obligated to let his father cause him financial damage. The Ramah[7] agrees with the Ri that in a case in which the son is able to stop his father before he causes the damage, he may do so even if this will cause the father embarrassment; after the damage is done, however, he cannot scold his father, although he may sue him.
The Shulchan Aruch[8] accepts the Rambam’s application of mora as requiring the son’s self-restraint even in the face of significant loss. The Rama, on the other hand, rules like the opinions that a son may protect his monetary rights. It is not clear how far one is expected to go to avoid suing his parent or whether the Rambam could agree to the possibility of such a suit.[9]
The machloket between the Shulchan Aruch and Rama seems to impact on our case. According to the Shulchan Aruch, a child likely may not stand up for his rights, financial or psychological, by emotionally hurting his parents. According to the Rama, however, if one can sue his father in court, he presumably may accurately criticize his father if necessary to protect his own psychological needs (which are no less important than his monetary rights), even at the expense of upsetting the parent.
Another pertinent discussion is whether one may be directly critical of one’s parent as part of the performing the mitzva of the tochacha (rebuke) for the parent’s improper actions. The gemara[10] instructs a son who sees his father violating the Torah to only carefully hint to him that it is wrong. Yet, certain laws of tochacha are learned from Yonatan’s rebuke of his father, Shaul.[11] Apparently, while tochacha should be given as gently as possible, a child may, and even should, rebuke his parent under certain circumstances and in certain manners.
Does tochacha extend to a parent’s sins against his child? The simple reading of the pasuk regarding tochacha[12] is that if one wrongs you, you should air your grievance rather than harbor hatred, and the Rambam[13] rules in accordance with this reading. Given that a child may rebuke his parent under certain circumstances, a child should be permitted to rebuke his parent for wronging him.
However, the extent to which any person giving rebuke may upset the offender is limited,[14] and it is laudable to let the matter go if the victim can overcome and remove his feelings of enmity by himself.[15] It makes sense that when the offender is a parent, if the victim/child is indeed permitted to say anything, it should be only if there is great need, and even then only with “kid gloves.” On the other hand, although disgracing parents is a particularly severe sin,[16] harboring hatred toward them is also severe.[17] Thus, if needed to fix a greatly strained relationship, it would seem that one may raise certain criticisms, but should do so carefully.
To summarize, it appears that a psychologist may encourage a patient (at least an Ashkenazi one) to appropriately air grievances to his parent. But we need to clarify the guidelines on this sensitive matter as best as we can.
The gemara[18] tells of Rav Assi’s mother, whose mind deteriorated to the point that she viewed her son romantically. Rav Assi ran away so as to sever their relationship. The Rambam[19] rules that while one should try to tend to a parent whose cognition is impaired, if the parent’s behavior is bad enough, the child may leave the parent and instruct others to tend to him. The Ra’avad[20] disagrees because he does not believe there is a viable alternative to the child’s care. The Kesef Mishneh[21] rejects the Ra’avad’s argument, based on the story of Rav Assi.
The Ra’avad seems to understand that the Rambam’s ruling that the son leaves is referring to permission to leave because the task is not doable; the Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and argues that there is no better alternative for the parent. The Radbaz[22] and the Aruch HaShulchan,[23] however, explain that the Rambam’s point is that the child specifically should not be the caregiver. Rather, others can deal more forcefully (which may be necessary), in a manner that a child is forbidden to do. Thus, the child will find someone else to take the necessary actions that the child is not allowed to do. We see, then, that even when a parent’s state demands non-respectful behavior, the child should preferably find someone else to do it. Therefore, in our case, it is best (if it does not undermine the therapeutic process) for someone other than the child (e.g., the psychologist) to raise the grievances with the parent. The parent can then approach the child, and they can focus on ways to improve things.
Another halachic advantage of the psychologist broaching the topic is that it gives the parent an opportunity to be mochel (waive) his honor before discussion with the child ensues. The gemara[24] states that a father’s relinquishing of his rights to kavod is effective. Some authorities[25] maintain that he can only waive his rights to receive honor, but he cannot allow his child to disgrace him. Some equate a parent allowing such disgrace to a parent allowing the child to hit him,[26] whereas others distinguish between the two.[27] In any case, based on the following story recounted in the gemara,[28] it is clear that some level of negative interaction is permitted if the father agrees. The gemara describes that an Amora purposely did something to upset his son in order to test his reaction. The gemara asks how he could have (potentially) caused his son to violate the obligation to honor his father, and the gemara answers that the father waived his honor.[29]
When the psychologist prepares his patient for a conversation with his parent, he should teach him to raise the issues in a way that heals, not creates feuds. Presumably, he should say things like, “I know you love me, but when you act in a certain way, it hurts me.” While even such statements are not pleasant to hear, they likely do not constitute the type of disgraceful behavior for which mechila is not effective according to some opinions.
In summary, a child should be encouraged to complain to his parents about their parenting only when it is truly necessary for the patient’s mental health and/or the parent-child relationship. Even then, it is better for the psychologist to relay some of the harsher criticism instead of the child. The parent’s willful participation in the process, which hopefully will not be overly disgraceful, is helpful not only psychologically but also halachically.